GEM’s Advice for Aspiring Superinvestors

November 3, 2017 in Building a Great Investment Firm, Featured, The Manual of Ideas

We had the pleasure of interviewing the investment team of Global Endowment Management, based in Charlotte, North Carolina for The Manual of Ideas, the flagship publication of MOI Global, in 2015.

The GEM team’s perspective and advice are timeless and truly invaluable for emerging managers looking to build a great investment firm. Enjoy!

The Manual of Ideas: Please tell us about the genesis of Global Endowment Management and the principles that have guided you since the firm’s founding.

Mike Smith, Chief Investment Officer: Global Endowment was founded in early 2007 by Thruston Morton, the former CIO of Duke University’s investment office. The original idea and what we continue to do today is to manage a fully-discretionary pool of long-term capital primarily from US endowments and foundations. Our ultimate goal is to generate at least a 5% real return so that our investors can continue to fund their operating expenses and grants in perpetuity (since US endowments and foundations typically spend around 5% of their endowment capital each year).

MOI: How do you typically partner with clients that have an existing in-house investment team?

The majority of our endowment and foundation investors outsource 100% of their capital to us.

Campbell Wilson, Head of Public Investment Team: The majority of our endowment and foundation investors outsource 100% of their capital to us, so most of our interactions are with their board members, investment committees, and/or operations staff. However, we have some family office and sovereign wealth fund investors who only invest a portion of their assets with us, and we often do have a dialogue with those groups’ in-house teams: where we are finding interesting opportunities, potential co-investments, best practices, etc. (Operational reviews of managers are one topic that has come up recently, for example). Additionally, we’ve had some of those investors join us on research trips, such as our annual public investment team trip to the Berkshire Hathaway meeting in Omaha.

MOI: Please describe your underlying investment philosophy.

James Ferguson, Associate, Public Investment Team: Like most value investors, our investment team was introduced to investing through reading some combination of Graham, Buffett, Klarman, Schloss and Fisher. Buffett’s quote, “Price is what you pay. Value is what you get,” succinctly captures our investment thinking. We spend the majority of our time identifying and investing with value-oriented managers around the world. We’re focused less on fulfilling a search in a particular country or region than we are on finding great investors with whom we can partner, wherever they happen to be located. In an ideal world, we’d find 20 Buffetts from the 1960s dispersed across the globe, and spend all of our time building relationships and investing with them. If we could identify and invest with such a group, the best thing we could do is get out of their way and let them compound. Easier said than done, but it’s what we focus on constantly.

Campbell Wilson: We also focus on markets where truly mispriced securities are more likely to be found—where we’re not as likely to find thousands of smart, hardworking, highly paid investors competing with us every day. One of our favorite quotes is from Julian Robertson, who said “With hedge fund investing, you get paid on your batting average irrespective of the ‘league’ in which you’re playing. So go where the pitching is the worst.” (Graham and Doddsville, April 2012). We agree with that completely so we spend a lot of time trying to find great investors who focus on less efficient markets, and have small enough asset bases to take advantage of the inefficiencies that exist.

MOI: How does your investment philosophy shape your target asset allocation and manager selection criteria?

Campbell Wilson: “Invest bottoms up, worry top down” sums up our asset allocation vs manager selection philosophy. We believe manager selection is the key to sustainable outperformance, and our bottom up, value-oriented approach since inception has definitely explained most of our outperformance of relevant benchmarks. We deal with asset allocation concerns top down—at the overall pool level, addressing concentrations in particular factor exposures and portfolio risk through hedges and overlays. One of the nice things about having Mike focus on the portfolio from a top down perspective is that it allows our public and private investment teams to concentrate on finding great investments.

MOI: You seek to deliver a minimum 5% real return over the long term. How do you think about inflation and how are inflation considerations incorporated into your investment process?

We are biased towards investing in higher quality businesses that have the ability to increase price, somewhat independent of the overall inflation level.

