TripAdvisor: Mr. Market Overlooking Valuable Platform Businesses

December 26, 2017 in Best Ideas 2018 Featured, Best Ideas Conference, Ideas

In this idea preview, we feature MOI Global instructor Artem Fokin, founder and portfolio manager of Caro-Kann Capital, based in San Francisco. Artem is an instructor at Best Ideas 2018, the fully online conference featuring more than one hundred expert instructors from the MOI Global membership community.

Both the sell-side and buy-side are myopically focused on challenges facing TripAdvisor’s hotel business in areas such as cost-per-click, “instant booking” rollout, and Priceline’s marketing budget re-allocation.

Artem brings a fresh look at this well-known company and convincingly introduces his variant perception in his presentation. Artem argues that over the past three-and-a-half years TripAdvisor has successfully built two platform businesses with winner-take-all dynamics – “attractions” and “restaurants” – and TripAdvisor is the winner. These two businesses make TRIP an attractive company regardless of how TRIP’s hotel business evolves. The non-hotel business alone would soon justify the recent market valuation of the entire TripAdvisor.

Artem therefore believes Mr. Market is “missing an elephant in the room and is throwing us a fat pitch”. While Artem cautiously views TripAdvisor shares as a double in four to five years, he notes that there is plenty of open-ended upside optionality and expects that the realized return will be even more attractive.

Further, Artem sees 15+% IRR for many years well beyond five years.

Access Artem’s presentation on TripAdvisor.

About the instructor:

Artem Fokin is the founder and portfolio manager of Caro-Kann Capital LLC, a hedge fund based in San Francisco. Prior to founding Caro-Kann, he was a principal at Outrider Management LLC. Before entering the investing industry, Artem was an attorney with Greenberg Traurig LLP in New York City. Artem earned an MBA from the Stanford GSB (Arjay Miller Scholar), a Master of Laws degree from NYU School of Law (Newman Scholar) and a bachelor of law from the Higher School of Economics (Presidential Scholar) in Russia. Artem is admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York and is a dual citizen of the United States and Russia.

Caro-Kann Capital LLC is the general partner of an investment partnership based on the principles of value investing that focuses primarily on special situations and compounders. Caro-Kann Capital is named after a chess defense that emphasizes building safety and defensible position before contemplating an offensive strategy. The Founder’s substantial legal experience brings a greater ability to analyze complex corporate documentation accompanying extraordinary corporate events. The Fund’s core investment principles include: (1) concentration when properly compensated, (2) risk is not equivalent to volatility, (3) non-economic selling can lead to attractive opportunities; (4) capital allocation is often underappreciated by the market, and (5) incentives and insider ownership are paramount.

The content of this website is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security. The content is distributed for informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment advice or a recommendation to sell or buy any security or other investment, or undertake any investment strategy. There are no warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or results obtained from any information set forth on this website. BeyondProxy’s officers, directors, employees, and/or contributing authors may have positions in and may, from time to time, make purchases or sales of the securities or other investments discussed or evaluated herein.

Preview of Cambria Automobiles: Owner-Operated UK Auto Dealer

December 25, 2017 in Best Ideas 2018 Featured, Best Ideas Conference, Ideas, Letters

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Alex Bossert, founder of Bossert Capital, based in Minneapolis–St. Paul. Alex started the firm in February 2017 to invest money on behalf of a select group of long term-oriented, business-minded wealthy families and individuals. Alex is an instructor at Best Ideas 2018.

Cambria Automobiles is a United Kingdom based auto dealership group that was founded by current CEO Mark Lavery in 2006 to pursue a dealership roll-up strategy. Lavery owns 40% of the outstanding shares and from a starting capital base of only £10.8m has built Cambria into a business with a market cap of £64m along with operating earnings of £11.8m in 2017. This impressive performance over the past 11 years has been achieved during a period that has included two recessions in the UK.

Auto dealers are good businesses and Cambria has averaged an ROE in the high teens. In 2017, Cambria earned an ROE of 20%. 40% of Cambria’s gross profits are generated by aftermarket (parts and service) which is not cyclical and will benefit from multiple tailwinds over time. Used car sales make up another 30% of gross profits and this portion of the business is consistent and growing.

