Previewing My Idea Presentation on School Specialty

June 13, 2018 in Equities, Ideas, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Patrick Retzer, Founder, President, and Chief Investment Officer of Retzer Capital Management. The article previews Patrick’s in-depth idea presentation on School Specialty (OTC: SCOO) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

The company that arguably has the widest and most effective moat is the company that has no true, head to head competitor. In addition, that company would ideally have high levels of recurring revenue, a large and growing addressable market with plenty of runway, an excellent, proven management team, be trading at an attractive valuation and have several catalysts in the very near future. That is the essence of School Specialty, Inc., a company that sets itself apart from potential competitors in 3 major ways.

First, SCOO serves, in some manner, over 95% of the school districts and 71% of the schools in the U.S. This is no small task, as it requires the ability to support public school procurement processes (access to legal purchasing vehicles, POs, multi-step approval routing, future dated orders, dedicated “punch-out” procurement sites, ERP integration) and the ability to support complex order processing and fulfillment requirements (orders can be broken down by building, classroom and/or teacher as necessary, while still accommodating centralized invoicing).

Second, SCOO carries over 100,000 SKUs, including supplies, furniture, Science curriculum, instruction and intervention products, student planners and AV Tech. The supplies category alone addresses the needs of the office, art, Phys Ed, basic classroom, science, special needs, early childhood and safety & security. No other company that serves SCOO’s $12 billion addressable market has their depth and breadth of product.

Third, SCOO has strengths in the two most critical issues facing public education today. The horrific school shootings illustrate the need for massive investment in safety equipment and training; $3.0 billion of new funding has been announced thus far in 2018. SCOO’s Safety & Security and Guardian offerings address these needs at a very high and comprehensive level. In this era of unsatisfactory results from all too many public school districts, SCOO’s well received 21st Century Safe School value proposition looks to improve student outcomes by addressing the social, emotional, mental and physical well-being and safety of students on a cohesive and holistic basis. This initiative elevates SCOO from working with teachers and procurement managers on a transactional basis to being more of a partner and engaging with principals, superintendents and school boards on a more comprehensive, inclusive, solutions-based basis.

In my opinion, SCOO’s moat is indeed wide and formidable, but even more impressive is the compelling valuation at which the stock currently trades as well as the significant catalysts that could move the stock higher in the immediate future. Without giving away the whole story, let me just say that SCOO currently trades at 17.3% free cash flow to market cap, 2.4 times 2018 estimated EBITDA to market cap and 5.2 times estimated EBITDA to enterprise value. Regarding near term catalysts, management is in the process of obtaining an uplisting to the NASDAQ which should multiply the investable audience for the stock. At the same time, the stock “overhang” that was present around the $17 share price seems to have been absorbed by the market. After several years of rebuilding the company to be competitive and efficient, operating results look poised to “break out” and accelerate higher. And finally, with the company on the verge of delivering impressive performance, management has begun an effort to actively tell the story. I believe we are likely to see them at investor conferences and perhaps gain research coverage in the very near future.

I last presented SCOO at the Manual of Ideas Best Ideas for 2018 conference about 5 months ago when the stock was at $17.00. At the risk of having you think I can only come up with one idea in a single year, I would argue that at $19.70 SCOO presents an even better opportunity as they have since issued impressive guidance for 2018 and I believe have several imminent catalysts.

Michael Lindsell y Nick Train sobre invertir en Japón

June 13, 2018 in MOI Global en Español, Traducciones

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Recientemente tuvimos el placer de participar en una sesión exclusiva de preguntas y respuestas sobre invertir en Japón con Michael Lindsell y Nick Train de Lindsell Train, una de las principales firmas globales de inversión  y especialistas en Japón. Con sede en Londres, Lindsell Train fue fundada en el 2000 por Michael y Nick y se especializa en la gestión de mandatos de renta variable para clientes institucionales en el Reino Unido, Japón y el mundo.