Mike Smith: The history of most fiat currencies, and certainly the US dollar, is one of consistently eroding value over time. Consequently, we want to build a portfolio that preserves the purchasing power of our investors’ capital, regardless of the type of macro environment we encounter. We are thus biased towards investing in higher quality businesses that have the ability to increase price, somewhat independent of the overall inflation level. We’re not confident in our ability to predict a single macro variable like inflation. But by constructing a portfolio across asset classes and geographies, focusing on businesses that have pricing power; we’ll have a better chance of achieving our ultimate goal. We’re quite aware that there are no absolute certainties in investing, but we believe that this approach is not only the most prudent, it also increases the probability of success.

MOI: You seek to “capture illiquidity premia when they exceed the opportunity cost.” Could you provide an example of a situation in which you judged an illiquidity premium to exceed your hurdle.

Mike Smith: This is basically dense language for the opportunity cost question, i.e., does the return justify the illiquidity. Unlike most endowment investors, we don’t have a target allocation to private investments. Instead, we think about overall equity risk and, at any given time, in what forms are we being best compensated to accept it. Our private investment commitments ebb and flow based on expected return premiums relative to public investment opportunities. That being said, there are specific situations where the private market tends to be more appropriate than public markets. An example would be turnaround situations requiring significant operational change where reported numbers can get significantly worse before they get better.

MOI: What is the typical process you go through with an investment manager prior to entrusting the manager with your capital?

It’s a common bromide in our business to say you’re a long term investor. Reality is that career risk and human psychology often intervene in the short term to derail that long term focus.

James Ferguson: In an ideal world, we would be able to spend several years building a relationship with a prospective manager, to underwrite both their process and their temperament. In our humble opinion, the former is much easier than the latter. We would like to see an investor work through a variety of market environments, and in particular how they react to adversity . If you look at challenging market environments throughout history, going back to the early 1920s, it’s amazing how many “great” investors did not have the emotional fortitude to withstand severe market drawdowns.

While we have spent years getting to know some of our managers before investing with them, it is often impractical to do so. Consequently, our ability to speak with people who have known the individual for a long time and have seen them in a variety of situations is a key part of our process. Besides personal vetting, we spend a significant amount of time going through individual portfolio companies to understand how the manager developed their thesis and identified areas of concern. The more in-depth the discussion we can have around the manager’s thinking about a company’s competitive dynamics, industry characteristics, and overall moat, the easier it is to underwrite the substance and sustainability of his or her process.

The second step of our approach is that we think it’s important for a prospective manager to know how we will behave in challenging environments. Given the inherent fragility of an investment partnership, a manger’s confidence in their investor base could help reinforce their ability to withstand a significant drawdown. We encourage prospective managers to speak with our current managers in order to get a sense of how we respond. It’s a common bromide in our business to say you’re a long term investor. Reality is that career risk and human psychology often intervene in the short term to derail that long term focus. We think we are good long term partners, and that we do what we say we’re going to do. We want prospective managers to get a sense of that. Time and talking with others can go a long way in building that trust. Once we have conviction in a manager as an investor, we then conduct a thorough operational review in order to get comfortable with the controls and protections that are in place.

MOI: What characteristics make an emerging investment manager appealing to you as a long-term partner?

Campbell Wilson: What we’re ultimately looking for is a skilled investment analyst with the discipline and temperament to succeed in different environments. Importantly, they must be able to transition from analyst to portfolio manager—we have seen many who cannot. Creativity, persistence and humility are key traits—people who are confident in their abilities but clear-headed and forthright about their weaknesses. Seth Klarmann described it well when he said “You need to balance arrogance and humility”. And maybe more than anything else, we’re looking for fanatics who are extremely passionate about the pursuit of investing. Given the monetary benefits of working in the financial industry, it is often difficult to discern “passion for investing” from “passion for making money”, but understanding a manager’s motivation is a key requirement for us.

MOI: What are some common mistakes managers make early on that make it more difficult for you to partner with them down the road?

A behavior that typically turns into a mistake is a fund hiring a big team early on. While this is inevitably sold as a reflection of seriousness and commitment, it forces the fund to raise more assets to support the operating costs of the team, fancy office space, etc.

