The Biggest Question of Them All: Why Now?

May 18, 2018 in Diary, Letters

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor and Zurich Project participant Bogumil Baranowski, co-founder and partner of Sicart Associates, a New York-based investment advisory firm serving families and entrepreneurs.

Bogumil discussed his book, Outsmarting the Crowd, on The Zurich Project Podcast.

When John asked me about my takeaways from Berkshire Hathaway’s meeting, my first thought was that I usually care more about what I didn’t hear rather than about what I heard. Somehow that quality has helped me tremendously in my equity research all these years.

I’m the biggest fan of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger, no question about it. I don’t think there is anyone who can put the complexity of the financial and economic world in simpler terms – I doubt they will ever stop to impress me. I also credit them both for my career choice of being a lifelong stock picker aspiring to wisely compound capital over the next hundred years, but I do have a big, glaring question that remains unanswered.

The big question I have is – why now? — and it pertains to the recent high profile, even bigger acquisition of Apple shares at an all-time high. Apple’s success has been no secret to hundreds of millions of consumers, and possibly most stock investors, I even used it as a familiar brand example in my recent TEDx Talk, but the timing of Berkshire’s Apple purchase is what leaves me wondering.

Whenever I look at a new idea or someone recommends an investment to me, the first question I always ask myself and others is – why now? In my mind, if there is no good answer, there is no investment case. Any security I don’t have to buy today — I can buy another time, any security I haven’t bought — I don’t mind waiting to see a better price. As investors with very long-term investment horizon guiding multi-generational families with their wealth growth and preservation, the one thing we have is — time.

Berkshire Hathaway was built to last for generations, and they too have time, and as patient, long-term value contrarian investor, I would have the hardest time to convince myself to buy even a wonderful company at an all-time high.

Again, why now is the question that is on my mind.

Is it just me?

Disclaimer: This article is not intended to be a client‐specific suitability analysis or recommendation, an offer to participate in any investment, or a recommendation to buy, hold or sell securities. Do not use this report as the sole basis for investment decisions. Do not select an asset class or investment product based on performance alone. Consider all relevant information, including your existing portfolio, investment objectives, risk tolerance, liquidity needs and investment time horizon. This report is for general informational purposes only and is not intended to predict or guarantee the future performance of any individual security, market sector or the markets generally.

Deserving Success

May 18, 2018 in Commentary, Featured, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018 Featured

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor and Zurich Project participant Michael Lee, managing member of Hypotenuse Capital, based in North Hollywood, California.

What makes an investment successful? 

There are many factors that can drive the price of a stock higher.  Sometimes the fundamentals of the underlying business improve and earnings grow; with such cash flow growth a proportionate increase in valuation is rational.  At other times the price of a stock may go up simply because the market grows more enthusiastic or positive about the company.  Such shifts in sentiment can drive large swings in the price the market is willing to pay for a company even if the underlying earnings of the company do not change materially.  Although it is possible to analyze historical market sentiment patterns, it is nonetheless very difficult to predict with any accuracy when and by how much sentiment will vary. 

On the other hand, a company’s ability to successfully grow its earnings should be eminently analyzable and, in some cases, foreseeable.

How can we know what businesses will be successful before the fact? This is quite literally the million dollar question. Although we can’t turn back the clock and invest retroactively, we can study the past to search for clues as to what characteristics will lead to a company’s future success and prosperity. One case study that comes to mind is GEICO.

The Flame that Still Burns [1]

“GEICO, the company that set my heart afire 66 years ago (and for which the flame still burns).” —Warren Buffett, Berkshire Shareholder Letter, 2016

In his [2017] annual letter, The Oracle of Omaha reminisces about a car insurance company as if it were a hot crush from his adolescence. While it’s not unusual for Warren to wax effusively about a company he admires, his adulation for GEICO goes a step beyond, almost into the realm of romantic poetry. And there is good reason; GEICO, indeed, was like his first love. He first set eyes on the company at the tender age of 20 while studying under Ben Graham at Columbia Business School.

So immediate was his infatuation, he soon hopped on a train to Washington D.C. on a winter Saturday and presented himself, unannounced, at the front door of the company’s downtown headquarters which was closed for the weekend. Like a star-crossed Romeo, he pined away below the balcony and pounded on the locked front door until a confused custodian finally answered his calls and granted him entry to the chambers within. There he met Lorimer Davidson, who would later become GEICO’s CEO, and then the courtship began in earnest.