Lindsell Train, que tenía activos bajo gestión por £3.1 mil millones a finales de septiembre de 2013, sigue siendo mayoritariamente propiedad de Michael y Nick. Michael se ha especializado en la inversión en renta variable japonesa desde el comienzo de su carrera de inversión, que abarca más de treinta años.

The Manual of Ideas: ¿Cuál es la mentalidad correcta del inversor cuando se trata de oportunidades de inversión en Japón?

Michael Lindsell y Nick Train: Consideramos las oportunidades de inversión japonesas exactamente de la misma manera que cualquier otra oportunidad de inversión, ya que buscamos identificar compañías excepcionales. Encontramos una buena selección de tales compañías en Japón.

Pregunta: ¿Qué es diferente de tu mentalidad inversora, o enfoque, después de la recuperación de la Bolsa del año pasado? ¿Sigues viendo valor en Japón y, de ser así, en qué áreas del mercado o tipos de inversiones.

Respuesta: No hemos cambiado nuestro enfoque después del rally; continuamos concentrándonos en invertir en empresas maravillosas a largo plazo. Por supuesto, con algunas medidas de precios fuertes, las valoraciones de varias de nuestras compañías han aumentado, pero en general no en la medida en que estamos tentados a vender.

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Visual Impressions from The Zurich Project 2018

June 12, 2018 in Diary, The Zurich Project

“I learned so much at The Zurich Project. Incredibly grateful to returning and new participants for making it such a wonderful event. Looking forward to sharing highlights in a forthcoming edition of The Manual of Ideas.” –John Mihaljevic, CFA

Here’s to renewing the bonds in 2019!

Previewing My Idea Presentation on Ferrovial

June 12, 2018 in Equities, Europe, Ideas, Mid Cap, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Luis Garcia Alvarez, Equity Portfolio Manager at MAPFRE AM. The article previews Luis’ in-depth idea presentation on Ferrovial (Spain: FER) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

Ferrovial is a multinational infrastructure, services and construction group headquartered in Madrid, Spain. It owns significant stakes in Canada’s 407 ETR toll road (43% equity) and Heathrow airport (25% equity), plus four “managed lane” projects in the United States (of which two are currently operational). The company has a portfolio of mature assets generating predictable cash flows that the construction division deploys to develop new concession projects.

Ferrovial was founded in 1952 by Rafael del Pino y Moreno. Today, the del Pino family still owns a significant stake in the company. Rafael del Pino Calvo-Sotelo, the current Chairman, owns a 20% stake. His sister María del Pino owns an 8% stake and his brother Leopoldo del Pino owns 5%. Unlike other companies exposed to construction, infrastructure and services in Spain during the last decades, Ferrovial followed a conservative approach with respect to financial leverage and possesses a solid balance sheet with net cash at the parent company level.

Ferrovial’s valuation in terms of accounting multiples is distorted by the fact that the assets that contribute the most to the valuation (ETR, LHR) are integrated by the equity method without contribution to sales or EBITDA. The company has also started reporting its accounts proportionally to better reflect its economic and business reality.

During recent quarters, adverse market conditions in the Services activities in the United Kingdom and a lower contribution from projects in Construction, together with a couple of loss-making projects, have compressed the company’s operating margins on the contracting side. Additionally, political uncertainty in Spain has increased investors’ pessimism about Spanish stocks in general.

These factors combined have led to significant weakness in Ferrovial’s share price, which has decreased from EUR20 per share in mid-2017 to approximately EUR17 per share in May 2018. However, we think that this is a case in which investors are simply not focused on the right issues and misunderstand the relative weight of the various segments and geographies in Ferrovial’s valuation.

First, political uncertainty in Spain has very limited impact on the company’s cash-flow generation as the bulk of its operating cash flow currently comes from outside its home country.

Second, although the competitive environment remains tough for the UK Services division, we believe that the worst is likely over. Operating margins should start to recover going forward as the negative impact of the challenging Birmingham project fades away. We further believe that the provisions that the company has already made regarding this project, which we subtract from our valuation, appropriately account for the negative impact. In any case, even if we were wrong regarding this view, our estimated valuation for the entire UK Services division is a minor component of the company’s total equity value, posing limited downside risk.