Campbell Wilson: At a high level we often see young managers compromise their investment ideals or approach in order to raise assets. They might, for example, agree to hold more positions than they would prefer. At the end of the day, we want our managers to manage our funds like it was their own money and they didn’t have a client base to worry about. Decisions made for the sake of the business or client base are often detrimental to long term returns in our opinion, and it’s very difficult for small, young managers to say no to someone who wants to give them money. Our advice is to give yourself as long of a runway as possible to stick to your guns.

More specifically, there can be structural elements that make it difficult for us to invest. The first is a fund with co-portfolio managers. This isn’t an absolute ‘no’ for us but for managers with multiple senior team members we prefer when there’s a clear driver and a clear passenger vs. a 50/50 partnership. Investing is a personal endeavour with decisions based on imperfect information – two smart people trained by the same person and armed with the same set of facts will frequently come to different conclusions. We’re all wired differently, and the best investors tailor their portfolio to match their own psychology – but that also makes it important to have one person ultimately responsible for pulling the trigger.

A second structural impediment is a particularly challenging seed investment arrangement. We’re not opposed to firms that have seeds —we have made a few select seed investments ourselves. However, we’ve seen funds where the benefits brought by the seeder are de minimis and the costs are high. A particularly challenging form of seed is one where the seeder is in business to benefit from the seed itself, rather than as an investor in the fund. It’s tough for us to invest in partnerships with seeds from big asset managers or financial institutions simply because the incentive to grow can overwhelm the incentive to create a great track record. Given our focus on investing in less competitive markets, it’s important that our managers stay small enough to retain their ability to invest in less efficient situations.

The third categorical mistake is a partnership that is not selective on the types of investors that they allow into the fund. This may sound a bit arrogant but it’s really important that there are similarly-minded investors in a partnership, as any sort of hot money can be a detriment to the entire partnership. We’ve seen it happen that a manager loses money and, while our conviction in the manager hasn’t changed, enough other investors submit for redemption and then the entire fund goes into wind-down.

Another behavior that typically turns into a mistake is a fund hiring a big team early on. While this is inevitably sold as a reflection of seriousness and commitment, it forces the fund to raise more assets to support the operating costs of the team, fancy office space, etc. We would rather invest with a manager that runs a lean start-up in order to focus on investing, and then slowly raises money (a) over time and (b) appropriate for the strategy.

MOI: What are some of the ways in which you have sought to improve alignment of incentives between your firm and the investment managers to whom you entrust capital?

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An Update on Electronic Data Processing

November 2, 2017 in Ideas

This article is excerpted from a letter to partners of Boyles Asset Management.

The strategic process remains ongoing at Electronic Data Processing. For those following closely, that is the same sentence with which we opened the Q2 update.

A final report on the company’s pension position was just released in mid-October, and we believe that potential buyers now have a critical final due diligence item. It is our belief that the eventual outcome will soon be clear. Fortunately for investors, the final pension report was much more favorable than a preliminary review carried out in early 2017.

We understand that the company would prefer to sell itself in its entirety, but if no transaction occurs, as large shareholders, we believe we will be consulted about a significant capital return and the future path for the business.

The content of this website is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security. The content is distributed for informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment advice or a recommendation to sell or buy any security or other investment, or undertake any investment strategy. There are no warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or results obtained from any information set forth on this website. BeyondProxy’s officers, directors, employees, and/or contributing authors may have positions in and may, from time to time, make purchases or sales of the securities or other investments discussed or evaluated herein.

Why We Invested in IES Holdings

November 2, 2017 in Equities, Ideas, Letters

This article by Matthew Sweeney is excerpted from a letter of Laughing Water Capital.

IES Holdings (IESC) entered our portfolio as a smaller position.

The company is a conglomerate with business in four verticals – Commercial & Industrial, Communications, Residential, and Infrastructure. While these businesses should benefit from both cyclical and secular tailwinds in the years to come and are thus interesting in their own right, what makes an investment in IESC more interesting is that it is almost 60% controlled by Jeffrey Gendell, an excellent capital allocator. Gendell is the founder of Tontine Capital, where he previously compounded capital at ~40% a year for a decade. Further, the company has approximately $400 million in NOLs, meaning that Gendell will be able to allocate IESC’s earnings under a tax shield, which should drive considerable shareholder value.

