Peter Lynch on Making Money in the U.S. Stock Market

October 26, 2019 in Curated, Full Video, Timeless Selections, Transcripts

Legendary investor Peter Lynch, former manager of Fidelity’s Magellan Fund, gave a lecture on equity investing and the U.S. economy at the National Press Club in 1994.

Peter Lynch is one of the most successful and well-known investors of all time. He is the legendary former manager of the Magellan Fund at the major investment brokerage Fidelity. He took over the fund in 1977 at age 33 and ran it for thirteen years. His success allowed him to retire in 1990 at age 46. His investment style has been described as adaptive to the prevailing economic environment at the time, but Lynch always stressed that you should be able to understand what you own.

For a deeper understanding of Peter Lynch’s investment philosophy, read his classic, One Up On Wall Street.

We are pleased to provide the following transcript as a courtesy. The transcript has been edited for space and clarity. It may contain errors.

Peter Lynch: I will speak about some of the ideas I used when I was an amateur, when I ran Magellan, and which I still use today. They can make sense for investors.

It’s a tragedy in America that small investors have been convinced by the media – the print media, radio, television media – they don’t have a chance. These media giants have convinced many small investors they can’t compete with big institutions – with all their computers and degrees and money. It just isn’t true. When this happens, people act accordingly. When they believe it, they buy stocks for a week, and they buy options, and they buy the Chile fund this week. Next week it’s the Argentina fund, and they get results proportionate to that investing style. That’s bothersome. The public can do extremely well in the stock market on their own. The fact that institutions dominate the market today is a positive for small investors. These institutions push stocks on usual lows. They push them on usual highs. For someone that can sit back and have their own opinion and know something about the industry, this is a positive. It’s not a negative. So that’s what I want to talk about.

The single most important thing to me in the stock market for anyone is to know what you own. I’m amazed how many people who own stocks would not be able to tell you why they own them. If you press them, they’ll say, “The reason I own this is because the sucker’s going up.” That’s the only reason they own it. I’m serious. If you can’t explain to a 10-year-old in two minutes or less why you own a stock, you shouldn’t own it. That’s true of about 80% of people who own stocks.

This is the stock people like to own. This is the company people adore owning. These are relatively simple companies, and they make a narrow, easy-to-understand product. They make a one-megabit, SRAM, CMOS, bi-polar risk, floating point data IO array processor, with an optimized compiler, a 16-bit dual-port memory, a double-defused metal oxide semiconductor monolithic logic chip with a plasma matrix vacuum fluorescent display with a 16-bit dual memory with a UNIX operating system, four whetstone megaflop poly-silicone emitter, a high bandwidth – that’s important – six-gigahertz double metallization communication protocol, an asynchronous backward compatibility, peripheral bus architecture, four-way interleaf memory, a token ring interchanging backplane, and it does it in 15 nanoseconds of capability. If you own a piece of crap like that, you will never make money. Somebody will come along with more whetstones or less whetstones, a bigger megaflop or a smaller megaflop. You won’t have the foggiest idea what’s happening, and people buy this junk all the time.

I made money in Dunkin’ Donuts. I can understand it. When there were recessions, I didn’t have to worry about what was happening. I could go there, and people were still there, I didn’t have to worry about low-priced Korean imports. I can understand it. And you laugh. I made 10 or 15 times my money in Dunkin’ Donuts. Those are the stocks I can understand. If you don’t understand it, it doesn’t work. This is the single biggest principle.

It bothers me that people are careful with their money. The public, when they buy a refrigerator, they go to Consumer Reports. They buy a microwave oven, they do that. They ask people what’s the best radar range or what car to buy. They do research on apartments. When they go on a trip to Wyoming, they get a Mobil travel guide. When they go to Europe, they get the Michelin travel guide. People hear a tip on a bus on some stock and they’ll put half their life savings in it before sunset, and they wonder why they lose money in the stock market. When they lose money, they blame it on the institutions and program trading. That is garbage. They didn’t do any research. They bought a piece of junk, they didn’t look at the balance sheet, and that’s what you get for it. That’s what we’re being driven to, and it’s self-fulfilling. The public invests terribly, and they say they don’t have a chance. It’s because that’s the way they’re acting. I’m trying to convince people there is a method. There are reasons for stocks to go up. This is magic. It’s a magic number, easy to remember. Coca-Cola is earning 30 times per share what they earned 32 years ago. The stock has gone up thirtyfold. Bethlehem Steel is earning less than they did 30 years ago. The stock is half its price of 30 years ago. Stocks are not lottery tickets. There’s a company behind every stock. If a company does well, the stock does well. It’s not that complicated.

People get too carried away. They try to predict the stock market. That is a total waste of time. No one can predict the stock market. They try to predict interest rates. If anybody can predict interest rates right three times in a row, they’d be a billionaire. Certainly, there’s not that many billionaires on the planet. I took logic, syllogism, when I studied at Boston College. There can’t be that many people who can predict interest rates because there’d be lots of billionaires, and no one can predict the economy. I know a lot of people in this room were around in 1981 and 1982 when we had a 20% prime rate with double-digit inflation, double-digit unemployment. I don’t remember anybody telling me in 1981 about it. I read. I study all this stuff. I don’t remember anybody telling me we’ll have the worst recession since the Depression. It would be useful to know what the stock market will do. It would be terrific to know the Dow Jones average a year from now, to know we’ll have a full-scale recession, or to know interest rates will be 12%. That’s useful stuff. You never know it, though. You just don’t get to learn it.

I’ve always said if you spend 14 minutes a year on economics, you’ve wasted 12 minutes. Now, I must be fair. I’m talking about economics in the broad scale, predicting the downturn for next year, or the upturn, or M1 and M2, 3B. All of these economic terms are less useful to me than when you talk about scrap prices. When I own auto stocks, I want to know what’s happening to used car prices. When used car prices rise, it’s a good indicator. When I own hotel stocks, I want to know hotel occupancies. When I own chemical stocks, I want to know what’s happening to the price of ethylene. These are facts. If aluminum inventories go down five straight months, that’s relevant. I can deal with that. I want to know about home affordability when I own Fannie Mae, or I own a housing stock. These are facts. There are economic facts and there are economic predictions, and economic predictions are a total waste. Alan Greenspan is an honest guy. He would tell you he can’t predict interest rates. He can tell you what short rates will do in the next six months. Try and stick him on what the long-term rate will be three years from now. He’ll say, “I don’t have any idea.” So how are you, the investor, supposed to predict interest rates if the head of the Federal Reserve can’t do it?

You should study history. History teaches you the market goes down. It goes down a lot. The math is simple. There have been 93 years this century. The market has had 50 declines of 10% or more. With 50 declines in 93 years, the market falls at least 10% about once every two years. We call that a “correction,” a euphemism for losing a lot of money rapidly. Of those 50 declines, 15 have been 25% or more. That’s known as a “bear market.” We’ve had 15 declines of at least 25% in 93 years, so every six years, the market has a 25% decline. That’s all you need to know. You need to know the market will go down sometimes. If you’re not ready for that, you shouldn’t own stocks.

It’s good when the market goes down. If you like a stock at $14 and it goes to $6, that’s great. You understand the company. You look at the balance sheet. They’re doing fine. You hope for $22; $14 to $22 is terrific, $6 to $22 is exceptional, so you take advantage of these declines. Declines happen, and no one knows when they’ll happen. People tell you they predicted it, but they predicted it 53 times. You can take advantage of the volatility of the market if you understand what you own. That’s a key element.

Another key element is that you have plenty of time. People are in an unbelievable rush to buy a stock. I’ll give you an example of a well-known company. Walmart went public in October of 1970. It already had a great record with 15 years’ performance and a great balance sheet. You’re a conservative investor. You’re not sure if Walmart can make it. You want to check. You see them operate in small towns. You’re afraid. They make it in seven or eight states. You want to wait until they go to more states. You keep waiting. You could have bought Walmart 10 years after it went public and made 35 times your money. If you bought it when they went public, you would have made 500 times your money, but you could have waited 10 years after it went public and made over 30 times your money. You could have waited three years after Microsoft went public and made 10 times your money. I know nothing about software. If you knew something about software, you would have said, “These guys have it. I don’t care who’s going to win, Compaq, IBM. I don’t know who’s going to win, Japanese computers. I know Microsoft, MS-DOS is the right thing.

Stocks are not a lottery ticket. There’s a company behind every stock, and you can watch it. You have plenty of time. People are in an amazing rush to purchase a security. They’re out of breath when they call up. You don’t need to do this.

You need an edge to make money, too. People have incredible edges and they throw them away. I’ll give you a quick example of Smith Kline. This is a stock that had the successful drug, Tagamet. You didn’t have to buy Smith Kline when Tagamet was doing clinical trials. You didn’t have to buy Smith Kline when Tagamet was talked about in the New England Journal of Medicine or in the British version, Lancet. You could have bought Smith Kline when Tagamet first came out or a year after it came out. Let’s say somebody in your family or you are a nurse, a druggist, or a physician writing all these prescriptions. Tagamet was doing an amazing job of curing ulcers. It was a wonderful pill for the company because if you had stopped taking it, the ulcer came back. It wasn’t a crummy product, you took it for a buck and then it went away. You could have bought it two years after the product was on the market and made 5 or 6 times your money. All the druggists, all the nurses, all the people, millions of people saw this product, but instead they’re out buying oil companies or drilling rigs. It happens. Then three or four years later Glaxo, an even bigger company, a huge company, a British company, bought Zantac which was, at that time, an improved product. You could have seen that take market share and do well. You could have bought Glaxo and tripled your money. You only need a few stocks in your lifetime. They’re in your industry.