Finally, the most important asset in terms of equity value for the company – the Canadian 407 ETR toll road (close to 50% of our estimated intrinsic value for Ferrovial) – has continued to report very solid results in recent quarters, generating strong cash flow and outperforming analysts’ estimates on both tariff increases and traffic growth.

It is precisely the exceptional terms and performance of the 407 ETR concession that cause us to consider Ferrovial a Wide-Moat company. The 407 ETR is located in Toronto, Ontario (Canada) and runs parallel to the first city ring road, the 401, one of North America’s most congested highways. Currently, 108 km of the 407 ETR are operational. The concession was awarded to Ferrovial in 1999 as part of a consortium (in which it has a 43% stake) and runs until 2099 (more than 80 years remaining!). In our view, this is one of the best infrastructure assets in the world for the reasons we will explain below.

The 407 ETR is the world’s first all-electronic, barrier-free toll highway, which means the toll system does not require drivers to stop at the entry or exit tollbooths. Instead, it detects the vehicle, calculates the route to be covered and manages billing automatically. Most importantly for Ferrovial, toll charges can be varied freely provided that traffic remains above a certain threshold. This means that drivers pay according to the value (i.e., timesaving) that the highway provides at any given time.

From our point of view, the operative question and main value driver for this motorway (and, hence, for Ferrovial as a whole) is the price sensitivity of demand to changes in tariffs. Logically, increases in tariffs reduce expected traffic volume. However, despite 9% annual growth in tariffs over the past ten years, price elasticity has proven to be low (EBITDA grew 10.5% annually during this period). We see potential for continued low levels of elasticity into the medium term with significant implications for long-term value creation given the concession’s remarkable duration.

Ferrovial has been managing the 407 ETR successfully for almost 20 years. This constitutes, in our view, a key component of the company’s sustainable competitive advantage: proprietary expertise. For two decades the company has tested the elasticity of demand to changes in tariffs, which is the primary driver of cash flow for largely fixed-cost assets like toll roads. Hence, Ferrovial has access to a priceless set of data on how traffic reacts to changes in prices.

Other infrastructure competitors simply do not have comparable data, especially considering the uniqueness of the 407 Toll Road. This creates an advantage for Ferrovial and enables the company to design more compelling and competitive offers when bidding for projects where this information is crucial. For example, Ferrovial’s data capabilities were crucial to its success in winning the four “managed lanes” awards in the United States, projects that represent significant long-term value creation potential for shareholders.

Previewing My Idea Presentation on BlackBerry

June 12, 2018 in Communication Services, Deep Value, Equities, Ideas, Information Technology, Mid Cap, North America, Special Situations, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Rodrigo Lopez Buenrostro, Investment Principal at KUE Capital. The article previews Rodrigo’s in-depth idea presentation on BlackBerry (NYSE: BB) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

“John Chen has completed the transition of BlackBerry from a smartphone company to a software company with about $1 billion in revenue and growing. BlackBerry’s reputation for security for mobile devices, its focus on an integrated internet of things system and its very large patent portfolio stand it in good stead for the future. Its QNX platform has had much success with building autonomous car systems for the major automobile companies, and its Radar for the trucking industry continues to excel.” –Prem Watsa, 2017 Letter to Shareholders of Fairfax Financial Holdings

“Wait, I thought Blackberry didn’t exist anymore…” is a phrase I have heard quite often the past few months. I don’t blame these people as BB isn’t the smartphone manufacturer that many people in the world used to know. Today, BB’s largest clients are government, banks, insurance companies, hospitals and large automotive OEMs. In fact, many of these clients have remained Blackberry clients since the company’s start back in the 1990s thanks to the company’s strong legacy on secure communications.