Credit for this idea belongs to Chris Colvin of Breach Inlet Capital, who first brought it to our attention.

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Disclaimer: This document, which is being provided on a confidential basis, shall not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of any offer to buy which may only be made at the time a qualified offeree receives a confidential private offering memorandum (“CPOM”) / confidential explanatory memorandum (“CEM”), which contains important information (including investment objective, policies, risk factors, fees, tax implications and relevant qualifications), and only in those jurisdictions where permitted by law. In the case of any inconsistency between the descriptions or terms in this document and the CPOM/CEM, the CPOM/CEM shall control. These securities shall not be offered or sold in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful until the requirements of the laws of such jurisdiction have been satisfied. This document is not intended for public use or distribution. While all the information prepared in this document is believed to be accurate, Laughing Water Capital, LP and LW Capital Management, LLC make no express warranty as to the completeness or accuracy, nor can they accept responsibility for errors appearing in the document. An investment in the fund/partnership is speculative and involves a high degree of risk. Opportunities for withdrawal/redemption and transferability of interests are restricted, so investors may not have access to capital when it is needed. There is no secondary market for the interests and none is expected to develop. The portfolio is under the sole trading authority of the general partner/investment manager. A portion of the trades executed may take place on non-U.S. exchanges. Leverage may be employed in the portfolio, which can make investment performance volatile. The portfolio is concentrated, which leads to increased volatility. An investor should not make an investment, unless it is prepared to lose all or a substantial portion of its investment. The fees and expenses charged in connection with this investment may be higher than the fees and expenses of other investment alternatives and may offset profits. There is no guarantee that the investment objective will be achieved. Moreover, the past performance of the investment team should not be construed as an indicator of future performance. Any projections, market outlooks or estimates in this document are forward-looking statements and are based upon certain assumptions. Other events which were not taken into account may occur and may significantly affect the returns or performance of the fund/partnership. Any projections, outlooks or assumptions should not be construed to be indicative of the actual events which will occur. The enclosed material is confidential and not to be reproduced or redistributed in whole or in part without the prior written consent of LW Capital Management, LLC. The information in this material is only current as of the date indicated, and may be superseded by subsequent market events or for other reasons. Statements concerning financial market trends are based on current market conditions, which will fluctuate. Any statements of opinion constitute only current opinions of Laughing Water Capital LP, which are subject to change and which Laughing Water Capital LP does not undertake to update. Due to, among other things, the volatile nature of the markets, an investment in the fund/partnership may only be suitable for certain investors. Parties should independently investigate any investment strategy or manager, and should consult with qualified investment, legal and tax professionals before making any investment. The fund/partnership is not registered under the investment company act of 1940, as amended, in reliance on an exemption there under. Interests in the fund/partnership have not been registered under the securities act of 1933, as amended, or the securities laws of any state and are being offered and sold in reliance on exemptions from the registration requirements of said act and laws. The S&P 500 and Russell 2000 are indices of US equities. They are included for informational purposes only and may not be representative of the type of investments made by the fund.

Economic and Financial Market Commentary

November 2, 2017 in Commentary, Letters

This article by Michael Melby is excerpted from a letter of Gate City Capital Management.

During the quarter, the Federal Reserve announced its plan for reducing its $4.5 trillion balance sheet. Rather than selling any assets, the Fed elected to only reinvest a portion of the principal that matures each month from its fixed income portfolio. The slower pace of reinvestment is expected to gradually reduce the size of the Fed’s balance sheet over several years.

To the best of our understanding, the maturing principal that is not reinvested will be returned to the U.S. Treasury. As predicted in prior letters, the Fed’s proposed mechanism ensures that the U.S. Treasury will never have to repay any principal or interest associated with the Fed’s asset purchases, effectively monetizing approximately $1.7 trillion of the U.S. national debt.

In September, the Trump administration announced plans to reduce the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20% as part of a broader overhaul of the tax code. The announcement helped spur stock prices and proved especially beneficial to small-cap value stocks as these companies tend to pay higher tax rates as a greater percentage of their earnings are generated in the United States. The announcement led to renewed enthusiasm surrounding the so-called “Trump Trade” as these small-cap value companies were also strong outperformers following the presidential election in November of 2016.