If you’d worked in the auto industry – let’s say you have been an auto dealer for the last 10 years – you would have seen Chrysler come up with the minivan. If you were a Buick dealer, a Toyota dealer, a Honda dealer, you would have seen the Chrysler dealership packed with people. You could have made 10 times your money on Chrysler a year after the minivan came out. Ford introduced the Taurus Sable, the most exceptional line of cars in the last 20 years. Ford went up sevenfold on the Taurus Sable. So, if you’re a car dealer, you only need to buy a few stocks every decade. When your lifetime is over, you don’t need a lot of five-baggers to make a lot of money starting with $10,000 or $5,000. In your own industry you’ll see a lot of stocks, and that’s what bothers me. There are good stocks out there looking for you. People aren’t listening and they’re not watching.

People have big edges over me. They work in the aluminum industry. I see the aluminum industry has been coming down; the inventory has declined for six straight months. I see demand improving. In America today, it’s hard to get an EPA permit for a bowling alley, never mind an aluminum smelter. You know when aluminum gets tight, and you just can’t build seven aluminum smelters. When you see this coming, you can say, “Wait a second. I can make some money.” When an industry goes from terrible to mediocre, the stock goes north. When it goes from mediocre to good, the stock goes north. When it goes from good to terrific, the stock goes north. There are lots of ways to make money in your own industry. You can be a supplier in the industry. You can be a customer. This thing happens in the paper industry. It happens in the steel industry. It doesn’t happen every week, but if you’re in some field, you’ll see it turn. You’ll see something in the publishing industry. These things come along, and it’s just mindboggling that people throw it away.

I want to throw out a couple of rules I find useful. People buy when they see a stock has gone down. They ask how much further it can go down. I remember when Polaroid went from $130 to $100 and people said, “Here’s this great company, great record. If it ever gets below $100, just buy every share.” It did get below $100 and a lot of people bought on that basis saying, “Look, it’s gone from $135 to $100. It’s now at $95. What a buy!” Within a year, Polaroid was $18. This is a company with no debt. It was just so overpriced, it went down.

I did the same thing in my first or second year in Fidelity. Kaiser Industries had gone from $26 a share to $16. I said, “How much lower can it go at $16?” I think we bought one of the biggest blocks ever probably on the American stock exchange of Kaiser Industries at $14. I said, “It’s gone from $26 to $16. How much lower can it go?” At $10, I called my mother and said, “Mom, you got to look at this Kaiser Industries. How much lower can it go? It’s gone from $26 to $10.” It went to $6. It went to $5. It went to $4, and it went to $3. I am fortunate this happened rapidly, or I would probably still be caddying or working at the Stop and Shop. It happened fast. It was compressed.

At $3, I figured out there’s something wrong here because Kaiser Industries owns 40% of Kaiser Steel. They own 40% of Kaiser Aluminum. They own 32% of Kaiser Cement. They own Kaiser Broadcasting, Kaiser Sand and Gravel, and Kaiser Engineers. They own Jeep. They own business after business, and they had no debt. I learned this early. This might be a breakthrough for some of you people. It’s hard to go bankrupt if you don’t have any debt, and the whole company, at $3, was selling at a total market cap of about $75 million. At that point, it was equal to buying one Boeing 747. I said there’s something wrong with this company selling for $75 million. I was a little premature at $16, but I said everything’s fine, and eventually this will work out.

Kaiser effectively gave away all their shares to their shareholders. They passed out shares at Kaiser Cement. They passed out shares in Kaiser Aluminum. They passed out the public shares in Kaiser Steel. They sold all the other businesses, and you got about $50 a share. But if you didn’t understand the company, if you were just buying on the fact the stock had gone from $26 to $16 and then it had gone to $10, what would you do when it went to $9? What would you do when it went to $8? What would you do when it went to $7? This is the problem people have. They sell stocks because they didn’t know why they bought it, then it goes down and they don’t know what to do. Do you flip a coin? Do you walk around the block? What do you do? Psychiatrists haven’t worked so far. I haven’t seen the psychiatric or psychological fund file with the SEC and make it through as a mutual fund. They haven’t seemed to help. I’ve tried prayer. That hasn’t worked. If you don’t understand the company, you have this problem when they go down. Eventually, they think it will always come back. This line of thinking doesn’t work, either. People think RCA just about got back to its 1929 high when General Electric took it over. Double knits never came back. Remember those beauties? Floppy disks, Western Union, the list goes on and on. People say it’ll come back. It doesn’t have to come back.

Here’s another one you hear all the time. I’ve had people call me up saying, “I’m thinking of buying this stock at $3. How much can I lose?” Well, you may need a piece of paper for this, but if your neighbor put $20,000 at $50 into the stock and you put $20,000 in at $3 and it goes to zero, you lose exactly the same amount of money, everything. If people say, “It’s $3. How much can I lose?” If you put $1 million on it, you can lose $1 million.

This may be a reason to research a stock. The fact a stock is down $3 from $100 doesn’t mean you should buy it. In fact, short sellers – people who make money in stocks – don’t short Walmart. They don’t short Home Depot. They don’t short the great companies like Johnson & Johnson. They short stocks down from $80 to $7. They’d like to short it at $22, but they figured out at $7, this company will go to zero. They just haven’t blown taps on this thing yet. It’s going to zero, and they’re selling short at $7. They’re selling short at $6, at $5, at $4, at $3, at $2, at $1.25. And you know what? If you sell something short, you need a buyer. Somebody must buy the damn thing! You wonder who’s buying this thing. The buyers are people saying, “It’s $3. How much lower can it go?”

You can’t get too attached to a stock. You must understand there’s a company behind it. You can’t treat this like your grandchildren. You must deal with the stock and say, “I understand the company.” If it deteriorates, if the fundamentals slip, you must say goodbye to it. Remember the rule that the stock does not know you own it. This is a breakthrough. You must understand it and say, they’re doing well and as long as they’re doing well, I’ll hold on to my position. My best stocks have been the stocks I owned in my fifth, sixth, and seventh years, not my fifth, sixth, or seventh day.

I’ll switch through to my long shots. Avoid long shots. I bought about 30 long shots in my life. I’ve never broken even on one of them. I call the bad ones “whisper stocks.” If Arthur Levitt were here, he’d appreciate these stories. These are the times that somebody calls you up and says, “Hi, Peter. How’s Carolyn? How are the kids? I’d like to talk to you about international blivit. Earnings will be unpredictable. They’ll be small. It’s $3 a share,” and they keep whispering all these things. What are you talking about? I don’t understand. Either they’re so surrounded by people that are going to run out and buy this stock because it’s so exciting, or they think the SEC is listening in. They’ll get a shorter term –they’ll get six months in the camp rather than two years in the camp. But whisper stocks don’t work.

I want to conclude by saying there’s always something to worry about if you own stocks. You can’t get away from it. What happened in the 1950s, people were worried about. The only reason we got out of the Depression was World War II. We got another recession in the early 1950s. We said we’re going to go right back into a depression. People were worried about a depression in the 1950s, and they were worried about nuclear war. Back then, the little warheads they had then, they couldn’t blow up a McLane in West Virginia, or a McLane in Virginia or Charleston. All of these countries that end in -stan – there’s nine of these “-stan” countries that came out of Russia. They all have enough warheads to blow the world up and no one worries about it. When I was a kid, people built fallout shelters. We used to have civil defense drills. Remember this one in high school? You get under your desk. I never thought, even then, that was a particularly good thing to do. They’d blow a whistle, somebody would put on a hat, and we would all get under our desks. But in the 1950s, people wouldn’t buy stocks. Except for the 1980s, the 1950s was the best decade this century of the stock market. People wouldn’t buy stocks in the 1950s because they were worried about nuclear war and they were worried about a possible depression.

Remember when oil went from $4 to $40 and was headed for $100 and we were going to have a depression? About three years later, the same experts who said oil would go to $100 are higher paid now and they said it was headed for $4 and we’re going to have a depression.

Remember how the Japanese were going to own the world, and we were going to have a depression? And then about two years later, we were all worried about Japan collapsing. This is the most absurd thing I’ve ever heard. This is a country with a 20% savings rate, incredible work force, incredible productivity, and people were saying we’re going to have a depression because Japan is going to collapse. In their prayer list, they’ve lowered Mother Teresa and crippled children and they’re praying for Japan at night. It’s unbelievable.

Remember the LDC debt? Chase had lent their net worth to Brazil, Chile, Peru and those other countries. They were not going to pay it back and we were going to have a depression. It always ends in we’re going to have a depression, or we’ll have the Great Depression. Now, I understand what these are called – then, they were called “less developed” countries. We used to call them “underdeveloped” countries. Those are all wrong terms. Those are not politically correct. You must call these “emerging” countries. The other day I heard the politically correct term for somebody that’s overweight: laterally challenged. There is always something to worry about.

The key organ in your body in the stock market is your stomach. It’s not the brain. If you can add 8 and 8 and get reasonably close to 16, that’s the only level of math you need to know. You don’t need to know the area under the curve. Remember that quadratic equation and integral calculus and the area under the curve? Whoever cared what was under the damn curve? But you had to study this. You don’t need this in the stock market. All you must know is that it’ll always be scary, there will always be something to worry about. You must forget all about it. Cut it all out and own good companies or own turnarounds. Study them and you’ll do well.

The following are excerpts of the Q&A session:

Monroe Karmin: When managing a portfolio, do you pay attention to the activities of Congress and the regulators?

Lynch: I spend zero time thinking about what’s happening down here in Washington, and I spend only a little time thinking about what’s going on in Russia or China. I just deal with facts. When the economy’s going down, when economy’s going the wrong way, I can deal with that. But this whole healthcare reform bill drove a lot of drug stocks down to low levels. I could say to myself, “60% of Johnson & Johnson’s earnings are outside the United States.” Their pharmaceutical drug business is all patented and nothing’s coming off patent. They only have 5% of sales from one product, which is Tylenol, which is already an over-the-counter drug and it’s growing overseas. Why has this stock gone from $58 to $36? These companies are already dealing in Japan and overseas. They already have the government controlling pharmaceutical prices. They’ve dealt with them. I deal with facts. They might, this year – I thought it was likely they’d have a bill passed on healthcare. It didn’t happen. It drove the stocks down, but I think the stocks would have rebounded anyway even if the healthcare bill had passed. I don’t deal with what’s happening in Congress or what’s going to happen in the future. I just deal with what’s happening in the economy and what’s happening in the companies I call.