Blackberry is a software security company. It focuses on mobile, security, and automotive software, catering to the enterprise. Blackberry’s value add includes securing and managing endpoints in the Internet of Things. At the beginning of 2017, new CEO John Chen announced their withdrawal from the hardware business which he claims to be “commoditized and saturated”.

As of the latest filing, more than 80% of revenues are software and services and this is expected to be 100% in the next couple of quarters as they continue to exit the hardware market. 75% of this revenue is recurring and requires limited CAPEX/WC to continue to grow. Current gross margins stand at 72% and are expected to increase toward the 80-85% range in the next couple of years.

As with any software business, R&D is BB’s most important expense. The company spends 20-25% of revenues on R&D or $230-250M per year. Although this investment is dwarfed by the large tech firms who spend billions on developing new products, BB has been able to win market share in the cybersecurity segment. Why? Because BB has a unique patent portfolio that allows it to compete despite smaller investment in R&D. These patents have positioned BB as the to-go cybersecurity company in the world for high-profile clients such as 9/10 of the largest commercial banks and insurance companies, 8/10 of the largest healthcare and aerospace/defense companies, and all of the G7 governments. Blackberry is the only company that has the ISO 26262 certification, which is the international standard for functional safety in electronic systems in automobiles, as well as the patents that allow Blackberry to be the sole user of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), essentially the most secure and efficient cryptography for the near future.

Given that the patents provide the wide moat for BB, we can get a sense of their market value with previous software acquisitions and the bid to buy the whole company from a renowned value investor. First, previous acquisitions provide a reference value of $116K EV/patent. Assuming no premium for Blackberry’s unique patents, this values BB at $10.9 per share or a downside of ~9%. Second, Prem Watsa from Fairfax Financial offered to buy the whole company for $9 per share back in 2013. If I bring Watsa’s offer to 2018 numbers after adding invested capital and current net cash, he would be willing to buy BB for $11-12 per share, like the current market price.

That covers the downside as is tradition at Kue Capital. What about the upside? The two main drivers for Blackberry’s business going forward are QNX (secure automotive software platform) and EMM (enterprise communications security service). Assuming conservatively that BB grows parallel to the overall cybersecurity industry and takes advantage of the operating leverage inherent in this great business this company could be valued at $25-27 in 5 years or $15 per share today providing an attractive risk-reward relative to the value of its patents.

Blackberry is an opportunity to invest in a tarnished yet legacy brand, in a formerly mismanaged company that boasts the right team today, in a company that used to manufacture smartphones but today sells cybersecurity solutions to large-ticket clients, and finally, in a portfolio of solid patents that provide the foundation for growth in the enterprise of things.

Valentum sobre IPCO y BPI

June 11, 2018 in Ideas de inversión, MOI Global en Español

NOTA DEL EDITOR: Estas idea de inversión presentadas por Luis de Blas y Jesús Domínguez, son obtenidas de la carta a los inversores  de Valentum FI , correspondiente a abril de 2018.

* * *

IPCO: Es una compañía de extracción de petróleo con pozos en Malasia, Francia, Holanda y Canadá. IPCO es una escisión de Lundin Petroleum [LUPE] y gran parte del equipo directivo de Lundin se ha quedado en IPCO y la familia Lundin en el accionariado (37%). La razón de la escisión es porque los pozos de IPCO no son muy relevantes por tamaño dentro de la estructura de Lundin, pero de forma independiente se centrarán más en la inversión y eficiencias de estos activos, pudiendo extraer más valor. La vida de los activos no es muy larga (Europa unos 12 años, Malasia 4 y Canadá en torno a 11), pero esas son unas cifras conservadoras que son fácilmente ampliables con algo de inversión (no excesiva), especialmente en Malasia donde hay mucha extensión por explorar y las perforaciones se hacen con inversiones muy modestas para los retornos que se obtienen. Cuando IPCO salió a cotizar aún no tenía el campo de Canadá que adquirió posteriormente de forma oportunista a un precio muy atractivo. Este campo tiene unos costes de extracción bajísimos (menos de 10$) y amplias posibilidades de ampliación. Recientemente actualizaron su NAV incluyendo Canadá aumentando de US$4,8/acc. a US$9,1/acc. pero el mercado no ha reaccionado en exceso y el valor sigue cotizando a en SEK42/acc., equivalentes a US$4.8/acc.