The proposed reduction of the corporate tax rate would increase the after-tax cash flows of a company by 23% (assuming the company was previously taxed at the full corporate rate). This potential increase in after-tax free cash flows serves as a possible offset to historically-high stock market valuations. We note that the legislative process is difficult to predict and the timing and size of any potential future cash flow remains highly uncertain. We have not yet changed any tax rate assumptions for our modelling purposes, but remain cognizant that a reduction to the corporate tax rate would meaningfully increase the free cash flows of our portfolio companies.

U.S. equity markets rose in the third quarter, and many equity indices reached record highs. The third quarter also marked the 8th consecutive quarter of positive performance for the S&P 500. Small-cap companies outperformed large-cap companies, partially reversing the outperformance of large-cap companies seen earlier in 2017. Similarly, value companies were notable outperformers of growth companies, reversing the trend seen earlier in the year. Technology, energy, and materials were the top performing sectors while consumer stocks lagged.

The widely-followed VIX Index which tracks the implied volatility in stock options also declined to near record lows, potentially indicating growing complacency from equity market investors. In fixed income, interest rates were largely unchanged as the Fed held short-term rates steady and inflation expectations remained muted. In commodities, gold prices ended the quarter higher on increased geopolitical concerns and oil prices also advanced.

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Disclaimer: Performance for the period from September 2011 through August 2014 has undergone an Examination by Spicer Jeffries LLP. Performance for the period from September 2014 through December 2016 has undergone an Audit by Spicer Jeffries LLP. Performance for 2017 is unaudited. The performance results presented above reflect the reinvestment of interest, dividends and capital gains. The Fund did not charge any fees prior to September 2014.The results shown prior to September 2014 do not reflect the deduction of costs, including management fees, that would have been payable to manage the portfolio and that would have reduced the portfolio’s returns. Actual performance results will be reduced by fees including, but not limited to, investment management fees and other costs such as custodial, reporting, evaluation and advisory services. The net compounded impact of the deduction of such fees over time will be affected by the amount of the fees, the time period and investment performance. Specific calculations of net of fees performance can be provided upon request.

Start with the Customer

November 2, 2017 in Letters

This article by Fang Li is excerpted from a letter of Baleen Capital.

We’ve done a lot and learned a lot over our first five years at Baleen. One of the most important things we’ve learned is to start with the customer.

As investors, we naturally focus on revenue, profits, and returns – ergo “value” investors – but the customers are the ones actually paying the bills, and customers pay based on the value they receive from the company. In other words, customer value (the problems the company solves for them, how much their lives are improved) is what leads to economic value (the revenue, profits, and returns that we care about as investors). We need to understand the customer in order to really understand a company.

Further, when a company goes above and beyond for its customers – delivering “insanely awesome” experiences, products, and service – great things can happen. Examples include internet companies like Amazon, Apple, or Google, as well as offline businesses like Costco, Home Depot, or In-N-Out.

Over the years, we’ve seen this personally. We’ve seen our companies that deliver exceptional customer value keep growing and growing (e.g. Interactive Brokers). We’ve seen how things are harder for companies delivering good but not exceptional customer value (e.g. Atlas Financial). And we’ve seen how companies with mediocre customer value are left at the mercy of their markets (e.g. SMTC).

Through our investments in younger companies, we’ve seen firsthand how customers react to products that really make a difference vs. those that are just nice to have. We’ve seen what happens when management empathizes deeply with their customers and care about their well-being, and the impact that makes. And we’ve seen how changes in customer value affect business health and prospects over time.

We’ve become convinced that delivering outstanding customer value is the first step to building the rare, amazing company that keeps growing and growing, leading to sustainable long-term value creation.

Improving customer value over time is a way to build a business’s moat. Or, as Henry Ford wrote, “A business that makes nothing but money is a poor business… A business absolutely devoted to service will have only one worry about profits: They will be embarrassingly large.”

We’re looking for exceptionalism: companies that make a difference, that make their customers’ lives so much better that they wonder how they lived before it (to paraphrase the CEO of a recent investment).