Karmin: How useful is the financial reporting in the general daily press to you? And how useful should it be to investors in general?

Lynch: It has improved dramatically not just in the press but also company reporting. Ten years ago, companies didn’t have interim balance sheets. I’d imagine they only gave their balance sheet to you annually. Now they share it quarterly. They report inventories, receivables, and other useful information. In the major newspapers, they even show types of funds. There are around 2,500 companies in the New York Stock Exchange. There are over 5,000 different mutual funds, twice as many mutual funds as stocks. At least in the paper, they explain something about the fund.

If you own auto stocks, you shouldn’t be reading the financial part of the newspaper. Many local newspapers devote a whole four pages on automobiles weekly. They talk about new models and offer opinions about automobiles. If you own auto stocks, that’s the part of the newspaper automobile stock owners should look at.

You shouldn’t be calling your broker four times a day to get stock quotes. It doesn’t work. Getting up in the morning to see how your stock did yesterday is not useful, either. All this stuff is just a waste of time. If you’re adding up how much your stocks are worth, it’s an absolute waste of time. You should be looking at the company when you get the quarterly reports.

If you were in the retailing industry or if you were in the restaurant industry, you would have seen companies like Taco Bell, McDonald’s, and Toys “R” Us. You would have seen all these companies do terrifically well. You would have seen Bombay and Radio Shack and its Tandy. You would have seen Radio Shack roll across the country until there were 25 Radio Shacks in every major city. You said there’s not much room for them to grow, but they had a great 20-year run. That’s what you’re dealing with. You’re not dealing with the minutiae of today. You’re dealing with what this company is doing two years, three years, four years, five years from now. If you’re dealing with a cyclical and business is turning around, you wait for signs that business is slowing down. When you see it, you move on to something else.

Karmin: Are you concerned about the volatility in the financial markets today? Do you think something needs to be done to reduce it?

Lynch: I love volatility. I remember the market went down dramatically in 1972. Taco Bell went from $14 to $1. It had no debt. It never closed a restaurant. I started buying at $7, but I kept on it and it went to $1. It was the largest position in Magellan in 1978 when Pepsi-Cola bought it out at $42. It would have gone to $400 if Pepsi hadn’t bought it out. Volatility is terrific. These calls are important. I don’t think the market going up 80 points one day and down 80 the next is a good thing for the public. But I think all these callers and all these other things to keep the volatility down each day is important, but the market is going to go up and down.

Human nature hasn’t changed a lot in 25,000 years. Some event will come out of left field and the market will go down or the market will go up. Volatility will occur, and the markets will continue to have these ups and downs. That presents a great opportunity if people can understand what they own. If they don’t understand what they own, they can own mutual funds and keep adding to their mutual funds. Basic corporate profits have grown about 8% per year historically. Corporate profits double about every nine years. The stock market ought to double about every nine years, too. The market is about 3,800 today. I’m convinced the next 3,800 points will be up. It won’t be down. After that – the next 500 or 600 points – I don’t know which way they’ll go. The market ought to double in the next eight or nine years and double again in the eight or nine years after that because profits will go up 8%, then stocks will fall. That’s all there is to it.

Karmin: We’re in the month of October. Beware of the month of October, the witching month of the stock market. What do you see as the outlook for this month? And when do you think the Dow will hit 4,000?

Lynch: October’s always been a special month. In 1987, I was convinced the market was not in trouble and I didn’t worry about things. Carolyn and I planned this great golf vacation to Ireland. We planned to visit one course and stay at a little house and visit another and go all along the west coast of Ireland and play golf. We left on a Thursday night. The market went down 55 points that day, which was not too good. The next day, we got to Ireland. Because of the time difference, we had completed our day. I got back to the hotel and called in. The market had gone down 112 on Friday. I said to Carolyn, “I think if the market goes down on Monday, we’re going to have to go back.” We stayed there for the weekend, and on Monday, the market went down 508 points. My fund went from around $12 billion to around $8 billion. That gets your attention – two working days. I said by the end of this week, I’d have no fund.

There wasn’t a lot I could do. Here it was Monday, because the market didn’t open – by 12:00 in Ireland it was still 7:00 in New York. We did spend that day, and we played around and golfed more, and then we went somewhere instead to watch the market deteriorate. I did return home. There was nothing I could do about it. But I think my shareholders thought differently. They called up and asked, “Well, what’s Lynch doing?” They said, “He’s on the sixth hole. He’s even par now, but he’s in a trap. This could be a triple bogey here. This could be a big inning.” I don’t think that’s exactly what shareholders wanted to hear, but it’s not like I could do something about this damn thing. So, I came back home and suffered with everybody else. I was consistent. When I ran Magellan, in 13 years the market went down nine times. Every time the market went down, Magellan went down. I was nine for nine.

Here’s another one of these numbers you must write down: If you put $1,000 in a stock, all you can lose is $1,000. I’ve done that several times. But if you’re right, you make $5,000, $10,000, $20,000. In this business, you don’t have to be right one out of two times. You can be right one out of four. A lot of the times you’re right, you know the company’s doing well, you know they’re doing a great job, and you add to it or at least you don’t sell it, which is a tragedy. You can make more money on the upside. I just roll those out. I will now flip a coin to tell you whether the market will go to 4,000 this year or next year. Heads means it goes up, but it’s a two-headed coin. I flipped the coin and the market will go up in the next year. That’s it. That’s all I ever know about the stock market.

Karmin: As you can imagine, we have many questions about where people should put their money. I’ll divide it into two parts, and you can address it. This questioner intends to put $1,000 yearly into their four-year-old daughter’s education fund. Where should it be invested? The other question covers everybody else: What are some of your current market favorites and why?

Lynch: On the first one – and this is important whether you’re investing for a four-year-old, a 14-year-old, or a 74-year-old – you must ask, “What am I going to do when the market goes down?” I’ve had audiences like this, and I’ve asked, “How many people in the room are short-term investors?” I’ve never had anybody raise their hand. Everybody in the world is a long-term investor until the market goes down. I remember 1990, a scarier year than 1987. In 1987, the market just fell. You call up companies, and they say, “Our business is terrific. We’re about to announce a stock buyback. We’re already buying back stock. Business is great, and we can’t figure this out.” But 1990 was different. Iraq invaded Kuwait. You had the banking system on the ropes, I mean close. You call up a company and they say their business was slowing down.

We sent 500,000 troops to Saudi, and we’re about to fight what people thought was the fourth largest army in the world. Some said they were the toughest army in the world. This was going to be a terrible war, and we ought to sit them out. Remember the big theory? A lot of people in this city said we ought to wait them out. We’d still be waiting for them in 120 degrees, about 500,000 people. I think Bush made an incredibly brave decision on the information he was getting to go in there and knock them out or we’d still be there. But that was an ugly time, and that was scary. Some people learned from 1987 and they stood throughout that and said, “I’m confident about the next 5, 10, 15 years in this country,” and they hung in there.

If you want to buy a small growth fund or a balanced fund that’s part bonds and part stocks and you put so much money in, then you should put more in every year. You’ll be pleased in 10, 20, or 30 years. Stocks will beat the hell out of money markets. They’ll beat the hell out of bonds. Think of it this way: Great corporations like McDonald’s, Marriott, or any other will never get together and say, “We’re doing well. Why don’t we raise the coupon on our bonds? Those bond holders have been loyal. We’ve been given 8%. Why don’t we raise it to 9%?” Companies like Automatic Data Processing – it does payrolls, an amazing prosaic company, 32 years of higher earnings, 32 years of double-digit earnings growth. We’ve had recessions. We’ve had wars. We’ve had changes in Congress, changes in the Supreme Court, but it’s had 32 years of up earnings. That’s what you’re relying on; Johnson & Johnson has 30 years of up earnings, General Parts 42 years of up earnings, Emerson Electric 38 years of up earnings. You don’t see companies like this in other parts of the world. That’s what you buy when you buy a fund. You buy a bunch of good companies.

As for the stocks, the financial area has been attractive. Stocks like Chemical, or Traveler’s, or Citicorp, or Bank of Austin, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, these stocks have all come down. Their businesses are terrific. They’ve improved their balance sheets. They’re selling at multiples half or 1/3 lower than the general market. We have a chance for the cyclicals for the first time in a long time – the steels, papers, aluminums, chemicals. It’s their turn to come to the plate. We seem to have an economy recovering in Latin America. Brazil is turning around. These are facts, again. Things are improving in India. Europe had the worst recession since the Depression. There are 18 million people out of work in Western Europe right now, and the economy is starting to slowly turn. Japan has bottomed. I think you’ll see demand.

Commodity prices look attractive. Aluminum prices reached a 30-year low. Ingot has almost doubled. You’ll see the same thing with linerboard. We’ll see a good time for cyclical stocks, and I think the auto stocks are also extremely cheap at four or five times earnings. These are not extraordinary times. Housing is affordable. It’s not as affordable as it was two years ago, but on a 20-year basis, housing is affordable. Automobiles are affordable. Consumer durables are affordable.

We hear about job growth. In the recession, we lost 1.8 million jobs, and now we’ve added 5.8 million, 4.5 million in the last 19 months. We lost 1.8 million and we’ve added 5.8 million back. We’re 4 million to the good. The tough part of it is we dropped about 600,000 manufacturing jobs and we only brought back 100,000 manufacturing jobs. But there are a lot more people working, and I think that trend will continue. This is key. This is what you hear from the press. This is what you hear from TV. In the decade of the 1980s, the 500 largest companies eliminated 3 million jobs, but there were 2.1 million businesses started in the 1980s. If they just have 10 people each, that’s 21 million jobs. It’s an incredible job machine we have in America.