So hot was Warren’s passion for GEICO that, upon returning home to Omaha after graduating from Columbia, he penned a public letter of his affection, entitled “The Security I Like Best”, which he published in a leading financial periodical. Apparently, Buffett had no problem with long-distance relationships or public displays of affection. He pitched the shares to anyone who would listen and bought a substantial position for his own account over the course of 1951; according to his own records, at the end of that year he held 350 shares accumulated at a cost of $10,282.

As with so many young romances, Warren’s initial affair with GEICO was short-lived. He sold the shares in 1952 for handsome proceeds of $15,259 or a 50% gain over his cost. While the profits of this early episode with GEICO were objectively material, Warren himself acknowledges his misdeed here:

“This act of infidelity can partially be excused by the fact that Western [the interloper that seduced Buffet into dumping GEICO] was selling for slightly more than one times its current earnings, a P/E ratio that for some reason caught my eye. But in the next 20 years, the GEICO stock I sold grew in value to about $1.3 million, which taught me a lesson about the inadvisability of selling a stake in an identifiably-wonderful company.”

Warren is understandably harsh on himself for his “infidelity” in this fling as his choice cost him dearly. All was not lost in the relationship though as the two would come together again a quarter of a century later in 1976 when GEICO found itself lost in a quagmire of underwriting losses and teetering towards insolvency. Buffett’s friend, Kay Graham of the Washington Post, arranged a reunion of sorts between Buffett and newly-appointed GEICO CEO, Jack Byrne, at her Georgetown home. The tryst rekindled the flame and Buffett was once again buying shares of GEICO the very next morning. Soon Berkshire Hathaway would own over a third of GEICO’s shares.

A decade later in 1987, Buffett informed his shareholders that GEICO, amongst others, should be considered a “permanent” holding; in other words, “‘til death do we part.” Finally, in 1995, Buffett committed himself wholly to the relationship and Berkshire Hathaway bought out the remaining shares of GEICO that it did not already hold.

What was it exactly that made the Oracle of Omaha fall so hard for an insurance company? It is one thing for someone to fall for a first love at a young age but to be so adoring of a single company almost 70 years later is a truly unique kind of affection.

The Key to Success

At the core of Buffett’s adulation for GEICO is its simple ability to deliver a product to its customers at a substantially lower cost than its competitors. As Buffett explains in his shareholder letters:

“When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed.” [The emphasis is Buffett’s own.]

GEICO has a distinguishing feature which sets it apart from the rest of the industry: it sells directly to customers. By avoiding the cost of supporting a network of independent commission-carrying sales agents, GEICO has a considerably more efficient operation than other insurers. In fact, GEICO’s expense-to-premiums written ratio is approximately 15%, versus 25% for the average auto insurance carrier. This significant cost advantage allows GEICO to price its product at a level that almost no other competitor can profitably sustain. As Buffett explained in 1976:

“I always have been attracted to the low-cost operator in any business and, when you can find a combination of (i) an extremely large business, (ii) a more or less homogenous product, and (iii) a very large gap in operating costs between the low-cost operator and all of the other companies in the industry, you have a really attractive investment situation.”

I will note that although GEICO is an industry leader when it comes to cost, the company doesn’t just skimp on quality. According to insure.com, GEICO receives customer satisfaction ratings of 94 and 89 for claims experience and customer service, respectively. 87% of reviewers would recommend GEICO to a friend. GEICO’s product is not only low cost but also high quality.

Deviant Behavior

Of course, the relationship between price and quality has always been a useful framework for people looking to buy something.  This is why websites like Yelp, TripAdvisor and Amazon are so popular: it’s extraordinarily useful to know the quality of a product or service prior to purchase. And generally, one expects that as a product’s quality increases, so too does its price. Thus, if one were to plot a two-dimensional chart with quality on the x-axis and price on the y-axis, one would expect that a line representing a given product’s expected price would be upwardly sloping to the right as quality increases.

Now, an inherent tension exists in that a typical business that is trying to maximize profits in the short-term is incentivized to raise prices but lower costs.  Of course, it is difficult to cut costs without sacrificing quality. Hence many firms tend to migrate towards the upper left-hand quadrant of the chart (low quality, high price). This is a rational decision for any firm trying to maximize profits in the short-term but it creates challenges over the long-run since no one likes to pay a lot of money for a shoddy product.