Cambria is trading for just 6.9 times earnings. Earnings are being depressed by two temporary factors that I will discuss in further detail in the valuation section. Going forward, this business has multiple tailwinds that will benefit earnings in the long run. 1) High margin aftermarket parts and service revenue are consistently growing. 2) Many of their acquired dealerships have not reached their full operational potential. 3) There are six capital projects under way that will contribute to earnings once complete. 4) Cambria’s management team has demonstrated intelligent capital allocation decisions over time and I expect them to continue to deploy existing cash flows into intelligent acquisitions.

Cambria trades at a large discount to peers in the United States and historical acquisition multiples in the UK. Eventually, I believe Cambria will reach £1 billion in sales and earn a 2% pre-tax margin. If this is achieved and Cambria trades in line with US peers and historical buyout multiples, Cambria is likely to be worth 4 times the current price in 5-7 years.

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The Phillips Conversations: Janet Lowe

December 25, 2017 in Audio, Full Video, The Phillips Conversations, Transcripts

The following interview is part of The Phillips Conversations, hosted by Scott Phillips of Templeton and Phillips Capital Management.

MOI Global has partnered with Templeton Press to bring you this exclusive series of conversations on investing and the legacy of Sir John Templeton, one of the greatest investors of the 20th century.

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About the interviewee:

Janet Celesta Lowe is a female American author, university lecturer and business writer. Lowe is originally from Santa Fe, New Mexico. She worked as production assistant or producer for several television stations, usually in their news departments. She then positioned herself as a marketing resource for television stations, preparing regular newsletters, providing web pages and web content, and holding workshops for station workers.

Preview of Varex Imaging: Moaty Spinoff in Oligopolistic Market

December 24, 2017 in Best Ideas Conference, Ideas, Letters

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Samir Mohamed, manager of a private family fund, based in Switzerland. Samir is an instructor at Best Ideas 2018, the fully online conference featuring more than one hundred expert instructors from the MOI Global membership community.

Joel Greenblatt describes in his book “You can be a stock market genius…” how special situations can have attractive investment returns. Spin-offs are one such situation where management incentives to downplay the business outlook, investors getting shares they did not buy and a business free of a much larger organization often lead to an undervalued stock. Unrelated to spin-offs when a company has low organic sales growth and declining profit margins due to temporary factors investors tend to underestimate how fast that business can grow and how profitable it can be when those factors subside. Varex Imaging is a spin-off where organic sales have been declining in 2015-2016 and profit margins declined ever since hitting a high in 2014 likely due to temporary factors. The company was spun-off from Varian Medical Systems in January 2017 and has sales of about 780 Mio. USD when fully consolidating a recent acquisition. The company is a supplier of components and subsystems for X-ray imaging systems to OEMs like GE Healthcare.

A business with strong moats and long-term growth drivers at a fair price

Varex Imaging has the broadest portfolio of components and software packages in the industry; X-ray tubes and digital detectors (to detect X-rays and create images) comprise about 45% of sales each. 80% of its sales are in the X-ray medical imaging and 20% in the industrial and security X-ray imaging market. Applications range from CT (computed tomography) to scanners for airport security or non-destructive testing in industrial manufacturing. The company acquired a digital detector competitor in May 2017 with annual sales of 140 Mio. USD and complementary technology and customers. It has a good track record of integrating previous acquisitions and did not overpay.

The medical imaging market is an oligopoly: In digital detectors Varex has 30% market share, Trixell – a joint venture between Thales, Philips and Siemens – has 27% and the rest is split among smaller players and medical system OEMs that produce their own detectors. In X-ray tubes Varex has 20% of the market while the second largest player Toshiba Medical Systems (acquired by Canon) has 7%. The rest of the market are mostly OEMs that have not yet outsourced the development and manufacturing of X-ray tubes. Rather than competition these OEMs present a growth opportunity for Varex if they decide to outsource X-ray tubes. Varex management mentioned in webcasts that new OEMs (e.g. in China) consistently outsource X-ray tubes.