That’s what happened in the 1980s. These 2.1 million businesses created all the jobs. In the decade of the 1990s, the top 500 companies will eliminate another 3 million jobs, and all you ever hear about is company X lays off 5,000 people in Hartford, and company Y lays off 5,000 people in Rochester. Somebody doesn’t buy a sofa in Scottsdale, Arizona because they read about layoffs in the Northeast. That’s the nature. These companies must make these layoffs to stay competitive. That’s our business. We’ve had, in the last 2.5 years, 1,750 companies become public. They raised over $100 billion. There are only 2,500 companies on the New York Stock Exchange. They’ll put the capital they raised into research and development. They’ll put it into more plants and more efficient equipment. This is a fantastic thing for these companies. I think the situation is excellent.

The banking system today has more investments on the left side of the balance sheet. We’re talking about the governments they own, the mortgage-backed securities they own, then they have loans for the first time ever since 1951. They’re only making 50, 20, 30 basis points and they said, “We’ll have to make loans.” The banking system has the highest equity-to-assets in 45 years. The banking system is ready to go. There’s lots of liquidity to run. I don’t know why some people are so depressed about people getting hired all the time. I can’t quite figure this out. I’ve never met a banker or anybody in business that likes recession. I’ve yet to find these people.

Karmin: Speaking of banks, are you concerned about banks being allowed to offer mutual funds and the confusion that creates among investors over whether bank deposits are insured or not? Are you concerned about the whole question of deregulation?

Lynch: I think it’s positive that banks will be allowed to sell mutual funds because they’ll probably sell a lot of Fidelity mutual funds. That’s important. No, but seriously, I think it’s important that people understand when they own a bond fund that bonds can go up and down. Bonds are just about as volatile as stocks. If they own a 30-year bond fund, then you can lose 25%, 30% of your money fast even if they’re government bonds. People must understand this.

There’s an incredible rate of illiteracy in our public. All they ever hear about is what happened today to Bristol-Myers going up $2 or $3, what happened to Dow Jones. They don’t get to learn anything about America. People near retirement are given, say, $450,000 as early retirement. They have no experience. They don’t know what a bond is. They don’t know what stocks are. They must make decisions in 30 or 60 days, or they’ll have a big tax consequence. These people have no experience learning about the stock market. It’s a tragedy. I think anything we can do to educate the public, if you can convince people, if they understand the volatility of the stock market – I’m not saying anybody should buy a stock. I’m just saying if you purchase a stock, you must do certain things. If you’re not ready to do those things, you should keep your money in the bank. Keep your money in a money market fund.

Some people don’t do their homework, they don’t have the stomach for it. They should stay out. They’re not doing anybody any good by taking half their life savings and putting it in the stock market. They’ve been lucky enough to save $50,000 or $60,000 to send their kids to college, and one is going to start in a year. They’re going to take all that money and put it in an equity mutual fund with a one-year horizon. That’s doing no one any good. The SEC is working hard on explaining to people the nature of these products. If they understand them, they’ll do better with it. The more information, the merrier.

Fidelity is launching a major study on retirement. It will be out by the end of this year. We’ll do it over 1,600 people, over 300 experts. We’ll do a major study and explain to people the nature of retirement and how they can best understand how they should invest their assets. We won’t mention Fidelity – maybe subliminally! We’re trying to help. There’s been an incredible push by the SEC to do this, and I think it’s a positive element.

Karmin: A couple of questions about that. What do you think of the SEC’s proposal to require mutual funds to adapt a quantitative ratings scale for riskiness? Also, what effect do you feel the new shareholder rights proposals for more open disclosure and communication are having on companies and the market?

Lynch: I’m not too familiar with the SEC proposal. Concerning the new shareholder rights proposals, I think you must be careful crossing the bridge on how much we get involved in managing companies. There should be a disclosure about people getting paid and a disclosure on how many shares they own. But I don’t think we should decide whether they should make this acquisition or whether they should expand this plant. When you get too involved in running a company, it’s complex. A lot of great companies have made a lot of decisions you haven’t heard about because they decided not to do something, so the best decision they didn’t do is to not do something. If they’re under all this pressure from shareholders of what to do and what not to do, they’ll take their eye off the ball and won’t be able to run the business. The companies that do well look out five, six, or seven years. Some of the decisions they make might not be the right thing for the next year, but they are the right thing for years later. The more we concentrate on what they’re doing and we keep commenting on it as outsiders, it’s going to be run by an enormous committee and we’ll get committee results. I don’t think that’ll help anybody. But disclosure of relevant facts like how many options people have, whether the options are at the market, and what they’re paid – I think that’s important.

Comments in a letter by the Chief Executive in the annual report are fairly new. It is a valuable piece of information. You don’t realize these companies spend a lot of time on this letter. It’s a serious document, and it’s helpful to shareholders. Quarterly shareholder reports are excellent. Also, everybody in America can contact a company. Access is not limited to Fidelity and Platinum and Dreyfus. If you own 100 shares, you can call a company, and somebody will talk to you about it. People don’t take advantage of that. These companies are willing to talk.

On these quantitative and qualitative risk ratings, I think if it could be done, I think it might be possible. I’m a little confused about it. I’m not that current on it. But I think people should understand that certain stock funds, emerging growth funds, small cap funds, and investment companies with $50 million of sales are more volatile than when you’re buying major quality blue chip growth companies. Also, long-term bonds are more viable than medium-term bonds, which are more volatile than one-year bonds. These are things that should be explained to people. People should get a menu like you get at Howard Johnson’s.

Karmin: Several people in the audience asked how you view Fannie Mae’s stocks and options today.

Lynch: I’d include Freddie Mac in that, too. Both companies have great businesses. People study chess. This would not be a good game to study for the stock market. In chess, an outstanding player beats a good player 1,000 times in a row. Everything’s in front of you. All the moves are known. It’s all technique. However, in poker and bridge, there are many uncertainties. You can play a hand exactly right and lose. You can say, “Well, I played it right. If I do it again, over a night, over a month….” That’s not the stock market. The stock market is closer to poker than to any other game, and I think that’s the important thing to know.

Fannie Mae has been like a 27-card stud poker game. Cards keep getting turned over. We were not doing so well in Houston – this was 10 to 12 years ago – with these 5% downs that a lot of people had in mortgages. People moved there for jobs. They brought their spouses along. The job left. They had no ties to those communities and they left. It was the same in Oklahoma or in Alaska. When that card turned over, it was ugly. They were losing $1 million a day. That was easy to remember. That wasn’t too pleasant. They finally figured out we have a good business. We’re extremely low cost. If we can match our liabilities and assets, make a small spread even when we have low cost, we can have a pretty good business. Then a card would turn over like when real estate prices started to go down in California. They started to go down in the Northeast. Then you’d say, “Oh, I better keep checking to see what foreclosures were like.” If you keep watching the story, every year you get a chance to buy this again. Something will come up. People are worried rates would go down. Stocks went down because rates went down. Now that interest rates are going up, the stocks are going down because interest rates are going up. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are still doing great, and I think they’ll be terrific stocks. They won’t quadruple, but they’re about 25% undervalued now. They’d be good stocks to own for five years.

Karmin: This next question is from a fellow with a real problem. He says if the real secret of your success is following your daughters to the shopping mall for stock tips, what do we bachelors do?

Lynch: I think one of the reasons people get so depressed is they get away from children. On the weekends they read all these magazines, they need the newspapers, and they’d become economists and get so depressed. They’re bullish if they take that lunch to work on Monday. You need to rent a 12-year-old on the weekend. They don’t know about the problem of the ozone layer disappearing and all these terrible things we think of all the time and we get so depressed about. They don’t know about how second basemen and shortstops get paid $4 million and they can’t throw to first base on a bounce. You need to find a 12-year-old and rent him for the weekend and follow this boy or girl around and see where they’re shopping.

Our kids love Body Shop. I bought it, and I think it will be a good stock. Our oldest daughter, Mary, likes Ann Taylor. She had to dress up to go to work when she was working a summer in a consulting firm. She thought Ann Taylor’s prices were good and the quality was good, and it was a great stock pick. My wife, Carolyn, is an extremely good shopper. She almost got a black belt in shopping. Because of the children, she didn’t quite finish that, but she’s a good shopper. She’s given me some great tips, too. I think either you must use your spouse, or you must go out on your own.

Once the biggest position in my fund was Hanes, which owned L’eggs. It was a huge stock. Consolidated Foods eventually bought it. Hanes had a monopoly on L’eggs, and L’eggs is a big company. I knew somebody would come along with a new product. Kayser-Roth introduced “No Nonsense.” I was worried this “No Nonsense” thing was better, and I couldn’t quite figure out what was going on. I went to the supermarket and bought 62 pairs of “No Nonsense.” I bought different colors, different shapes. They must have wondered what house I came from. I brought them into the office and passed that to anybody, male or female, who wanted one of these things. Just take them all and tell me how it is. They came about in about three weeks and said it’s not as good. That’s what research is. That’s all it was. I held on to Hanes, and the stock was a huge stock. That’s what it’s about.

David Einhorn in Discussion at the Oxford Union Society

October 26, 2019 in Curated, Full Video, Timeless Selections, Transcripts

David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital visited the Oxford Union in 2017 to engage in a question-and-answer session with students at Oxford University.

David Einhorn is an American investor, hedge fund manager, and philanthropist. He is the founder and president of Greenlight Capital, a “long-short value-oriented hedge fund.” Born in New Jersey, Einhorn graduated from Cornell University in 1991 and moved to Westchester, New York to start his fund. He started his fund in 1996 with $900,000 and generated 16.5% annualized return for investors from 1996 to 2016. As of 2017, Greenlight Capital had US$9.27 billion in assets under management. He has received extensive coverage in the financial press for his fund’s performance, his investing strategy and his positions.

For a case study of David Einhorn’s battles as a short seller, read his book, Fooling Some of the People All of the Time.