On the other hand, there are companies that pride themselves upon crafting extraordinarily high-quality products and will charge exorbitant prices for them (think of luxury goods makers like Hermès). Economists and business school professors might argue that this is the mark of a successful firm: significant pricing power and the ability to realize above average profit margins and returns on investment.

It is entirely understandable and common for firms to move up the price dimension of our chart; conversely, firms that try to move down the price dimensions are rare, and even more unusual are the firms that do so while also moving to the right on the quality dimension. Such companies are “deviants” in a competitive world typically obsessed with expanding profit margins. Yet this is the domain where GEICO operates and it is a fundamental driver of why the company has been so successful.

This commitment to providing a high-quality product at a bargain price is an unusual ethos but one that drives a decidedly virtuous cycle. Customers who buy a high-quality product at a low price delight at their fortune of getting a good bargain. They return as repeat customers and recommend the product to their friends. As such a company grows and benefits from economies of scale; the deviant can continue to offer even lower prices and even better service, thus allowing it to capture even more market share.

This ability to march down and to the right on the cost-quality curve creates an ever-widening and durable moat which competitors cannot cross. Deviants make their money not by squeezing every last penny of margin out of any given customer and supplier, but by operating at extraordinarily low margins where the competition cannot follow.  The scale benefits rewarded to deviants by happy customers make it still harder for competitors to retrace a deviant’s footsteps.  Deviants may sacrifice profits on an individual unit basis but make up for it in sheer volume.

Today, GEICO is a powerhouse within the insurance industry. GEICO is the second largest auto insurer in the nation with 12% market share, which is up from 2.5% when Berkshire took control of it in 1995. GEICO is creeping up on the country’s leading auto insurer, State Farm, which has about 18% share. GEICO wrote $26 billion in premiums in 2016 up from $21 billion just two years prior.

GEICO provides a hoard of cash for Buffett to invest in the form of its $17 billion float while also operating at an underwriting profit. GEICO’s continually increasing success is undeniable and very much “deserved.”

There are other examples of deviant low-cost high-quality ethos companies who have earned dramatic success. Consider Costco, which by rule will never markup merchandise more than 14% above cost and earns less than a 1% pretax operating margin on its retail sales, even on “luxury” items like fine wines, handbags and diamonds. Today, Costco has a fanatical membership base and is one of the most successful and prosperous retailers in the world. 

Think of Southwest Airlines, which started as a misfit regional air carrier serving just three cities in Texas, and became one the largest air carriers in the U.S., all based on the proposition of providing a wonderful flying experience at a lower price.

Contemplate the prosperity of fast food chain In-N-Out Burger, which for decades has provided freshly made, never frozen hamburgers at an absurdly low cost. To this day, the queues for the drive-through at In-N-Out often snake through the parking lot and spill into the street.

These companies have earned the right to succeed because the deviant ethos of low-price, high-quality is a winning one-two knockout proposition for the consumer. In short, these companies deserve to succeed and consequently have delivered remarkable returns for their owners.

Most companies try to find ways to make their stock prices go up. Many of them do so by trying to grow profits by lowering costs and raising prices. A few might be pushing the boundaries of higher quality but still expect higher prices as a reward for their efforts.

It takes a contrarian mentality to steer a business down the deviant path of lower prices while offering higher quality. Such players are forgoing profits in the near-term to win over the long-term. They don’t get fat off of excessive margins but rather reinvest in delivering superior value to their customers.  They stay lean and run ever faster on behalf of their clients.  These are a unique and rarely seen breed.

Not every successful company will be a deviant, nor will every investment we make fall under this criteria; yet when deviants do present themselves, they can prove to be astoundingly successful businesses and, by extension, wonderful investments.

An Oracle and his Gecko

A parting observation about GEICO’s deserved success revolves around its reptilian spokesperson, who has also earned Warren Buffett’s affection and admiration. Buffett wrote in his 2014 shareholder letter:

“Our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. The gecko, I should add, has one particularly endearing quality – he works without pay. Unlike a human spokesperson, he never gets a swelled head from his fame nor does he have an agent to constantly remind us how valuable he is. I love the little guy.”

The witty lizard certainly does seem like the ideal employee.  However, given that he is a computer rendering, perhaps it’s not really that remarkable. What is remarkable is the resemblance the gecko bears to another important Berkshire Hathaway employee: the Chairman himself. Consider that Buffett has worked for over five decades at a nominal salary ($100k annually) with no bonus, and no equity grants or stock options. He’s never complained about the size of his paycheck and certainly has never called on an agent to negotiate his contract.