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The Most Valuable Thing: Value vs. Value Trap

December 23, 2017 in Best Ideas Conference, Letters

This article is co-authored by Ashish Desai and MOI Global instructor A.J. Noronha, partner of Desai Capital Management, based in Chicago. A.J. is an instructor at Best Ideas 2018, the fully online conference featuring more than one hundred expert instructors from the MOI Global membership community.

As longtime value investors, we have noticed that there is frequently a fine line when distinguishing between stocks that provide true underlying value and stocks that are merely cheap for various reasons. Experience is often the best teacher, and through close review of both our winning and losing investments over the years, we have identified several factors which continue to play a valuable role in our investment approach and which we believe can help other investors avoid value traps and find truly valuable investment opportunities in an uncertain market. We hope you find this helpful, and welcome any feedback.

Value Trap #1: Price/Book

We commonly use trailing P/E, forward P/E, P/B, and enterprise value/EBITDA to give us an indication of the relative value of a stock in comparison to a peer company or the greater market (e.g. S&P 500). The first mistake we make is using the wrong metric. P/B is relevant when you are speaking of financial services companies, REITs, or other companies with large amounts of regularly measured assets. It is largely irrelevant when it comes to technology companies or companies with large amounts of intangible assets. Book value measurements also allow for large deviations regarding intangible and inventory write-downs, making these areas to watch for value traps. Compare Intel and Apple. When it comes to inventory, Intel’s products tend to become obsolete & are replaced more quickly, making their book value quite different from Apple’s longer-lasting products.

Similarly, it is hard to accurately predict assets of companies that buy a large number of patents. For example, pharmaceutical companies have great risk when it comes to measuring the potential value of in-process drugs. The patent value is only measurable at the point of purchase and will fluctuate greatly with every milestone, creating substantial uncertainty throughout the R&D process and making the value of this intangible asset very hard to measure and thus hard to draw comparisons across companies or industries.

Value Trap #2: Price/Earnings

P/E can be a good comparison when it comes to companies with very similar capital structures. However, companies very frequently can have low P/Es when they choose to finance heavily with debt, creating another potential value trap and making P/E a less accurate gauge of relative value. The airline industry during the financial crisis provides us with a great example of this. Delta, United, US Airways, American, and Northwest all declared bankruptcy while sporting low P/Es that were the result of high levels of debt. While they might appear to be a bargain at a superficial glance, a deeper look would show that they essentially become substantially more risky and expensive when you factor in bankruptcy risk. Southwest, which had a higher P/E, was more conservative with its use of debt and thus did not require bankruptcy protection.

Value Trap #3: Enterprise Value & EBITDA

Finally, enterprise value/EBITDA takes into account all capital sources but requires greater inspection of debt structure, tax treatments (deferrals, loss carryforwards, international operations) and various methods of depreciation. In order to accurately compare different companies using this metric, adjustments would have to be made to reflect each of these factors. In the case of GE, they pay a much lower tax rate than the 35% US corporate rate, have many international subsidiaries, and have significant depreciation of industrial plant and equipment. To compare them to another industrial company of a similar scope would be costly and time-consuming. However, a consistently profitable company with operations that are predominantly in the same country can typically be used as a reasonable comparison.

Value Driver #1: Net Cash & Market Dynamics

So far, the reasons not to invest have been addressed. Outside of the opposite of the aforementioned reasons, think of a company’s net cash position as a great driver of intrinsic value. Think of their standing within an industry. For example, NTAP has net cash which comprises nearly half of their market cap, operates in what is essentially a duopoly market and maintains high profit margins, yet is trading at a forward P/E below 7 once you back out cash.