George Soros on the General Theory of Reflexivity

October 26, 2019 in Curated, Full Video, Timeless Selections, Transcripts

George Soros shared his thinking on economics and politics in a five-part lecture series recorded at Central European University in 2009. The lectures were the culmination of a lifetime of practical and philosophical reflection.

In the following lecture, which is of particular interest to investors, Soros discussed his general theory of reflexivity and its application to financial markets, providing insights into the financial crisis of 2008. Other lectures examined the concept of open society, which had guided Soros’s global philanthropy, as well as the potential for conflict between capitalism and open society. The closing lecture focused on the way ahead, examining the important economic and political role that China would play in the future.

Robert Cialdini on the Power of Pre-Suasion

October 26, 2019 in Curated, Equities, Full Video, Timeless Selections, YouTube

Robert Cialdini spoke at the London-based Royal Society of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce about his book, The Power of Pre-Suasion, in 2016. What separates effective communicators from truly successful persuaders? The world’s foremost expert on influence reveals the results of three decades of research.

Cialdini’s research shows that the secret to persuasion doesn’t lie in the message itself, but in the key moment before that message is delivered. He visited the RSA to show that the best persuaders spend more time crafting what they do and say before making a request. In this way, they gain a singular kind of persuasive traction by arranging for recipients to be receptive to a message before they encounter it. Cialdini calls this pre-suasion. “To persuade optimally,” he says, “it’s necessary to pre-suade optimally.” In other words, to change minds most effectively, a pre-suader must change initial “states of mind.”

Alliance Data Systems: Defensible Core, Rapidly Winning New Business

October 26, 2019 in Communication Services, Financials, Ideas, Letters

This article is excerpted from a letter authored by Samer Hakoura, principal at Alphyn Capital Management, based in New York.

ADS has two segments, the Card services division (85% of operating profit) and LoyaltyOne (air miles in Canada, 15% of operating profits). Card Services operates Private Label Credit Cards, which are store-issued cards that consumers can use only at the issuing store. While ADS manages its customers’ card operations, such as receivable financing, bill processing, and delinquency management, its real strength is in driving customers’ sales through targeted loyalty programs and marketing campaigns. It does this by signing long-term (5-15 year) contracts and integrating with and managing its clients’ customer care and digital marketing activities, providing trained call center staff and data scientists who build detailed individual customer profiles to track shoppers’ buying habit and preferences.

With its deep roots in the retail industry, ADS was formed in December 1996 through the merger of J.C. Penney’s credit card processing unit and The Limited’s credit card bank operation, the company has a large proprietary data set of consumer behavior, and is thus able to target highly relevant digital ads that drive additional consumer purchases. For example, when a consumer buys an item at a retail partner, they receive an email or are exposed to targeted display advertising suggesting a matching accessory or related item. This requires both SKU-level detailed data, and purchase behavior across different retailers. It would be financially prohibitive and operationally complex for customers to replicate these marketing activities, and few competitors possess equivalent data at the same level of granularity. ADS has a demonstrated ability to increase customer sales by 20-30%,[1] and a very sticky business (a “high switching cost” moat), as evidenced by retention rates of approximately 99% (excluding customer bankruptcies and sales), and multi-year Returns on Equity in the 30%+ range.

Card Services earns money like most other credit card companies, through interest and fees on credit card balances and late payments. A difference between it and general card companies is ADS is on a closed loop system, with no interchange fees to be paid by the customer (as charged by Visa and MasterCard). In fact ADS pays retailers a proportion of sales through a through a Revenue Share Agreement.

Sentiment on the company is currently quite negative for a plethora of reasons, most of it beginning in early 2016 when overall market sentiment turned against all things bricks and mortar, from traditional retailers to mall operators. ADS went from being a 20%+ per year growth story to a more pedestrian 8-10% as large legacy files were liquidated, such as Bon-Ton (liquidation, ~4.5% of receivables), Gander Mountain (bankruptcy), and Virgin America (bought by Alaska Air).[2] A series of own goals did not help, including repeatedly missing earnings guidance, and a poorly managed plan in 2016 to let LoyaltyOne’s air miles points expire that caused public outcry in Canada.[3]

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The Oil Tanker Industry: The Pendulum Swings Back

October 24, 2019 in Commentary, Equities, Industry Primers, Transportation

This article is authored by Alirio Sendrea, head of research at Invexcel, based in Madrid. Alirio focuses on bottom-up analysis of European small and mid-caps.

During the last couple of weeks, rates of both crude (dirty cargo) and product tankers (clean cargo) have increased dramatically, reaching ten-year highs. The trigger has been US sanctions on China’s shipper COSCO for carrying Iranian crude just when the industry is heading into high season (i.e., winter in the North Hemisphere) and into its most transformational change (i.e., IMO 2020). Inevitably, the market has turned again to the Tanker industry pushing prices to the upside. Unsurprisingly, many tanker companies rush to pitch their virtues, trying to convince investors on why they are the best positioned to take advantage of the juncture.

All this is nothing but temporary noise. As part of the group of investors who have been patiently waiting for over two years for the developments to occur, this is a key moment to stick to the fundamental aspects behind the cycle.

This is a competitive, fragmented industry. Operators and ton owners, price takers by large, have shown historically a chronical lack of discipline which worsens the extreme cyclicality of the industry, especially for the downside. Key is to understand the current cycle, let’s tear apart and briefly summarized the different demand and supply moving pieces.

Demand Side

No matter what the surge in alternative energies, oil consumption increases as a reflection of the growth in world population and urbanization. Unsurprisingly, ~80% of consumption growth comes from Asia. Meanwhile, ~80% of the new oil extraction comes from the Atlantic basin, supporting the ton/mile demand, a key driver for the crude tanker industry.

Industry specialists forecast the yearly growth of oil consumption to be in a band of 1.1mbd to 1.4mbd. The same as you, neither do we believe in the forecasting power of specialists. However, let’s do some basic numbers. Considering 1.0mbd/year growth, assuming 50% of new barrels come from the Atlantic Basin plus the balance from the Arabic Gulf, and six trips/year/vessel (to simplify the complex even more, let’s think only in terms of VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers, a juggernaut able to carry up to two million barrels), the result is demand increase of 30+ VLCCs equivalent a year, i.e., ~2.5% of the global fleet.

Important to note, US shale oil provides not only for a mitigation to OPEC+ oil supply reductions but it’s also a great support for the ton-mile story. Gulf infrastructure was an issue to accommodate large carriers, but this is now being solved with new investments in ports and pipelines.

Supply Side

Newbuilds and Orderbook

Tanker industry comes from foolish ordering recently. As a consequence, 2019 is set to be a record year in terms of deliveries (in the VLCC segment, we are witnessing a 25-year record). However, the orderbook begins to fade in 2020, approaching record lows, and pointing to almost zero deliveries in 2021/2022. Current orderbook over global fleet represent ~10% for crude tankers and ~7% for product tankers.

There are good reasons to believe that there is no significant risk to this thesis, at least during the next 24 months. Access to financing has tightened and shipyard capacity has diminished and will continue to be limited.

Financing

Traditional source of finance for the whole shipping industry has been banks from the Northern Europe/Baltic region. These banks now suffer heavy regulatory burdens, which explains their diminishing exposure to the industry. And regulation for banks can only increase.

A few years ago, every ship owner had reasonable access to bank financing; today, it is mainly available to those with good track records and strong balance sheets. Alternative financing is available in the form of sale and leaseback transactions, but at a higher cost.

Shipyards

Part of the miseries in the tanker industry were caused by the increased capacity in shipyards (tankers are built mainly in South Korea, China and, in lesser extent, in Japan) and their irrational pricing policies when the orderbook began to shrink. Shipyards built at a loss for a time and ton owners placed orders to take advantage, worsening the fleet capacity issue which is still correcting. As the race took longer, the shipyard industry went into stress, some even went out of business. Nowadays, the sector has consolidated and surviving shipyards are subject to a tight control by their creditors.

Shipyard business is on average running almost at full capacity, their pipeline is very busy at least for the following two years as they are delivering tankers ordered during the mad years and the increased demand for LPG/LNG carriers.

Building a tanker takes, from ordering to delivery, between 18 and 24 months. All in all, it is not expected any significant additions to the global fleet at least until 2022.

Fleet Ageing

Tanker fleets are getting old. Vessels older than fifteen years represent ~20% and ~16% of the crude and product tanker global fleets, respectively. For those new to the shipping industry, compulsory drydocking (Special Surveys) take place every five years up to year fifteen and every two-and-a-half years afterwards. As the hull and engines get older, Special Surveys get more expensive. As a consequence, depending on rate environment and expectations, beginning year 15, ton owners face the dilemma of going ahead with the next Survey, move to storage or sell to demolition. Obviously, there are other factors playing like oil/products inventory levels, steel scrap values, opportunity to move from dirty to clean cargo or vice versa.

This time, Special Surveys come with some different caveats.

First, beginning October 2019 vessels traveling on ballast should install in their next Special Survey a “Ballast Water Treatment” filter to meet environmental regulations. This adds something from $0.5m to $1.5m, depending on vessel size.

Second, IMO 2020 regulation enters into force on 1 January 2020, setting a 0.5% sulfur cap on the fuel used for shipping. This is a transformational change for the industry as there are two possible options to meet this regulation: burn MGO or any compliant blend fuel meeting the cap (the latter being developed by refiners, this won’t be a short term option for the whole market given expected homogeneity and stability issues) or install a costly filter named Exhaust Gas Cleaning System AKA “Scrubber”, which cost ranges from $2.0m to $5.5m depending on vessels size and specifications.