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Moats of Discipline, Moats of Control: Investing Beyond The Castle

June 9, 2018 in Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Jonathan Isaac, President and Portfolio Manager of Quilt Investment Management. Jonathan is an instructor at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

In observing institutions such as schools, factories, hospitals, the army, and prisons, the twentieth-century French philosopher Michel Foucault became fascinated by disciplinary relationships — the relationships that produced subjects and exercised power. (1) Years later, these relationships expanded beyond institutions towards the production of corporate structural advantages in public spaces, shopping spaces, and eventually even the home. This “mechanism of normalization” is how so many of today’s consumers develop their own personal brand, and how they prioritize a certain product or service in a certain space or in certain conditions. (2) These site-specific encounters, where a product or service and an instance come together in a feedback loop, are what we might call “disciplinary moats.” (3)

With Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, we can see the origins of disciplinary moats as the metastasized product of procedures that emerged in an institutional context hundreds of years ago, before eventually spreading throughout society. (4) Foucault’s disciplinary societies reached their peak at the beginning of the twentieth century and their successor, which the philosopher Gilles Deleuze called the “societies of control,” saw their emergence gain momentum after World War II. (5) In today’s globalized world, both disciplinary societies and societies of control coexist, generating and regenerating moats. (6) What we will describe as control moats are structural advantages that maintain themselves or grow as environments and scenarios change, rather than being suctioned to the discipline of a spatial relationship in order to maintain returns on invested capital or pricing power.

In this article I will take the reader from a description of disciplinary moats and their individual distinctions, through disciplinary moats in holding company form, to control moats. The reader will see how moats shift, from the discipline of a consumer’s repeated action producing a known end, towards the “perpetual training” and “continuous control” of a consumer without other options or even a known end. (7) This may be where we are today, in a feedback loop or endless marathon of consumption—or we may already be embedded in new types of moats.

I

Disciplinary moats are those that operate through routine and repetition; they are site-specific, occurring within the bounds of a relationship. Their livelihood is their ability to discipline the flows and the relationships created by the environment. It doesn’t matter how seemingly wide or deep the moat is around the castle if the community decides it doesn’t need castles anymore, or if the environment’s proclivity towards shifts and tectonic movements impacts the viability of the moat’s particular seal of normativity.

Much of the discourse on moats ends here, with the closed system of the castle and its capacities. Through analytical techniques, the investor can declare that a moat exists; through an understanding of the scenography producing the business relationships, and the business itself, the investor can declare that a castle exists. One may even look into the future and see capacities for reinvestment, capital allocation, or a positive outlook considering the environment. This is the discourse of structural stability: the capacity of a closed system to reproduce relationships, events, and self-similarity from within its conditions of possibility, a posteriori.

But sometimes even the most structurally stable systems may overlook the Trojan horse of shifting business landscapes. By focusing on a company’s research and development efforts as a way to gain an advantage in business, Philip Fisher chose an expansive style of investing over the repetitious and eventually decadent mechanics of disciplinary moats. (8) Fisher could see the beginnings of something beyond post-war, halcyon notions of stability. For Fisher’s generation, the television’s capacity to encompass new demands within its reach was the beauty of the TV dinner, an intermediary object in the transformation of disciplinary spaces into control spaces. What else would the population do, at that time of day, than eat in front of the television and kill two birds with one stone?

Epochal shifts occur in these subliminal ways when those engaged in sedentary processes are forced to encounter new situations. The modality shifts, creating new demands and making indispensable demands seem incorrigible, parochial, and out-of-step. For the castle, willful blindness is rarely an economic solution. While the reasons for the fatal attack on the castle are obvious in retrospect, how the structure interacts with environmental variability may have a predictive value. In other words, by focusing on structural stability and its apparatus of reproduction within a closed system, we miss not only the fissures that may lead to the castle’s fall, but also a thorough understanding of the value of interoperability.