Despite his fortune and fame, Buffett keeps a low profile and his ego in check (how many billionaires still drive themselves through the McDonald’s drive-through on the way to work every morning?). Buffett’s adoration of the gecko is well-placed but Buffett himself certainly did more than his fair share to position Berkshire itself to succeed.

[1] Much of the factual information regarding Buffett’s history with GEICO comes from David A. Rolfe of Wedgewood Partners who wrote a wonderfully in-depth paper on the subject.  While I am indebted to him for the original source documents and analyses he provided, he deserves no blame for gratuitous stylistic embellishments in this discussion; that burden is mine alone to shoulder.

Disclaimer: THIS WEBSITE AND ITS CONTENTS SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR THE SOLICITATION OF ANY OFFER TO BUY WHICH MAY ONLY BE MADE AT THE TIME A QUALIFIED OFFEREE RECEIVES A CONFIDENTIAL PRIVATE OFFERING MEMORANDUM, WHICH CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION (INCLUDING INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, POLICIES, RISK FACTORS, FEES, TAX IMPLICATIONS AND RELEVANT QUALIFICATIONS), AND ONLY IN THOSE JURISDICTIONS WHERE PERMITTED BY LAW.

Role of Currency Hedging Within Portfolio of International Equities

May 14, 2018 in Letters, Portfolio Management, Risk Management

This article by Will Thomson is excerpted from a letter of Massif Capital.

What follows is a brief review of how we at Massif Capital understand currencies and manage our currency exposure within a multi-currency portfolio. This paper arose out of conversations and questions asked by current investors regarding our lack of currency hedges.

At the current time, our portfolio is exposed to the US, Canadian and Singapore dollar as well as the Euro. Despite the diversity of currencies, we maintain no currency hedges and are unlikely to at any time soon. We have pursued this strategy for two reasons, one practical and demonstrated, the other philosophical.

Practical Reasoning

The first issue we consider when thinking about our foreign exchange (FX) exposure is what we would be looking to accomplish with an actively managed FX strategy. Specifically, are we looking to manage risk or are we looking to enhance portfolio returns? Differentiating between the two goals is important. From our perspective, a return enhancement strategy is an alpha-generating strategy, which means it is a strategy based on a differentiated outlook for how a currency will appreciate or depreciate relative to another currency. As our investment practice seeks capital appreciation through careful asset selection and participation in the equity market, we do not engage in currency trading to enhance returns.

With respect to risk management, a key concern of ours, there is ample empirical evidence to suggest that currency hedging strategies are of little value-add to portfolio returns. Take for example a 2010 study conducted by Vanguard which found that over a 22-year period from January 1988 to January 2010 the average hedge impact was not statistically different than zero for currency-hedged portfolio of the MSCI World Index. Similar results were documented in a paper by Kenneth Fisher and Meir Statement which found that the realized returns and risk for hedged and unhedged portfolios were virtually identical during the 1988 to 2002-time period.

These results are unsurprising. To hedge well requires one to have an idea about the direction of a currency in relation to another. Unfortunately, as a paper by Kenneth Rogoff and Richard Meese found, exchange rate models and most expert forecasts were no more accurate than a random walk would be in forecasting changes in currencies a year out. If our ability to forecast currency moves is that poor, hedges would seem as likely to hurt returns as they would to help.

One final practical issue worth considering is the cost associated with implementing an FX hedging strategy. Although rather small, any strategy can only be properly assessed within the context of the return on the cash deployed. Research by Stephen Nesbitt indicates that hedging costs (using forward contracts) for an international equity portfolio are well north of 0.25% per annum on average. Given that long run studies cited above find almost no impact on returns for hedged vs. unhedged portfolios, even that small cost seems unwarranted.

Philosophical Reasoning

Our philosophical approach is consistent with the lack of demonstrated evidence that hedging currency risk is value added to a portfolio returns. Fiat money, as we know it, is not a commodity good, which means it has no scarcity, it is created at the whim of financial institutions and central banks. Fiat money is not tied the nature of the capital or assets it commands but instead to the abstract idea that the printer is credit worthy and/or a good steward of the yardstick by which we (society) have decided to judge value.