In the meantime, owners are happily taking advantage of current juicy rates. But this will not last for longer, they will face the dilemma sooner than later and options are basically:

A. Incur in expensive Surveys in addition to retrofit costs:

a. Install the Ballast Water filter and a Scrubber, or
b. Install the Ballast Water filter but not a Scrubber. In this case, the old vessel choosing to burn more expensive fuels will compete with younger and more efficient vessels, and with those that installed Scrubbers,

B. Take their vessel out for storage, or

C. Scrap.

We believe that incurring in such high investments is not an option for very old vessels, so we will see mainly options B and C for vessels older than fifteen years.

Tying the numbers to the low orderbook and structural demand increase, we expect a supply-demand inflection point very soon.

Some Words on IMO Regulations

Vessels that have chosen to install Scrubbers are taking advantage of imminent Special Surveys for necessary retrofits which lengthens the drydocking time. Therefore, a short-term constraint in supply will concur with the busy winter season.

Furthermore, IMO 2020 represents a great opportunity for the Product tanker segment. The need of compliant fuels and their storage in almost every single port imply more cargo moves around the globe.

Thinking more long term, IMO 2030 is on sight with a target to reduce CO2 emissions by at least 40% by 2030. For those looking to invest in a ship with a 20/25-year useful life, this is a material aspect to consider as more than half of the life of that vessel will be available when this new regulation gets enforced. Today, there’s no clear path to follow. LNG seems like the long-term winner, however the investment in retrofitting seems quite pricy (some talk of $15+ million). New, more efficient engines using the same fuels could be and option, but need to be designed… and tested.

Don’t Overlook the Risks

Leverage matters a lot. Many participants feel that non-recourse debt (i.e. attached to vessels which do business by their own as separate legal entities) is a wildcard that can be drawn at convenience.

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Why Brand Stewardship Matters

October 23, 2019 in Equities, Letters

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Todd Wenning, a senior investment analyst at Ensemble Capital Management, based in Burlingame, California. Visit Ensemble’s Intrinsic Investing website for additional insights.

“Sometimes, I am even asked why I can feel so optimistic about our future. The answer is simple; We are in a great business, with great people, great products and technology, and an unbeatable brand name.” —CEO George M. C. Fisher, 1997 Kodak Annual Report

Like many kids over the last 50-plus years, my four-year-old son recently got into LEGO. You might even say his interest in LEGO was inevitable. The LEGO brand is so powerful it’s just assumed that kids will play with their interlocking plastic bricks.

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The Concept of Traps, Updates on Mastercard and Tiffany

October 22, 2019 in Commentary, Equities, Ideas, Letters

This article is excerpted from a letter by MOI Global instructor Sean Stannard-Stockton, president and chief investment officer of Ensemble Capital Management, based in Burlingame, California. Visit Intrinsic Investing for additional insights.

One of the more important drivers of equity returns recently has been something that did not happen. The US did not go into a recession. Back in the 4th quarter of 2018, many investors began to fear that a recession was near at hand after strong levels of economic optimism had characterized the first nine months of 2018. But as we pass the one-year anniversary of these fears exploding into the public consciousness, the unemployment rate has remained at low levels, solid rates of economic growth continues, even as the US laps quite strong levels of growth last year, and corporate revenue and earnings continue to grow.

Notably, the decline in home sales that began last summer and was a key sign of potential economic weakness, has now reversed and returned to growth. As we discussed in a blog post in November of last year examining the housing weakness, even indicators like declining home sales that have a decent historical record of predicting recessions, are not by themselves actually strong evidence that a recession is coming.

While the overall US economy has not gone into a recession, the manufacturing and industrial segments of the economy have slowed to a crawl and are running at near recessionary levels. This is actually the third such slowdown over the last ten years. During both of the past slowdowns, as well as so far this time, consumer spending, which makes up 70% of the US economy, has remained resilient.

In the fund, we have Mastercard (6.2% weight in portfolio) trading near all-time highs as the company directly benefits from consumer spending with management saying they see continued growth. On the other hand, we have Landstar Systems (4.7% weight in portfolio), which facilitates transportation of goods shipped via big rig trucks. The company’s flatbed segment specializes in moving heavy equipment used in manufacturing and industrial industries and the slowdown in these end markets is evident in the company’s financial results.

But as is normal, the drivers of the Fund performance this past quarter were primarily company specific items, rather than macro trends. Notable areas of strength in the Fund during the third quarter included TransDigm (3.3% weight in portfolio) up 14%, Google (7.2% weight in portfolio) which rallied by 13% and First American Financial (4.7% weight in portfolio) which gained 11%. TransDigm’s gains were driven by positive updates from the company on the integration of a large acquisition they completed recently. The strength in Google came from a strong earnings report, which calmed market concerns related to the previous quarter in which the company missed earnings expectations. And First American’s stock benefit from the rebound in housing sales.

The primary source of weakness in the Fund was Netflix (6.0% weight in portfolio), which fell 27%. We also saw modest declines of 5% and 3% respectively in Ferrari (6.6% weight in portfolio) and Oracle (4.5% weight in portfolio). The decline in Netflix’ stock was caused by weaker than expected new subscriber additions in the most recent quarter and investor concerns about competition from Disney Plus, launching in November. We’ve written extensively about Netflix, but in short, we believe that the weaker than expected subscriber results was within the range of normal volatility seen when the company raises prices and we believe that Disney Plus will do well, but a slate of blockbuster movies and kids TV shows will be an addition to, not a replacement for, a Netflix subscription. The declines in Ferrari and Oracle were relatively modest, with Ferrari’s decline more a consolidation of gains earlier in the year (the stock is still up over 50% this year) while Oracle declined some on renewed concerns about their shift to a software-as-a-service business model, and yet the stock remains up over 20% so far this year.

Later in the letter, we will be discussing two of the holdings in the Fund in more depth. However, in addition to investors being interested in the positions in the Fund, we are often asked why we don’t own certain companies. Given the Fund is a focused portfolio of 15-30 stocks, we spend a significant amount of time researching any company before it enters the Fund and then we continue to engage in rigorous research as long as we are shareholders. So, sometimes the answer to why we don’t own a certain stock is as simple as the stock in question has never made it to the top of our priority list. But we also research and ultimately pass on many potential investments that are perfectly good companies.

Back in the beginning of 2018, we published an in-depth discussion of why we chose not to invest in a company called Ecolab, despite concluding that it was a perfectly solid company. In this letter, we’re going to describe in more general terms entire classes of stocks that come close to meeting our requirements for investment, but which we ultimate decline to purchase. In a focused fund, what you don’t own can have a significant impact on performance and so we wanted to lay out the process by which we choose to avoid stocks that at first glance may appear to be great companies.

We recently created a diagram that distills our investment philosophy into a few core principles. In a recent blog post introducing the diagram, we noted that three factors must always be in place before we would consider investing in a company: a competitive moat protecting the company from competition, strong management, and forecastability. When one of those factors is missing, we call those investment ideas “traps.”

We thought we’d elaborate on our trap concept here. We’ve identified three traps we want to avoid. First, the commoditization trap. This is when there’s strong management in place and an easy-to-understand business, but either a non-existent or narrowing moat. Much of a company’s intrinsic value is driven by its so-called “terminal value” – the value the business will create over the very, very long term. As such, if we’re not confident that a company can maintain or widen its economic moat beyond 5 or 10 years, estimating terminal value becomes increasingly difficult. In this circumstance, long-term returns on invested capital and growth – the two pillars of our valuation model – can decline faster than might otherwise be expected. Some investors are comfortable making a bet on a company’s decline being slower than market expectations – and that’s another way to make money – but we think that’s a dangerous game and one we intentionally avoid.

The second trap is a stewardship trap. This is when there’s evidence of a durable moat and an easy-to-understand business, but we lack confidence in management. We live in a hyper-competitive economy where cheap and abundant capital and new advertising platforms have made it easier than ever for challengers – whether that’s a startup or Amazon – to take on lazy incumbents and chip away at their business. Because of this, we require our companies to be managed by what we consider to be good business stewards. Our management teams need to understand how to create sustainable value and thoughtfully allocate capital.

The final trap is the complexity trap. This is when we like management and think there’s a durable moat, but we just can’t get comfortable understanding the business. Sometimes the reason is that we lack requisite domain knowledge in a specialized field. Other times, the financials are opaque, or the business operates in multiple competitive arenas and we struggle to grasp unit economics. Before investing in any company, we want to appreciate the known risks and the so-called “known unknowns” about the business, and a lack of understanding prevents us from achieving this.

To be sure, there are a lot of good companies that fall into one of these traps. They might even make good investments at the right price. But our aim is to own great businesses – and then, of course, pay a reasonable price for them. Because we manage a concentrated fund of between 15-30 companies, we must be selective and stay true to our strategy. Hopefully this discussion provides a glimpse into the rigor of our investment process.

We know that there are a lot of good companies that we don’t own. Our goal isn’t to have an informed opinion on every stock in the market, but only to find 15 to 30 stocks that possess all of the characteristics that we look for and also trade at a discount to what we believe they are worth. The truth is, stock picking is hard. While there are lots of stocks that we think might be a good investment, we are looking for a very select group of stocks where we think the odds are stacked heavily in our favor. Sticking to the discipline we just described is critical to our process.

Company Focus

Mastercard Inc. Class-A (MA)

Mastercard Inc (6.2% weight in portfolio): We’ve owned Mastercard in the Fund since inception and we believe it ranks near the top of fund in terms of meeting and exceeding our requirements in each of the core areas of our assessment process.

Mastercard is a company that pretty much everyone has heard of. In fact, if you are reading this letter, no matter where you live in the world, as long as it’s not China, there is a very good chance you have a Mastercard in your wallet or purse. If you don’t, then you have a Visa card. You probably have both. These two companies hold an effective duopoly on the processing of credit and debit card payments.

Importantly, these companies do not lend any money. If you look at your credit or debit card, you’ll find that it is issued by a bank. If it has the name of a non-bank company on it, such as American Airlines or Apple, these companies have just partnered with a bank to issue the card. In American Airlines’ case, it’s Citibank and the new Apple credit card is issued by Goldman Sachs. The issuing bank is the one whose checking account a debit card is tied to and they are the ones lending the money to fund credit card payments.