As for Baleen, in addition to exceptional customer value, we’re also looking for high growth and profitability potential, as well as honest, capable, and customer-centric people. We’re also more and more looking for companies that can be leaders in their market or niche. When combined with a reasonable valuation, we think this is a recipe for long-term investment success. We’re looking for great companies that will grow to be many times bigger with time.

We’ve started paying higher headline prices for some of our investments. As value investors, this makes us shudder a little. However, the math works out that over the long-term, it’s better to buy a growing company at a higher price than a stale company at a cheap price. Our experience backs this up. Our worst mistakes have been buying companies that looked cheap at first but were mediocre underlying businesses. We have yet to regret buying a great company, because even if the stock has dropped, it’s been temporary (and often an opportunity to add).

Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Our goal at Baleen is to maximize long-term value for our investors. Decades, not years.

To sum, I think that we are starting to hit our stride. Of course, whenever I think this, I am reminded of the below whimsical chart that a friend sent me:

You may guess where on the chart we currently stand! Kidding aside, this chart has been surprisingly accurate in describing our experience at Baleen so far (and perhaps any environment that involves learning under uncertainty). My takeaway is that no matter what happens, we need to stay humble and hungry, and keep learning.

With that said, in the years to come, I would be surprised if we waver very far from our recipe of strong customer focus, great products, high profitability, big growth prospects, and good people. It is a good recipe.

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Disclaimer: This letter is for informational purposes only and shall not constitute an offer to sell, nor shall it constitute the solicitation of an offer to buy any interests in Baleen Capital Fund LP (the “Partnership”). Such an offer to sell or solicitation of an offer to buy interests may only be made via a confidential offering memorandum of the Partnership. No person should rely on any information in this letter, but instead should rely exclusively on the confidential offering memorandum in considering whether to invest in the Partnership. This letter is strictly confidential and may not be reproduced or redistributed in whole or in part nor may its contents be disclosed to any other person without the express written consent of Baleen Capital Management, LLC (“Baleen Capital”). The information contained herein reflects the opinions and projections of Baleen Capital as of the date of publication, which are subject to change without notice at any time subsequent to the date of issue. Baleen Capital does not represent that any opinion or projection will be realized. The description herein of the approach of Baleen Capital and the targeted characteristics of its strategies and investments is based on current expectations and should not be considered definitive or a guarantee that the approaches, strategies, and investment portfolio will, in fact, possess these characteristics. All information provided is for informational purposes only and should not be deemed as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase or sell any specific security. While the information presented herein is believed to be reliable and has been obtained from public sources believed to be reliable, no representation or warranty is made concerning the accuracy of any data presented. All trade names, trademarks, and service marks herein are the property of their respective owners who retain all proprietary rights over their use. Positions reflected in this letter do not represent all the positions held, purchased, or sold, and in the aggregate, the information may represent a small percentage of activity of the Partnership. The information presented is intended to provide insight into the noteworthy events, in the sole opinion of Baleen Capital, affecting the Partnership. Performance figures are estimated. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Actual returns may differ from the returns presented. Each limited partner will receive individual returns from the Partnership’s administrator. Reference to an index does not imply that the Partnerships will achieve returns, volatility, or other results similar to the index. The total returns for the index do not reflect the deduction of any fees or expenses which would reduce returns. An investment in any strategy, including the strategy described herein, involves a high degree of risk. There is no guarantee that the investment objective will be achieved. Past performance of these strategies is not necessarily indicative of future results. There is the possibility of loss and all investment involves risk including the loss of principal.

Deprival Super-Reaction Syndrome

November 1, 2017 in Human Misjudgment Revisited

This article is part of a multi-part series on human misjudgment by Phil Ordway, managing principal of Anabatic Investment Partners.

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Deprival super-reaction syndrome including bias caused by present or threatened scarcity, including threatened removal of something almost possessed, but never possessed.