Given these realities, fiat money has significant limitations. When you measure the value of an asset in say US dollars, you are measuring its value in terms of US government liabilities. Decisions made in the future and promises made in the past by the government regarding spending will impact the money value of the asset being measured even if there has been no change to the true value of the asset. Fiat currencies are thus correctly understood as an investment in a government that can, at any given time, make decisions that impact the relative purchasing power over your wealth.

If a portfolio manager chooses to pursue an FX strategy to manage currency risk actively, they are implicitly consolidating all their risk in one currency and thus one government. Every currency has this risk, and so we choose to stay diversified in our currencies. As an investment in a country’s government, it seems prudent to have a portfolio of diversified assets in diversified currencies.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed herein by Massif Capital, LLC (Massif Capital) are not an investment recommendation and are not meant to be relied upon in investment decisions. Massif Capital’s opinions expressed herein address only select aspects of potential investment in securities of the companies mentioned and cannot be a substitute for comprehensive investment analysis. Any analysis presented herein is limited in scope, based on an incomplete set of information, and has limitations to its accuracy. Massif Capital recommends that potential and existing investors conduct thorough investment research of their own, including detailed review of the companies’ regulatory filings, public statements and competitors. Consulting a qualified investment adviser may be prudent. The information upon which this material is based and was obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but has not been independently verified. Therefore, Massif Capital cannot guarantee its accuracy. Any opinions or estimates constitute Massif Capital’s best judgment as of the date of publication, and are subject to change without notice. Massif Capital explicitly disclaims any liability that may arise from the use of this material; reliance upon information in this publication is at the sole discretion of the reader. Furthermore, under no circumstances is this publication an offer to sell or a solicitation to buy securities or services discussed herein.

Apple: From Classic Ben Graham Deep Value Idea to Buffett-Style Compounder

May 14, 2018 in Case Studies, Equities, Information Technology, Large Cap

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Matthew Haynes, chief investment officer of 1949 Value Advisors.

One of the key takeaways for many shareholders who attended the 2018 Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) meeting in Omaha last weekend (including me) is the growing importance of Apple Inc. within BRK’s equity portfolio. After buying 75 million more shares during the first quarter of 2018, Apple is by far Berkshire’s largest equity holding in a public company. It was already Berkshire’s second largest position at the end of 2017, but now valued at approximately $45 billion, Apple is almost twice as big as its next largest position, Wells Fargo (~$24 billion).

This isn’t too difficult to fathom for those who are familiar with Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger’s investment style, although their recent foray into technology stocks might be (first IBM, which is no longer, and now Apple). Their preference for superior companies with defensible businesses (competitive “moats”) generating high returns on capital has typically meant investing in companies such as Coca-Cola, Kraft Heinz and many others, buying when their shares trade below intrinsic value. Very seldom does this quality-at-a-discount approach lead Berkshire to invest in average companies trading in deep-value territory. Apple is certainly not just an average company today, but for those with a long memory, Apple in 2003 was a classic deep-value idea that might have appealed more to Benjamin Graham than Warren Buffett.

For me, all the talk about Apple this past weekend in Omaha was a reminder of one of the greatest mistakes of my own investing career when I decided in 2003 that Apple’s new captive retail store distribution model was likely to burn a prodigious amount of its net cash, deserving of a further 10% discount to its then prevailing stock price before I felt we had a sufficient margin of safety. As Charlie Munger aptly said during a Berkshire Hathaway meeting many years ago, great ideas are too scarce to be parsimonious with, once found. I hadn’t yet learned that lesson.

As in life, mistakes in investing can be either sins of commission or sins of omission. Sins of omission in the investment management business are simply missed opportunities in companies that create significant value for shareholders over the long term. As an absolute return-oriented investor, I have always preferred to miss an opportunity than to experience a permanent loss of capital (a cardinal sin for value investors). In 2003, while working in Short Hills, NJ as Portfolio Co-manager of the Franklin Mutual Beacon Fund, we were picking through the wreckage of the technology, media and telecom (TMT) bust looking for interesting investment ideas. Keith Koeferl, one of the brightest investors with whom I’ve worked, brought Apple Inc. to my attention. The company had a relatively small market share in personal computers – a business that was experiencing rapid commoditization at that time, and I vastly underappreciated Apple’s devoted customer base and the genius of its visionary CEO and product development team.

If my memory serves me, Apple’s products in 2003 consisted primarily of Apple’s iMac, PowerBook and Macintosh personal computers and servers, and a new personal digital music device called the iPod was brand new. As a music lover, more than as an early adopter of technological gadgets (I’m far from it), I even owned an iPod back then, and I loved it.