Value Driver #2: Management

EMC was so stupid that they invested in VMWare ahead of time. Either they are much luckier than us or they have the financial flexibility to find the next big thing. I choose the latter. Every good CEO outside of Amphenol (greatest stock/run company of all-time) knows that you have to adapt. A really good friend of mine who runs an incubator company once told me, “find a CEO that can change and doesn’t have an ego. Easiest way to see if a company has a shot”. This approach can help the value investor identify great public companies too. Business as usual worked when Benjamin Graham was doing net working capital analysis, but is very different now Look for financial flexibility and sustained earnings. Amazon’s revenue growth and recent positive EPS have made them a market favorite with their stock price soaring accordingly over the last few years, but they will eventually be forced to justify their rich valuation, much like Apple’s rapid revenue growth and stock appreciation has led many investors to no longer perceive them as a growth company with the according generous valuation multiples.

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Machines Won’t Make Active Investors Obsolete Anytime Soon

December 22, 2017 in Best Ideas Conference, Diary, Interviews

We are pleased to feature the following interview with MOI Global instructor Robert Leitz, managing director of iolite Partners, based in Switzerland. Robert is an instructor at Best Ideas 2018, the fully online conference featuring more than one hundred expert instructors from the MOI Global membership community.

Q: Active managers are increasingly being replaced by artificial intelligence. What is your view on this development?

A: To some extent, investing is a game of pattern recognition, probabilities and emotional discipline. Intelligent machines are good at digging through vast amounts of data, finding correlations, and sticking to predefined strategies. This undoubtedly makes them very skilled quantitative investors. Humans tend to get swayed by social, emotional, and cognitive biases. It has already become quite difficult to compete against machines with simple quantitative strategies that worked in the past such as fishing for net-nets, low P/E, or magic formula stocks.

However, machines are limited to the data they are being fed. Most algorithmic value strategies are essentially based on some kind of “reverse to the mean” thesis. The question is: what is the mean and what if the future will be different from the past? I have seen countless examples of where a machine identified patterns and correlations that turned out to be random or only held up until a certain trend broke. Similarly, stocks that look cheap based on statistical averages may not be cheap if an industry is getting disrupted by a new technology or a powerful market entry.

I look at a multitude of data points and at criteria that are difficult to quantify (e.g. quality of management, alignment of interests, background of key shareholders, potential to fix value leaks, changing market dynamics, etc.). It will take many more years for machines to capture humans’ ability for innovative thinking or cognitive breadth and depth.

On another note, about 80% of the market’s capital is now “trapped” in passive and/or reactionary vehicles such as ETFs, pension funds, closet-indexing mutual funds, and automated strategies. In my mind, this is a dangerous development. Aside from the inherent technical risk given various self-reinforcing dynamics, why would a company’s management care about shareholder rights if a company’s stock price is driven by passive capital and ownership rights are not being exercised?

Q: How do you source ideas and what does your portfolio look like?

A: I look at many companies and pick those that I deem most attractive. I search top-down and bottom-up but invest bottom-up only. My portfolio is highly concentrated and five stocks frequently make up 80% of the assets.

As most readers will know, value investing can be defined as buying a business for less than what it is worth, whereby the value of a business is defined by the value of all future cash distributions. With this in mind, I look to buy great businesses at fair prices, bad businesses at very low prices, or assets under liquidation value. I also look to invest in asymmetric situations where the upside is a multiple of the downside. My valuation work routinely focuses on these questions:

1. Do I sufficiently understand the business model?
2. What is the visibility into the company’s ability to generate cash flows going forward?
3. What is the liquidation value of the company’s assets?
4. Is management allocating capital efficiently and in the interest of minority investors?

If I find an opportunity with an attractive risk/reward profile, I will rank this opportunity with the positions in the portfolio and those that I see in the wider market before making an investment decision.

Q: Discuss your research process in more detail. What are the research methods you employ, given that you run your fund entirely on your own?

A: I spend a lot of time reading annual and quarterly reports, listening to earnings calls, and studying the target’s industry. I do use screeners, but they are just one tool out of many. KPIs can be incredibly misleading – just because a company is trading at a low P/E or EV/EBITDA ratio does not tell me if it is a great investment opportunity. I follow other investors that I admire, and I look at markets and industries that have recently seen a steep decline in valuations. I may discuss an industry or a specific target with fellow investors that I trust, but I am also careful to avoid social biases. Lastly, I tend to dynamically model my ideas to get a better grasp of the relevant levers.