“People are really crazy about minor decrements down…People do not react symmetrically to loss and gain. Well maybe a great bridge player like Zeckhauser does, but that’s a trained response. Ordinary people, subconsciously affected by their inborn tendencies…” –Charlie Munger

The Munger cites the family dog – a sweet, harmless dog that could only be induced to bite if you try to take something out of its mouth, and labor negotiations. He added the example of a homeowner whose “next-door neighbor put a little pine tree on it that was about three feet high, and it turned his 180-degree view of the harbor into 179 3/4. Well they had a blood feud like the Hatfields and McCoys, and it went on and on and on… I mean people are really crazy about minor decrements down. And then, if you act on them, then you get into reciprocation tendency, because you don’t just reciprocate affection, you reciprocate animosity, and the whole thing can escalate. And so huge insanities can come from just subconsciously over-weighing the importance of what you’re losing or almost getting and not getting.”

New Coke, of course, is another prime example. The Coca-Cola Company nearly torched its business – or at least handed a massive advantage to its rival – but underestimating deprival super-reaction syndrome.

Update

Munger greatly expanded his remarks on this tendency in the revision to his original talk.

  • “A man with $10 million in his brokerage account will often be extremely irritated by the accidental loss of $100 out of the $300 in his wallet.”
  • “Bureaucratic infighting over the threatened loss of dominated territory often cause immense damage to an institution as whole.” Jack Welch’s long fight against bureaucracy is business’s wisest-ever campaigns.
  • DST often protects intense ideological or religious views by triggering hatred toward vocal nonbelievers, and that happens in part because the ideas of the nonbelievers would damage the influence of the believers if they spread.
  • University liberal arts departments, law schools, and businesses all display ideology-based groupthink.
  • Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency combined with Deprival-Superreaction Syndrome is an especially powerful duo.
  • Antidotes include the deliberate maintenance of extreme courtesy, as on the Supreme Court, the inclusion of “able and articulate disbelievers of groupthink.”
  • Labor negotiations often lead to the death of the company – it is more common for the entire company to die than to get a wage cut.
  • Mis-gambling compulsion also comes into play, as losses create a passion to “just get back to even.” Combined with the multiple “near misses” of some games this can lead to compulsive and ruinous gambling.
  • Good poker skill is a good antidote to throwing good money after bad.

An Update on System1 Group

November 1, 2017 in Ideas, Micro Cap

This article is excerpted from a letter to partners of Boyles Asset Management.

System1 Group has been a large swing factor in the fund’s performance during the year. Shares peaked at the end of May at around 1000 pence (p), adjusted for a special dividend. After ending Q2 at approximately 814p, the shares closed Q3 down 35.5% at 525p.

In our Q2 letter, we highlighted the company’s statement that growth was “a little slower than we expected.” While we were of the belief that this wasn’t a meaningful issue, in August the company reported that the trends worsened considerably, and the company would report a decline in net revenue in the high single digits. Given that the company was investing especially heavily this year in support of future growth, earnings would fall for the year and approach break even in H1 (the company has since reported a result much better than break even, but materially lower than in the prior year). This was a decidedly negative and remarkably abrupt change in business conditions.

In the prior three reported periods, net revenue growth on an organic, currency-adjusted basis was 11% in H1 2016, 18% in H2 2016, and 16% in Q1 (calendar 2017). The culprit could be found primarily in a single product line that has been severely impacted in the short term by the abrupt and significant changes that large consumer goods companies are making with their marketing and market research expenditures. In fact, System1 drew a straight line to the failed bid for Unilever by Kraft Heinz.

System1 has guided to a better H2 with revenue growth, but the market is rather suspect. While it has been painful during the last couple of months, we believe the company’s investment in future growth is warranted and that it is prudent (at this stage) that the company forge ahead with that investment despite the significant impact on earnings in a soft revenue year. If we were to recalibrate our thesis, in light of recent industry and business conditions, we would have to acknowledge that the company’s exposure to large global consumer multi-brand businesses, for which System1 has a small share of spend, may not be the tailwind we envisioned. While there remain some short-term concerns about earnings in H2, and we may have to adjust our belief in the tailwind just referenced, we believe the internal rate of return (IRR) potential over a long period is now significant, and that the company has returned to “temporary trudger” status (see our 2017 Q1 letter for a description of this investment category mental model).