On the other side of the transaction, is the merchant and its bank. No matter whether you swipe your card, or wave your Apple Watch with Apple Pay, or use PayPal to process a payment via your credit or debit card, or use Google Pay or Amazon Pay to facilitate an online transaction, in each case your bank and the merchants’ bank need to exchange information across a communication network. And that network is almost always provided by Visa or Mastercard. While you might hear about how merchants pay 2% or more in credit card fees, Visa and Mastercard are only collecting about 1/20th of that fee, with the banks, the ones taking the credit risk, earning the bulk of the fee.

Americans are so used to using debit and credit cards that it is easy to lose sight of how amazing the Visa and Mastercard networks are. The fact is that when you walk into a store anywhere in the United States, you take it for granted that the merchant will allow you to swipe a little piece of plastic with either the Mastercard or Visa logo on it and they will then let you walk out with your purchase. The reason you carry a Visa or Mastercard is because you know they are accepted everywhere. And the reason they are accepted everywhere is because everyone carries one. This is a classic example of a “chicken and egg problem.” Before everyone accepted these cards, it was difficult to convince consumers to carry one. And before everyone carried one, it was difficult to get merchants to accept them.

Having solved this problem, Mastercard and Visa now have a competitive moat around their businesses, which makes it very difficult for any new company to compete with them. Recently we visited a Target store in the middle of Silicon Valley. At the checkout stand we noticed a sticker advertising that they accepted Alipay, the payment network founded by the Chinese company Alibaba. When we asked the cashier how often people used Alipay, she actually didn’t know what we were talking about. Despite having noticed the sticker, no manager had ever thought to explain it to her, and no customer had ever asked to use it. Why wasn’t she trained on how to process Alipay transactions? Because her manager knows that few people carry this form of payment. Why don’t customers carry this form of payment? Because few stores accept it. Building a globally accepted payment network was hard in the past. But today it is even harder because not only must a new company in the payment industry solve the chicken and egg problem themselves, but now that it has already been solved, a new competitor must solve the problem in a way that is much better than the existing solution.

So, let’s finish looking at Mastercard through the lens that we just introduced; moat, management and forecastability.

First of all, we think Mastercard has a very strong moat for the reasons just explained. We also think this moat will remain valuable because we think it is highly likely that a decade and more from now, the service Mastercard provides will remain critical to facilitating commerce and valuable to both merchants and consumers.

We also believe Mastercard’s management team is top notch. Not content to sit still and milk cash earnings from their network, Mastercard’s management team is forging ahead into business to business transactions. While a large portion of consumer transactions occur via cards, business to business transactions, the payment of invoice to vendors and other payments between business, is still a slow, manual process. So Mastercard has been investing earnings from their credit and debit card network into solving the B2B payments problem. They’ve also been aggressively forging ahead in emerging markets, where they have been a leader in using new technologies and adopting their systems to local markets.

While Americans are used to their cards being accepted everywhere, in India, the birthplace of Mastercard’s CEO and a country with a population four times larger than the US, only 5% of merchants accept credit cards. With the chicken and egg problem not yet solved in this country as well as some other emerging markets, the competition is fierce, but the opportunity for Mastercard is very large. Despite reinvesting in their business, Mastercard produces far more excess cash than they need to grow the business. So, we are also glad that they have shown themselves to be smart allocators of capital, buying back significant levels of their own stock at very attractive prices, paying a dividend, and increasing the amount of debt in their capital structure in a prudent manner.

Finally, we believe that the company’s long-term economics and thus the value of the business, is reasonably forecastable. This is partially because of the domain expertise our team has built over the years and our confidence that we have a strong understanding of the payments industry in which Mastercard operates. But just as importantly, it is because we believe Mastercard’s business to demonstrate high levels of intrinsic forecastability.

While some companies are subject to highly unpredictable changes in macro factors, such as an oil company being dependent on the price of oil, Mastercard’s business is driven by far more stable trends. The key metric for those global consumer spending trends, which even during recessions do not decline by more than a couple percentage points and which we are confident will grow at a modest, but steady rate over the very long term. On top of that growth driver, the company benefits from the relentless shift of consumer spending from cash and checks to credit and debit. While it might seem that much of this shift has already played out in developed markets, we can look at a near cashless country like Sweden to see that even US consumers are likely to see continued declines in the use of cash and checks. Our CIO had a little example in his own life recently when his utility company emailed to say that rather than directly billing his checking account for his monthly bill, they were now offering the option to have his bill linked to his credit card. And in the San Francisco Bay Area, we see more and more new stores opening which simply do not accept cash payment.

Of course, while we have very high levels of conviction in Mastercard, it doesn’t come close to being a risk free investment. All investments in equities involve accepting relatively high levels of uncertainty. It is the requirement of accepting uncertainty that explains why stocks offer higher rates of returns than bonds. But in seeking investments for the Fund, we require every company to exhibit relatively low levels of uncertainty compared to the average public company on the core issues of the longevity and relevance of the their competitive positioning, the management teams capabilities in creating economic value and allocating excess cash flow, and both the intrinsic forecastability of the business as well as our own team’s capabilities and circle of competence.

Tiffany & Co (TIF)

Tiffany & Co (4.4% weight in portfolio): When we think about luxury goods, two things tend to come to mind. First, we tend to think of European brands like Louis Vuitton, Chanel, and Cartier. In fact, according to the consulting firm Deloitte, French, Italian, and Swiss companies together accounted for just under half of global luxury good sales in 2017. Second, we tend to recognize a luxury brand when we see one. A Ferrari, for example, is unmistakable, as are Louis Vuitton handbags with their ubiquitous LV insignias. That’s largely the point in purchasing a luxury item, of course – to communicate status to others.

Curiously, Tiffany does not fall into either of those buckets. It’s one of just a few global American luxury brands and the casual observer cannot tell a Tiffany diamond engagement ring from one purchased elsewhere. There’s no room on a diamond for logo placement, after all.

So how does Tiffany do it? Like its European luxury counterparts, Tiffany is draped in a wonderful narrative and history. You might be as surprised as I was to learn, for instance, that Tiffany has been around since 1837 and has been in the diamond business since 1848, when Charles Lewis Tiffany opportunistically purchased diamonds from fleeing French aristocrats in the French Revolution of 1848. His timing couldn’t have been better, as new American millionaires clamored for royal jewelry to show off their recently achieved status. That’s what got the ball rolling.

As a company, Tiffany is older than Cartier (founded in 1847), Louis Vuitton (founded in 1854), and Burberry (founded in 1856). This durability matters in luxury because it communicates a brand’s ability to endure all kinds of major socioeconomic changes and remain relevant over successive generations. It also communicates a certain timelessness of core products that remain in fashion despite intermittent fads and trends.

Tiffany is one of the few brands in the world that can be identified by a color alone. Its trademarked robin egg blue provides instant recognition, from near or far. And that color communicates elegance, exclusivity, and sophistication. To be sure, more than one would-be suitor has tried his hand at putting a non-Tiffany item in a Tiffany Blue Box to achieve the desired effect. It’s a risky move, of course, for if the ring doesn’t fit, you have some explaining to do when the recipient needs it to be resized. But that speaks to the power of the Tiffany brand – that the color of the box can multiply the value of what’s inside it. Assuming the item was properly acquired, a Tiffany ring in a Tiffany Blue Box communicates to the recipient that you’re worth the extra money.

Tiffany’s narrative has been carried forward into the modern era by popular media, such as the classic movie Breakfast at Tiffany’s starring Audrey Hepburn, and more recent movies like Sweet Home Alabama and The Great Gatsby. The most recent advertising campaigns feature millennial celebrities like Zoe Kravitz, Lady Gaga, and Elle Fanning.

To be sure, the Tiffany brand has been mismanaged at various points in its history. However, we think current CEO Alessandro Bogliolo, who joined the company at the end of 2017, has been a fantastic brand steward and is executing well in the areas the company can control. Notably, we are encouraged by his focus on “informal” luxury to better resonate with the Millennial generation. Last year, for instance, Tiffany opened a “style studio” in London’s Covent Garden, about a mile away from its ritzy high-end storefront on Old Bond Street. The “style studio” format is more informal than the main store, with barstool seating, fragrance dispensers, and opportunities to interact with and customize Tiffany-branded jewelry. We think this is a healthy way for Tiffany to reach out to new consumers without diluting the core brand value.

Like other luxury brands, Tiffany is seeing growth in emerging Asian economies, some of which are adopting Western-style engagement ring culture. In August, Tiffany announced a partnership with India-based luxury retailer Reliance Brands Limited to open new stores in Delhi and Mumbai. As the CEO of Reliance Brands put it in the press release announcing the deal, “Tiffany needs no introduction in India – it is iconic and timeless.”

That quote brings up an important point about Tiffany’s brand-driven moat. As we mentioned earlier, it’s extremely challenging to attach a brand (and command a related price markup) to a piece of jewelry that from a distance cannot be differentiated from a similar item. Given its rich heritage and place in popular culture, Tiffany, as the Reliance Brands CEO put it, “needs no introduction.” This is a huge advantage for Tiffany against any would-be upstart competitors.

In many other areas of the luxury goods market, we’ve seen direct-to-consumer brand startups leverage social media to take on incumbents. But it’s far more difficult to start and scale high-end jewelry, as the product doesn’t outwardly advertise the brand. It takes decades, if not generations, to be considered “iconic and timeless.” And this says nothing about the expensive input costs – gold, platinum, diamonds, skilled artisan wages – that would go into a high-end jewelry operation.

In summary, we’re confident in Tiffany’s moat and have growing confidence in Tiffany’s management. We think the company is set up well for continued relevance in future generations.

Definitions

Price-to-Earnings (P/E) Ratio is the standardized valuation metric. The higher the number, the more expensive the stock is for each dollar of earnings per share.