Q: How essential is management interaction in your view?

A: It is very important to find businesses run by capable, honest and driven CEOs who are incentivized to act in the best interest of shareholders. However, in my experience, very few CEOs will give you any real insight unless you either have power over them or they know you well. I also believe that great entrepreneurs and leaders are not necessarily good investors. I categorize CEOs into three types: (1) business builders (Steve Jobs, Bill Gates), (2) capital allocators (Warren Buffett) and (3) those that rose through corporate ranks by positioning themselves smartly and with luck.

1. A business builder might be a good leader for a business with space to grow for the core product, but he may not be the best capital allocator of excess cash flows.

2. A good capital allocator can create enormous value to shareholders, but he may fail to provide enough direction and leadership in terms of business organization and corporate culture. Over time, this usually erodes the value of the acquired assets. It’s also crucial to distinguish between those capital allocators who just got lucky riding a certain trend and those who repeatedly created value over many transactions across the cycle.

3. Lastly, I would be very wary of CEOs that made it to the top through politics. They will continue to be driven by opportunistically growing and protecting their own power rather than looking after the shareholders’ best interests.

CEOs of large companies tend to have it easier than their fellows at smaller companies, as it takes longer for their mistakes to become visible. Look at Apple: Tim Cook has largely failed to add any meaningful value to the company since he became CEO; he is still mainly benefiting from the tremendous momentum that Steve Jobs built. Very few small companies are able to create momentum strong enough to camouflage years of stagnant product innovation as well as overly expensive and business-irrelevant acquisitions. That said, even big ships can sink very quickly – as is illustrated by the story of Enron.

Q: What has been your average holding period for investments?

A: Generally speaking, I believe an investment thesis should play out over a five-year period, but in individual cases, the timing of realizing value can swing widely and is ultimately due to chance. A few times, my investments were taken private or went through a value-creating event very shortly after I committed capital. At other times, I had to wait years for a thesis to play out. For example, I have a small position in a company with no debt but a mild cash burn, trading at 1/3 of its cash. Absolutely nothing has happened to either the company or its share price over the last three years.

I shift investments if (a) a company went through a market re-rating and is now exceeding my fair value estimate, (b) I had to re-assess an investment thesis or (c) I found an even more appealing investment.

Q: What are your investors like?

A: My website has a section titled “reasons not to invest with me” and it is mandatory reading for all potential investors. I want to have a patient capital base because I think this is the most important foundation for sustainable performance. I am growing the business a lot slower than I could if I would be willing to accept anybody, and I have turned people down that I believed were not the right fit for my philosophy.

Many fund managers have to buy what is currently in vogue to attract capital and to avoid outflows. This might work in the short run, but is unlikely to result in sustainable outperformance. For example, most retail investors in Fidelity’s Magellan Fund in the 1977-1990 period (while it was run by Peter Lynch) lost money by churning into and out of the fund – even though the fund generated an average annual return of 29% during this period! It’s tough to be patient, but true value investors find it incredibly rewarding, as most other market participants are either passive or short-term in nature.

Q: What led you to become a value investor?

A: Upon graduating from university, I was looking for a job that offered me exposure to a wide variety of companies and industries to develop my practical business skills. I became a restructuring consultant and quickly learned about what makes companies succeed and fail. Later, working at a bank’s proprietary trading desk and subsequently a private equity-backed hedge fund, I was exposed to a value-driven approach that immediately and intuitively made sense to me. I learned to assess the value of a security’s underlying asset as well as value across the capital structure. I would typically spend most of my days digging through the small print of bond prospectuses to assess risks and value-triggers leading to low-risk but high-return opportunities. In hindsight, I could not have asked for better training. Bond markets are more complex than equity markets, and I learned to not only find mispriced assets, but to find mispriced pieces within the capital structure as well.

With my own firm, I am building on this experience. My goal is to sustainably compound capital at the highest rate possible. Investing is an intellectually stimulating exercise, and there is a certain purity in building one’s own track record. I shall be a happy man if history will show that in analysing the world and coming to my own conclusions, I was right more often than I was wrong.