One might wonder why we did not sell shares earlier in the year. We do believe that, for a brief period, the shares approximated fair value. While we did in fact sell a few shares, surprisingly they remained relatively illiquid throughout the year, especially so at the highs. Our thesis going into the investment—that as the company grew, performed well and attracted more attention, the shares would become more liquid—did not transpire during 2017. Our decision not to sell more aggressively, perhaps needing to be done at sizable discounts to the market price, was driven by the many great characteristics of the business that still remain true today: the potential to be meaningfully larger in time, a strong free cash flow generation model even while growing, minimal capital requirements, strong financial management, and last but not least, a fanatical owner-operator.

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The Twinkie Conspiracy

October 31, 2017 in Letters

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor John Heldman, portfolio manager of Triad Investment Management.

Field trips. We’ve all done them. My favorite from long ago-third grade I think-was a trip to Los Angeles. We visited the Continental Baking factory. Sound boring? Not for this third-grader. Continental was the home of an all-star lineup of kid’s favorites: Twinkies, Ding Dongs, Ho-Ho’s, Sno-Balls, Zingers, Suzy Q’s. Yes, junk food!

A recent New York Times article about Twinkies owner Hostess Brands got me reminiscing about my long-ago field trip. No, I didn’t go out and buy a 10 pack of them. But it got me thinking about corporate management and the so-called “agency” problem.

As most of us know, an “agent” is a person hired to act on behalf of another, usually called the “principal“. In the world of public investing, corporate executives (the agents) serve the company’s owners (the principals). These agents are paid a salary but often don’t have significant ownership. We’ve found in these cases the executives don’t think like owners because they aren’t substantial owners, they’re just hired guns.

But back to the Twinkie. In the case of Hostess, the company has a bit of a checkered past. The company filed for bankruptcy not once, but twice, due to poor management decisions, poor union leadership, and changing food consumption patterns. Production even shut down in November 2012 for nine months. Twinkie addicts were suffering withdrawal symptoms for months. Some fans feared that Twinkies would be gone–forever.

The carcass of Hostess was dragged through bankruptcy court by a private equity firm. The firm chose which assets to keep and which liabilities to shed. It trimmed the payrolls, closed facilities, shed union contracts and pension liabilities, rejuvenated marketing, and (most importantly) brought back Twinkies. They were a hit, again. The customer loyalty never left. It just required a different set of owners to create a financially viable business.

In the end the private equity firm (acting as an owner, since….they were the owner) made hundreds of millions of dollars of profit by resuscitating Hostess. Who lost out? Clearly, some of the unionized employees who lost their jobs in the process. And the previous public shareholders who saw their investment wiped out in bankruptcy. It’s possible an owner would have worked harder to prevent financial collapse than the agents running Hostess.

If this were just an isolated example of poor public company management it wouldn’t merit much mention. But it’s not. In our work, we see frequent examples of the lack of alignment between public company shareholders and management. Why does it persist?

Public company shareholders are generally dispersed and poorly organized. Big shareholders with the resources to fight, such as pension funds, often vote with their feet and sell the shares rather than create conflict. Information flows in one direction, from company agent to owner principal. No surprise, “agent” managers have an incentive to promote good news, and hide bad news. It’s a “heads I win, tails I don’t lose much” mentality, as managers can walk away from an underperforming business with attractive compensation on the way to their next gig.

Meanwhile, the private equity buyout crowd feasts on the leftovers. Their usual playbook: take an underperforming business private, load it up with debt, improve the operations out of the glare of public ownership, then sell it back to the same public shareholders, but at much higher valuations. Since much of their capital is borrowed, the return on investment for the private equity buyers can be astronomically high.

It’s a lot like buying a fixer-upper home with mostly borrowed money, doing a remodel and flipping it. Except it costs public shareholders billions in lost value.

What this demonstrates to us is the importance of investing in businesses where the managers act like owners. One of the best ways to ensure this is to invest with managers who ARE owners. We’ve found that a significant personal financial commitment is a good sign that management is sitting on the same side of the table as shareholders. And it wouldn’t hurt if there were a Twinkie or two on that table.

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