Shares in Apple at that time traded near $12 per share, down from $70 at the peak of the TMT bubble three years earlier, and were backstopped in part by an estimated $10 per share in net cash and real estate value (our conservative valuation of its Cupertino, CA headquarters and land). This implied only a $2 per share valuation on Apple’s operating businesses.

Our offices were across the street from one of New Jersey’s upscale shopping malls, the Short Hills Mall. Keith and I decided to walk over for lunch to see the brand new Apple store there first hand. I remember my dismay when we arrived to find a very expensive and modern-looking Apple store staffed with many cheerful and eager employees, but not one single customer. This might have qualified as the old-fashioned “shoe leather research” that Mr. Buffett referenced during the Q&A in Omaha on Saturday, and I felt it was important to factor our findings into the valuation and appraisal. I determined, somewhat subjectively, that at $11 per share, or $1 per share implied value of Apple’s computer business would allow for a sufficient margin of safety against a permanent loss. Apple shares never got there.

With the benefit of hindsight, we were simply too early (and dead wrong) in our assessment of Apple’s retail strategy. The primary driver of Apple’s meteoric success has always been their products and brand loyalty. The loss-leading Apple stores were an unfortunate distraction from the more important innovative products they were developing and the compelling economics of their business.

In the period since 2003, Apple effected two stock splits – a 2-for-1 split in 2005 and a 7-for-1 split in 2014. This means the split-adjusted stock price of Apple in 2003 when I decided to pass on the idea was less than $1 per share. At today’s closing price of $190 per share, Apple continues to provide me with an important lesson about parsimony when evaluating great investment ideas.

Lastly, Apple serves as an excellent (and rare) investment case study that bridges the gap between the differing value investing styles of Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett.

Nota bene: Fortunately, inefficient markets granted me an opportunity in mid-2006 to establish a meaningful position in AAPL on behalf of clients in the Lazard Classic Value – Global strategy, and again at the inception of the 1949 Global Value strategy in mid-2015.

This summary does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or investment product. Any such offer or solicitation may only be made to qualified investors and only by means of an approved confidential private offering memorandum or investment advisory agreement and only in those jurisdictions where permitted by law. While all information herein is believed to be accurate, 1949 Value Advisors makes no express warranty as to the completeness or accuracy nor does it accept responsibility for errors appearing in the summary. This summary is strictly confidential and may not be distributed.

Why We Invested in Capitala Finance

May 13, 2018 in Equities, Ideas

This article is excerpted from a letter by Jim Roumell, partner and portfolio manager of Roumell Asset Management, based in Chevy Chase, Maryland.

Capitala Finance Corporation is a publicly-traded business development company (“BDC”) primarily engaged in making debt and selective equity investments in lower and traditional middle market companies, primarily in the United States. CPTA generally invests between $5.0 million and $50.0 million per transaction.

At December 31, 2017, the reported net asset value (NAV) per share was $13.91. We purchased shares during the first quarter of 2018 at an average cost of $7.17. This represents a very attractive discount to NAV of approximately 48%.

CPTA currently pays a quarterly distribution of $0.25, providing an annualized distribution yield of 14% based on our purchase price. While we find the yield attractive, that was not the primary basis of our investment thesis. Rather, it was the significant discount that the stock traded at relative to the underlying NAV of the company. The primary assets of the business are loans and equity investments which are carried at estimated market value. These market values are reviewed periodically by independent sources (external auditors) and filed quarterly and annually with the Securities Exchange Commission. As such, we have confidence in the reasonableness of the reported market values.

We also note that Management has shown confidence in their business as evidenced by the fact that the Management team currently owns approximately 9.1% of the outstanding stock. In addition, the company has repurchased 4.6% of outstanding shares since 2015.

In summary, as with OXSQ, our thesis here is to purchase an asset trading at a substantial discount to its underlying NAV and get paid a double-digit distribution yield while we wait for the discount to close.

Disclosure: The specific securities identified and described do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold, or recommended for advisory clients, and the reader should not assume that investments in the securities identified and discussed were or will be profitable. The top three securities purchased in the quarter are based on the largest absolute dollar purchases made in the quarter.

Kennedy-Wilson: Reluctant Repurchasers No More?