Q: How do you differentiate yourself from the thousands of fund managers following the same investing principles?

A: I manage my clients’ money alongside my own – which aligns my interests with those of my clients and frees me from institutional pressures faced by most fund managers. My capital base is stable and patient, allowing me to be contrarian and to swim against the tide. The small size of my fund gives me the liberty to fish in small ponds, where the big funds cannot go. I have observed that large funds have their own guidelines for investing in stocks, such as a threshold market capitalization and liquidity, among several other factors. As a result, large funds often miss out on attractive opportunities, such as smaller micro caps, where there are a lot of market inefficiencies. With growing assets, I will look to take full control of smaller businesses.

Q: Investing can sometimes be stressful. What do you do to relax?

A: I try to find balance by spending time with my family, meeting friends, enjoying the Swiss countryside, and doing work around the house. I also love road trips and a dream I have is to circumnavigate the world on an extended road trip. While investing can be stressful and emotionally straining, I am aware that I live a very privileged life compared to most other people in this world. Being an ambitious and intrinsically motivated person makes it difficult for me to rest, but I try to find inner peace by keeping perspective.

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The Phillips Conversations: Nancy Rips and Tom Kerr

December 22, 2017 in Audio, Full Video, The Phillips Conversations, Transcripts

The following interview is part of The Phillips Conversations, hosted by Scott Phillips of Templeton and Phillips Capital Management.

MOI Global has partnered with Templeton Press to bring you this exclusive series of conversations on investing and the legacy of Sir John Templeton, one of the greatest investors of the 20th century.

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About the interviewees:

Nancy Rips and illustrator Tom Kerr, two Omaha residents, have teamed up on “My First Berkshire ABC” to teach children about one of the world’s best-known companies, and a little about the local billionaire behind it.

Value Investing in Latin America: Adaptability and Survivorship

December 21, 2017 in Best Ideas Conference, Diary, South America

This article is authored by MOI Global instructors Tito Avila and Mathias Wagner of LIS Capital, a value investment firm based in Brazil. Tito and Mathias are instructors at Best Ideas 2018, the fully online conference featuring more than one hundred expert instructors from the MOI Global membership community.

We at LIS Capital are value investors of the most traditional kind, always in search of overlooked companies, misunderstood business models and overestimated risks that generate opportunities for abnormal returns, achieved through diligent work and patience. Since we have been doing this together for quite a while, compounding knowledge and hopefully learning from our mistakes, we learned from experience to adapt and look for margin of safety using different techniques, anywhere in the range of Benjamin Graham´s net-nets to fair-priced high-quality companies, developing quite a wide array of approaches to value investing.

With the trend of assets migrating to passive indexing, while active management becomes more and more specialized, we face an uphill battle. It´s one we gladly fight, because, as it turns out, when investing in Latin/South American stock markets, as we do, such broad characteristics are of major importance. It is well documented how hard it is to make money consistently. It becomes even harder when you face a market as peculiar and challenging as ours. Just as in nature, we believe that being adaptable to your environment, while preserving the core pillars of value investing, is critical to long-term success.

There are several reasons why we judge our investing environment to be somewhat idiosyncratic. First, and foremost, Latin American markets are much smaller than the US or European stock markets. Summing the total listed companies in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Argentina and Colombia, we reach less than a thousand companies, or 20% of the total US listings. If we consider total market capitalization, it gets worse: those countries represent 5% of the total US market. And that is not even discounting the big oil companies, which are controlled by the state – one of our very rare “hard pass” rules when looking at investment opportunities. The variety of sectors represented in the stock market is also more restricted in Latin America, relatively speaking. Here, the top 3 sectors amount to, on average, 65% of the total market cap, against a 45% share in the US market. Governance and liquidity also play a role, as corporations are the exception to the rule in Latin America. Most commonly, companies have ownership groups that have varying levels of relationship with the stock market, with local regulations allowing quite a few loopholes that put unaware minority shareholders in danger. When the potential investing universe is this much smaller, stiff investment strategies might just not have enough oxygen to survive in the long run.