II

Alexander Galloway discusses the shift from Foucault’s disciplinary societies to Deleuze’s control societies in his essay “Computers and the Superfold.” Galloway declares that disciplinary functions are heterogeneous but “happen to interoperate because they have managed… to ‘grow’ the necessary sockets that fit into each other.” (9) The interoperability of disciplinary moats can benefit on paper the holding company owning multiple castles but not the structural advantages of each castle. The ability of disciplinary moats to link-up can create scale advantages: under one corporate roof, general and administrative, marketing costs, and other synergies can occur, as disciplinary holding companies piece together heterogeneous castles into wider arrays which, despite their number, still cannot control environmental variability.

The ability to connect castles is a largely spurious operation, capable of benefits that may deteriorate as the scale benefits—in addition to any financial engineering—divert attention from structural fissures. My leap of judgment from Galloway’s text is thinking of interoperability for control societies as a structure inherited in form but modified in function from disciplinary societies. With control moats, interoperability becomes less of a connective tissue between numerous site-specific functions, and more of a membrane through which life passes.

III

What happens to a product or service if the relationships that produce routine and repetition are modified? Can the product or service surf into other flows and still maintain its historical returns on invested capital? (10) Think, for instance, of the differences in interoperability between a substance built for a very specific use, unable to correspond with other forms and uses, versus a substance which does a general task very well and can be used from low-tech to high-tech applications in a wide variety of industries, without the site-specificity of customer or industry concentration. For the latter, a shifting environment may be an opportunity, while for the former it is often a death sentence.

Control moats have the capacity for continued relevance even when their conditions of possibility shift; they are resonant and experimental, while disciplinary moats are dogmatic and preset. Disciplinary moats are parts of a larger environment, without the ability to control variation but only to implore the subsistence of someone else’s action, while control moats take environmental variability with stride and rely more upon interpolation than repetition.

While disciplinary moats concentrate on the castle and its defense as a way to create preferable events again and again, like a video looped on auto-play that eventually disintegrates, control moats are oftentimes overheard saying, “Is the castle really the highest and best-use for that land?” Control moats figured out that encompassing only part of the environment is generally less durable and predictable in the face of variability than composing the entire environment, including the territory and processes outside of the castle’s walls. While disciplinary moats maintain the rigidity of warfare and alignment, control moats are comfortable leaving their military stripes behind when they leave the castle, if only to blend in.

Control moats, at their limit, have seamless interoperability. They are the epidemiology that evaded our grasp for too long, and now underlines reality; they are the membrane, the checkpoint through which we travel with each step or cognitive leap. (11) And so some companies today attempt to compose entire environments as a way to control the consumer and create further network effects and switching costs. While this semiotic leadership is a remnant from disciplinary moats, it is not so much about the consumer’s discipline in making this a control moat. It is about there being no other option.

Endnotes

(1) Regarding disciplinary societies, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Second Vintage Books ed. (New York: Second Vintage Books, 1995), particularly the section, “Discipline” (135-228).

(2) Foucault sums up disciplinary power as that which “normalizes” (183). Discussing the relevancy of normalization in modern society, Foucault declares, “Is this [the norm] the new law of modern society?” (184). Furthermore, Foucault says, “At present, the problem lies… in the steep rise in the use of these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging powers which, through the proliferation of new disciplines, they bring with them” (306, emphasis mine). We can presume that disciplinary moats, as a new discipline, include mechanisms of normalization.

(3) While the concept of the “moat” originates with Warren Buffett (see the 1986 Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letter), others such as Tom Russo, Connor Leonard, and Pat Dorsey have offered generally interesting developments of Buffett’s original theme.

(4) Foucault discusses how discipline became “deinstitutionalized” before its procedures spread throughout the society (211-212).