May 12, 2018 in Equities, Ideas, Letters

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Patrick Brennan, portfolio manager of Brennan Asset Management.

We discussed the investment rationale for Kennedy-Wilson (KW) in our past two quarterly letters. We believed that KW’s asset value was meaningfully higher than its current share price but expressed frustration on the company’s compensation program and its unwillingness to more aggressively repurchase shares. We had the privilege of meeting some of the senior team in Los Angeles earlier this year and the meeting confirmed our belief that:

  • The private market value of KW’s assets was far higher than current marks
  • There is considerable upside to the company’s pipeline project
  • The Dublin real estate market is on fire
  • KW’s Vintage Housing program is one of the greatest projects/rackets few have ever heard of
  • KW has a formidable fund-raising franchise
  • Management was surprised/frustrated at the price of the stock…but still seemed to hold a “guns and butter” approach to capital allocation (we can pay dividends, recycle assets, repurchase shares, save the world – ok, one of those is a bit much)

Obviously, we were delighted with the first 5 but frustrated at the last. On March 20, 2018, KW announced a $250 million buyback program. While we would prefer an even larger buyback, the announcement was clearly a step in the right direction. On April 3, 2018, KW announced that it had already completed roughly 45 percent of the program and retired over 4 percent of outstanding shares in two weeks. We applaud the aggressiveness of the buyback program, as we are convinced they are retiring shares meaningfully below intrinsic value.

Clearly, real estate investors are concerned about higher rates, as the typical REIT now trades at ~15-20% (or greater) discount to their net asset value. While we are not fans of the REIT structure, this gap alone is still interesting, considering that a REIT allows an investor to own a portfolio of real estate assets with daily liquidity. Historically, this benefit has often resulted in small premiums for public REITs versus private market assets. But, KW is not a REIT and therefore can retain capital for growth or share repurchases. Despite this critical advantage, KW trades at a wider discount than office and multi-family REITS. Clearly, these discounts could widen if interest rates quickly move substantially higher. But, even in this inflationary scenario, KW has longer-tenure, fixed rate debt and an asset base with better pricing power than most. While the path may not be straightforward, we suspect investors will eventually view KW more favorably, especially as the Irish pipeline projects convert into net operating income. Substantial value can be created if this appreciation coincides with a substantially lower share count.

The preference for LUK and KW buybacks would seem to contrast the wisdom of the broader business press that has warned that buybacks are a sign of the market top. The preference would also contrast with the strong preference for dividends in a low interest world. There is empirical evidence that companies are generally poor in timing buybacks – purchasing when a stock is expensive, but thumb sucking when it is weak. Some of this is the result of an economic cycle as companies are generally flush with cash during periods of expansion (when multiples tend to be higher) and more pressed during recessionary periods (when multiples are lower). That said, part of the problem is simply that many companies likely spend little time making an estimate of intrinsic value and instead simply repurchase when they have cash and stop when they have less. Without some calculation of value, how can a team judge the relative return from repurchasing stock versus an acquisition? Clearly, a valuation estimate is not a precise figure but a general range and this needs to be compared/ contrasted versus the current share price. Considering broader index valuation levels, share buybacks in the aggregate may not earn fantastic returns, but this does not mean that all buybacks are ill advised. In fact, well timed buybacks can be among the most value accretive capital allocation decisions any management team can execute. LUK and KW appear inexpensive relative to any reasonable estimate of value and therefore are prime candidates for more aggressive buybacks.

Disclaimer: BAM’s investment decision making process involves a number of different factors, not just those discussed in this document. The views expressed in this material are subject to ongoing evaluation and could change at any time. Past performance is not indicative of future results, which may vary. The value of investments and the income derived from investments can go down as well as up. It shall not be assumed that recommendations made in the future will be profitable or will equal the performance of the securities mentioned here. While BAM seeks to design a portfolio which reflects appropriate risk and return features, portfolio characteristics may deviate from those of the benchmark. Although BAM follows the same investment strategy for each advisory client with similar investment objectives and financial condition, differences in client holdings are dictated by variations in clients’ investment guidelines and risk tolerances. BAM may continue to hold a certain security in one client account while selling it for another client account when client guidelines or risk tolerances mandate a sale for a particular client. In some cases, consistent with client objectives and risk, BAM may purchase a security for one client while selling it for another. Consistent with specific client objectives and risk tolerance, clients’ trades may be executed at different times and at different prices. Each of these factors influences the overall performance of the investment strategies followed by the Firm. Nothing herein should be construed as a solicitation or offer, or recommendation to buy or sell any security, or as an offer to provide advisory services in any jurisdiction in which such solicitation or offer would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. The material provided herein is for informational purposes only. Before engaging BAM, prospective clients are strongly urged to perform additional due diligence, to ask additional questions of BAM as they deem appropriate, and to discuss any prospective investment with their legal and tax advisers.