Secondly, Latin American stock markets are more volatile than their developed counterparts. That can be explained in part by the sensibility to foreign capital flux, but, most importantly, by the impact that local politics have in the economy, since, broadly speaking, our institutions are less mature. It starts by having some of the biggest companies being owned by the state, but the ramifications go deeper and become more problematic.

Populism is still a big factor in regional politics. It has led Argentina and Venezuela to extreme economic conditions. Nevertheless, it has been present all over the continent, albeit in subtler, and fortunately less destroying, ways. Ever-growing government interference in the economy, along with short-term horizons for public expenditure plans, create disruptions and frequent temporary illusions of greatness, commonly at the expense of future stability and sustainable growth. These cycles are frequent, and add volatility to the stock markets, which creates opportunities, both on the bear and the bull markets. This fact brings us to two insights: once again, a narrow framework for investing most likely will not be suitable for the different phases of the cycles. Second: being negligent with macroeconomic environment can be very harmful.

The recent developments in Brazil are a good example of that. During the long crisis that extended from early 2013 to this year and was largely originated by irresponsible fiscal expending policy, the high quality and more resilient companies, although arguably more expensive, fared way better throughout the dip. This year, though, while the whole stock market has been in an upward trend, as the economy shows signs of improvement, the outperformers are those somewhat not so sound companies, which were more impacted during the economic downturn. Political reforms that countered the unsustainable social welfare state of the past decade, such as the public spending cap, labor law flexibilization, and the still-pending pension reform, have moved the Brazilian economy outlook from potential collapse to slow recovery. It turns out, as it usually is, this was the perfect setting for a steep appreciation among companies trading at doom future scenarios. More likely, as economic recovery becomes less fragile, the type of companies that will be outperformers for the upcoming period will be very different from the ones who did so up to this point.

Now, the point is not to defend one investment strategy over the other nor to focus the investment method on chasing after the expected outperformers necessarily. We believe that to be able to avoid permanent capital losses and therefore sustain adequate results in Latin American markets, we must be comfortable enough transitioning and balancing from one strategy to the other, adapting to the ever-changing environment.

This is easier said than done. Screening, analyzing, and following through an investment in a low-multiple or a compounder company is very different. The mental requirements for each are also different: for low-multiple stocks, you might be looking for triggers or value traps, while in a compounder you will have to put much more attention into understanding the sustainability of competitive advantages that will allow the company to continue to compound value throughout time, for example. It is not a simple task to balance these apparent antagonistic mindsets. We admit that doing so inevitably adds more complexity to the investment method. While we have enough evidence and examples of traditional local managers who make us believe this approach adds value, we respect Charlie Munger´s famous words: “It´s not supposed to be easy. Anyone who finds it easy is stupid”. For this reason, we value the importance of well-thought, disseminated and enforced processes that permeate the whole investment analysis and decision-making: all the way from selecting companies to analyze to balancing their portfolio sizing.

Processes are usually seen as a detractor to the geniality of money managers, taking away the art of active investing. We view them as a safety net for minimizing the frequency and the size of our mistakes. They are constructed in a way to minimize cognitive biases and protect us from what we don´t know that we don´t know – something to be tracked, particularly when you have a broader investment method. We follow Buffet´s 1st rule as closely as we can, and processes are an important tool we use to safeguard us from ourselves in doing that. This is emphasized by having a collegiate decision-making system, where personal biases are diluted, even more so since the team has known each other for many years.

So, when investing in Latin America, we find it mandatory to keep an open mind to value investing strategies that might work under different circumstances, as the regional markets are i) too restrictive to allow for specialization; and ii) constantly changing market circumstances create opportunities for diverse investment approaches. To minimize the downside risk of adding too much complexity, we see value in having processes that enforce rules of combat amidst all the noise, while protecting us from our own biases. Creating, fine-tuning, enforcing and following processes increases the amount of energy needed to invest by a considerate amount. We embrace that, as we would rather depend on transpiration and hard work than on inspiration and geniality.

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