(5) Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October, vol. 59 (Winter, 1992): 3-7, 1 (hereafter referred to as PSC). Regarding the societies of control, see also Gilles Deleuze, “Having an Idea in Cinema [On the Cinema of Straub-Huillet],” Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller (eds.), Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1998: 14-19 (hereafter referred to as HIC).

(6) As Deleuze discusses in HIC (17-18), the movement from disciplinary to control societies is not a clean break.

(7) Speaking of the shift from disciplinary societies to control societies, Deleuze explains in PSC: “Perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control… replace(s) the examination… In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished with anything—the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation…” (5).

(8) Philip Fisher, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits and Other Writings (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ed. Canada: 1996). Fisher’s discussions of research and development capacities and scientific/technical talent as paths towards survival remain eerily relevant in today’s world. In speaking about the subject matter, Fisher uses language such as “scientific manpower,” “frontiers of scientific technology,” and “leading technological edge” (30, 64, 230). “Outstanding research and technical effort” is part of Fisher’s first dimension (157-158). In Fisher’s second dimension, he lambasts corporate rigidity: “The company that is rigid in its actions and is not constantly challenging itself has only one way to go, and that way is down” (165). A zealot of self-similarity and repetition Philip Fisher was not.

(9) Alexander Galloway, “Computers and the Superfold,” Deleuze Studies 6.4 (2012): 513-528. Galloway defines the analogue, the language of disciplinary societies (517-518), as “[working through] modularity… What this means is that different elements, remaining relatively whole and heterogeneous to each other, are nevertheless able to interoperate immediately… In the analogue paradigm, the stuff of the world remains unaligned, idiosyncratic, singular… They only happen to interoperate because they have managed, by virtue of what Deleuze would call mutual deterritorialisation, to ‘grow’ the necessary sockets that fit into each other” (519-520).

(10) As Deleuze says in PSC, “The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network. Everywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports” (5-6, author’s emphasis retained).

(11) According to Galloway, “[The French word contrôle] means control as in the power to influence people and things, but it also refers to the actual administration of control via particular monitoring apparatuses, such as train turnstiles, border crossings and check points” (522).

Disclaimer

This is not a research report. Investments can lose money. Investments involve risk and unless otherwise stated, are not guaranteed. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. This essay is not intended to provide investment, tax, or legal advice. Be sure to first consult with a qualified financial adviser and/or tax professional or other relevant professionals before implementing any strategy. Quilt Investment Management, LLC (“QIML”) may only transact business in those states in which it is registered, or qualifies for an exemption or exclusion from registration requirements. This essay and its publication on the internet should not be construed by any consumer and/or prospective client as QIML’s solicitation to effect transactions in securities, or the rendering of personalized investment advice for compensation over the internet. QIML does not make any representations or warranties as to the accuracy, completeness, or relevance of any interpretations or writings in this essay. We disclaim any liability for actions stemming from the utilization of any of these ideas, as written or in other forms.

“Invertir tiene mucho que ver con conocerse a uno mismo”

June 6, 2018 in Entrevistas exclusivas, MOI Global en Español

Después de cuatro años de la última entrevista con Fernando del Pino, nuevamente tuvimos la oportunidad de entrevistarlo. En esta entrevista, Fernando nos cuenta que debemos invertir mediante nuestros propios criterios, deseos, etc.; además, comparte algunas lecturas interesantes y reflexiones para gestores emergentes.

MOI Global en Español: En la entrevista anterior, comentó que invierte en activos baratos globales. ¿Tiene algún sesgo en específico a ciertos sectores y/o industrias?

Fernando del Pino: Nuestro estilo de inversión es algo ecléctico: no nos ponemos límites en términos de ubicación geográfica (excluyendo mercados exóticos donde no me siento cómodo), capitalización bursátil (mientras exista un mínimo de liquidez), calidad empresarial, industria o moneda. Buscamos situaciones asimétricas de riesgo-rentabilidad en las que el potencial alcista sea mucho mayor que el riesgo a la baja, definiendo riesgo como pérdida permanente de capital (esto es, pérdida de dinero sin esperanza de recuperación), a la vez que tratamos de evitar balances sobrecargados de deuda.