Why We Initiated a Position in Shire

May 9, 2018 in Equities, Ideas, Letters

This article by Matthew Haynes is excerpted from a letter of 1949 Value Advisors, an absolute return-oriented global value investment firm based in Mahwah, New Jersey. Matt is a valued contributor to The Zurich Project.

[We initiated] a position in Shire plc following a 43% decline in its share price since August 2015.

We have not owned a pharmaceutical stock in many years. We have looked into several in the last year as almost all have suffered significant share price declines in recent years, but have elected to pass as key elements that we look for were missing.

With Shire plc, we believe that we’ve found an attractive investment opportunity in a high quality company suffering under a few short term clouds that should dissipate over time and unlock value. Its depressed share price and valuation at the time of our purchase implied very little potential downside, while its longer term prospects could provide meaningful upside. Good things often happen to cheap stocks, but we must first understand the issues.

First, its indebted balance sheet is the by-product of several recent acquisitions, the largest being its $35 billion purchase of Baxalta in 2016. Shire paid a hefty multiple for Baxalta (30X trailing EBIT, according to Bloomberg) and gained key products in hemophilia, but the debt burden has weighed heavily on Shire’s share price.

In addition, Baxalta’s leading drugs will face competitive pressure from the recent launch of Roche’s Hemlibra.

Fortunately, Shire’s other businesses generate significant free cash flow and the company allocates much of it toward debt reduction. Consensus estimates for free cash flow imply that Shire’s balance sheet could be debt free by year-end 2021. This deleveraging alone, assuming the current (depressed) multiple on EBIT remains constant, and using consensus EBIT estimates for 2021, could drive shares 67% higher over the next four years.

We would argue that post-deleveraging, the current depressed multiples on EBIT and earnings are no longer warranted and Shire shares should re-rate higher reflecting its diminished financial risk, providing additional material upside. Shire’s average EV/EBIT multiple over the last seven years has been 14, versus less than 10 at the time of our purchase, implying 100% upside over the next four years if consensus EBIT estimates are near the mark and deleveraging proceeds accordingly.

Lastly, Shire has been the subject of takeover speculation in recent months, following a failed bid by AbbVie in 2014 after the U.S. Treasury Department announced new rules taking aim at tax inversion deals. On January 1st of this year, Shire started accounting for its neuroscience business separately, implying the likelihood of a separation via tax-free spin-off or an outright sale. In either case, we believe that value would be unlocked as this business is worth considerably more than its implied value within Shire.

We would prefer a sale of this business as it would accelerate the company’s deleveraging, which we view as critical to realizing greater equity valuation. At the time of our purchase, we viewed Shire becoming a bid target as remote simply because of its size and the very limited number of global pharmaceutical companies large enough to acquire it.

To our surprise, shortly after building a full position, Takeda Pharmaceutical of Japan announced its interest in acquiring Shire plc. As of this writing, Takeda’s fifth offer in as many weeks is being considered by the Shire plc Board of Directors, representing a 50% premium to the undisturbed share price. If Takeda’s bid proves unsuccessful, it will have served to highlight the dramatic undervaluation of Shire plc.

We expect that the 50% premium offered by Takeda will have a significant positive impact on investor perceptions of the value of the company’s assets and cash flows.

Disclaimer: This summary does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or investment product. Any such offer or solicitation may only be made to qualified investors and only by means of an approved confidential private offering memorandum or investment advisory agreement and only in those jurisdictions where permitted by law. This summary reflects select positions of the current portfolio of a managed account advised by 1949 Value Advisors. There is no guarantee that a commingled investment vehicle or another investment account managed by 1949 Value Advisors will invest in the same investments set forth in this summary. The investment approach and portfolio construction set forth herein may be modified at any time in any manner believed to be consistent with the managed account’s overall investment objectives. While all information herein is believed to be accurate, 1949 Value Advisors makes no express warranty as to the completeness or accuracy nor does it accept responsibility for errors appearing in the summary. This summary is strictly confidential and may not be distributed

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