¿De dónde proviene el rendimiento de las inversiones, los beneficios? Schopenhauer, el filósofo alemán, diferenciaba lo que un hombre es (su personalidad, su salud, su fuerza, su carácter moral, su inteligencia y su educación), de lo que un hombre tiene (sus propiedades y posesiones de todo tipo) y de lo que un hombre es a los ojos de sus semejantes (mostrado por la opinión que tienen de él, que se manifiesta por el honor en el que se le tiene, y por su rango y reputación). Por cierto, el filósofo llegó a la conclusión de que la felicidad se encuentra, en gran medida, sólo en lo que un hombre realmente es, y se mostró sorprendido de que «la gente en las posiciones más altas de la vida, con toda su brillantez, pompa, despliegue, magnificencia y espectáculo» pensara que la clave estaba en «lo que yace en la mente de los demás» —llámese su amada imagen o reputación, un campo minado lleno de hipocresía, dependencia y falsedad—, así que cuando alguien dé una importancia exagerada a la reputación, estén alerta.

Pues bien, en el caso de unas acciones, hay dos factores en lugar de tres: lo que realmente son (sus activos, las características del negocio, su posición competitiva y sus perspectivas generales, lo que se llama calidad) y lo que son a los ojos del mercado (su precio de mercado, lo que se llama cantidad, la “máquina de votación del mercado” de Graham, que mide su popularidad actual). La «felicidad» (la alta rentabilidad) proviene de la combinación de ambas con una preponderancia del factor de valoración. Definir y acertar con la calidad es más difícil y está más sujeto a la incertidumbre y, por lo tanto, es un factor menos fiable que depender de la valoración, donde la naturaleza humana —que nunca cambiará—, proyecta hasta el infinito los acontecimientos recientes y llega a extremos de excitación y desesperación.

Por tanto, mi primera observación sería que comprar barato sigue siendo el factor clave de una inversión exitosa. Hay que puntualizar que los negocios e industrias atractivas no siempre implican que sean rentables en Bolsa mientras que, en ocasiones, negocios poco atractivos pueden ofrecer estupendos resultados de inversión. Incluso cuando el crecimiento del negocio es negativo, si las acciones se compran suficientemente baratas pueden convertirse en una inversión rentable. Sorprendentemente esto parece anatema hoy día en determinados círculos. Al mismo tiempo, uno debería hacer todo lo posible para que el enfoque en la calidad no se le vuelva en contra con cambios permanentes en las características y posición competitiva de los negocios y en las tendencias de las industrias que puedan erosionar de forma significativa su rentabilidad histórica. En cualquier caso, uno debe apoyarse en una valoración baja para compensar errores de juicio por el lado cualitativo. Pero insisto, así es como invertimos nosotros. Otros inversores siguen otros caminos y logran resultados excelentes.

Es muy importante invertir en consonancia con nuestra personalidad, nuestras necesidades y nuestras metas en la vida. Se podría decir que invertir es elegir entre sufrimientos puesto que, a la hora de invertir, el sufrimiento está presente por todas partes: el sufrimiento causado por una pérdida temporal o permanente de capital, el sufrimiento de ganar menos que el de al lado, el sufrimiento de arrepentirse por no haber invertido en lo que después resulta ser una inversión sensacional, el sufrimiento de calibrar incorrectamente la posición (esto es, haber invertido demasiado si resulta ser un error, demasiado poco si resulta beneficioso), etc. En otras palabras, invertir tiene mucho que ver con conocerse a uno mismo.

En segundo lugar, quiero enfatizar que nunca se puede hablar de valoración sin mencionar la rentabilidad que se espera obtener si invertimos a dicho valor. Por lo tanto, si alguien dice que un negocio determinado vale X, tendría que especificar qué rentabilidad podemos esperar si compramos acciones a X. La valoración sin la TIR esperada es un concepto cojo. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los inversores se olvidan de dar esta información.

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