Operating Profit is the profit of a company after it pays expenses attributed to its sales but before interest, taxes, restructuring and other onetime charges.

Operating Margin is Operating Profits divided by sales (or revenue). It allows you to compare profitability across companies and industries by standardizing across sales levels.

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Disclosures: Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks, and charges and expenses of the Fund carefully before investing. The prospectus contains this and other information about the Fund. You may obtain a prospectus at www.EnsembleFund.com or by calling the transfer agent at 1-800-785-8165. The prospectus should be read carefully before investing. An investment in the Fund is subject to investment risks, including the possible loss of the principal amount invested. There can be no assurance that the Fund will be successful in meeting its objectives. The Fund invests in common stocks which subjects investors to market risk. The Fund invests in small and mid-cap companies, which involve additional risks such as limited liquidity and greater volatility. The Fund invests in undervalued securities. Undervalued securities are, by definition, out of favor with investors, and there is no way to predict when, if ever, the securities may return to favor. The Fund may invest in foreign securities which involve greater volatility and political, economic and currency risks and differences in accounting methods. Investments in debt securities typically decrease in value when interest rates rise. This risk is usually greater for longer-term debt securities. More information about these risks and other risks can be found in the Fund’s prospectus. The Fund is a non-diversified fund and therefore may be subject to greater volatility than a more diversified investment.

The information contained in this post represents Ensemble Capital Management’s general opinions and should not be construed as personalized or individualized investment, financial, tax, legal, or other advice. No advisor/client relationship is created by your access of this site. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. All investments in securities carry risks, including the risk of losing one’s entire investment. If a security discussed in this blog entry is owned by an employee, principal and/or client of Ensemble Capital you will find a disclosure regarding the security held above. Should an employee, principal and/or client of Ensemble Capital subsequently purchase or sell any position in a security discussed in this blog entry, we will not update the above disclosure nor revise any archived blog entry after the date it is originally posted. If reviewing this blog entry after its original post date, please refer to our current 13F filing or contact us for a current or past copy of such filing. Each quarter we file a 13F report of holdings, which discloses all of our reportable client holdings. Ensemble Capital is a discretionary investment manager and does not make “recommendations” of securities. Nothing contained within this post (including any content we link to or other 3rd party content) constitutes a solicitation, recommendation, endorsement, or offer to buy or sell any securities or other financial instrument.

Kambi: The Picks-and-Shovels of the Sports Betting Industry

October 21, 2019 in Ideas, Letters

This article is excerpted from a letter by MOI Global instructor Elliot Turner, managing director of RGA Investment Advisors, based in Stamford, CT and Great Neck, NY.

2018 was a watershed year for turning this formerly illegal activity into a regulated, legal activity. Many regular people cheered and entrepreneurs greeted the news with enthusiasm. Meanwhile, the stock market hardly noticed. From the first two sentences, you may have thought we were writing a prelude to a marijuana company pitch, but you need not worry, we have yet to find an investment even tangentially related to marijuana that is not inflated with hot air. Instead, we will use this space to present to you our investment in sports betting.

On May 14, 2018 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 6-3 in favor of striking down The Professional and Amateur Sports Provision Act of 1992 (PASPA). PASPA effectively made sports betting illegal in any state who had not already commenced a sports betting system (the four grandfathered in states were Nevada, Oregon, Delaware and Montana, though only Nevada actually had a single-game betting regime in place).[1] [2] The case was commenced in 2011 following a New Jersey referendum in favor of legalizing sports betting in Atlantic City. Consequently, once SCOTUS overturned PASPA, New Jersey was the first new state ready to take a legal bet in a decades. On August 1, 2018, in New Jersey, DraftKings became the first company in the United States to take a legal sports bet through a mobile app ever.[3] That historic bet was powered by a company named Kambi Group PLC, the subject of this writeup.

Rarely can one find companies like Kambi that are well-positioned in an industry undergoing dramatic change, while also reasonably valued in the market. There are a few reasons this opportunity exists as it does. First, Kambi’s ownership base is predominantly European and the European sports betting market is far more mature on the regulatory and technology fronts. Familiarity with the US market and the regulatory regime is complicated and challenging for some Europeans to fully grasp. Second, US investors intrigued by sports betting hardly have Kambi on their radar. In our informal survey of other investors on the space, we have yet to encounter anyone who has heard of the name before, even those who have invested in companies premised on their exposure to the sports betting opportunity. Good evidence of this is a Bloomberg article boasting how “Draftkings’ Legal Betting Shows How Big Gambling Can Be.”[4] There is not a single mention of Kambi, though there is much excitement about the scale of the opportunity. In the hundreds of articles we have scoured from mainstream sources like Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal, there is hardly a mention of Kambi anywhere. We are quite fond of this setup.

In gold rush industries, the saying goes: “invest in the picks-and-shovels, not the gold miners” and we think the sports betting industry is no different. Kambi is the “picks-and-shovels” in the form of a SaaS provider of the tools the “gold miners” (aka the sports books) need in order to conduct their business. We have always been fond of the SaaS business model for its recurring revenue nature and high customer-level margin profile; however, given the market shares this infatuation multiples have become incredibly stretched at US-listed SaaS companies. Worse yet, many of these high valuation SaaS companies have yet to prove their business models can be profitable over the long-run. Kambi is different. They are both profitable and valued at a fraction of the sales multiple of the more glamorous SaaS names.

Kambi has a $430 million market cap and a $402 million enterprise value. The company is headquartered in Malta, and listed in Sweden on the NASDAQ OMX under the symbol KAMBI, with a pink sheet ADR in the US under the symbol KMBIF. Kambi boasts many of the qualities we often espouse in our commentaries: the people operating the business own meaningful equity, have a history of innovating in product and business model in their sector, are applying technology to old industries, benefit from strong secular tailwinds, boasts high margins and even higher incremental margins, and multiples that are downright reasonable. In fact, while Kambi’s stock has compounded at around 32% since its June 2014 IPO, its EV to Forward Sales (EV/S) multiple has contracted from about 4.5x to 3.25x. In other words, the returns in Kambi’s stock since inception have come from increasing the value of the business itself.

Kambi’s origins:

Kambi was founded in 2010 as part of a larger company formerly known as Unibet (today Kindred Gaming). Kambi CEO Kristian Nylen and his cofounders at Unibet saw an opportunity to take the prowess they had developed in setting lines and managing risk for the Unibet sports book and packaging it as a full service, business-to-business backend for both established and aspiring sports book operators. Founding essentially meant bringing in a customer who was willing to pay for the services other than Unibet and giving 80 employees a seat in the new division. By 2014, Kambi had established meaningful relationships with growing sports book operators, demonstrating robust top line growth and a scalable cost structure. The concept was thus proven and in 2014, Unibet decided that Kambi would need independence in order to achieve its highest ambitions. Independence from Unibet would be instrumental in Kambi’s go-to-market strategy of trying to win business with operators who may be competitors of Unibet in some or all jurisdictions. It would also afford Kambi its own institutional imperative and opportunity to forge its own unique identity separate and apart from a parent, while aligning incentive structures for employees. As such, on May 20, 2014, shares of Kambi were spun off to Unibet shareholders and Kambi became an independent public company.

Kambi’s business model is smart and aligned with their front-end partners. Partners who use Kambi have a better menu of possible wagers, can offer more lines in more situations, and are ultimately more profitable. The company charges a take rate in the low to mid-teens percent of net gaming revenue in exchange for providing their services. Net gaming revenue is the revenue an operator earns after deducting all regional and federal taxes and promotional activity offered by the operator from gross gaming revenue (GGR). Kambi’s revenue can be calculated as follows

Kambi Revenue = (GGR – promotions) * (1-tax) * (take rate)

The Industry Landscape:

Stated simply, the industry is highly complex. The complexity itself is multi-faceted. This is an industry with black, gray and legal markets. In places where sports betting is legal, investors and operators must contend with a highly fragmented regulatory regime, where each domicile has different rules and taxes. Plus, there are multiple layers of companies operating in the industry who in some respects look like competitors, while in other respects they may be partners. Establishing an addressable market for the industry, let alone a given company focusing in a niche is thus a complex endeavor itself.

Essentially there are three ways sports books make lines (the following three are paraphrased from The Logic of Sports Betting by Ed Miller and Matthew Davidow)[5]:

1. Algorithms that rely on troves of data to estimate probabilities.
2. Scraping lines from publicly available betting sites on the Internet.
3. The market making price discovery function.

None of these are mutually exclusive and the best bookies rely to some degree of all three. For bookies where the algorithms drive the lines, human traders add an overlay and reassess changes in model inputs that a computer simply cannot see on its own.

A recent example illustrates why this is so important:

[6]

When Andrew Luck announced his sudden retirement on August 24, 2019, the Borgata sports book, (run by GVC) held its lines related to the Colts for extended periods of time. Any time a quarterback will miss time, especially one with the skill of Andrew Luck, betting lines related to the team should change. This mistake at the Borgata afforded the opportunity for some sharp bettors to place action on stale lines, reflecting imperfect information. The bettors gain in this case is the book’s loss.

The landscape in the United States offers a nice microcosm for the challenges the entire industry faces. While the repeal of PASPA opened the door for legalized betting on the state level, the Interstate Wire Act of 1961 (The WIRE Act) effectively makes interstate sports betting efforts illegal.[7] As a result, even if sports betting were legalized in each and every state individually, there would be challenges in operating a national sports betting business.

Here is a good map that as of the time of this writing, shows where each state stands:

[8]

Even if every state does eventually legalize sports betting, each state has taken its own approach to creating an industry structure. Effectively there are three distinct market structures states can choose from:

1. Open competition. Allowing any and all worthy operators with a license the opportunity to compete.
2. Monopolistic/oligopolistic licensing structure. So far this typically evolves in states with an existing, but limited brick-and-mortar betting industry, where operators are given the right to launch their own sports books.
3. The lottery structure whereby the state owns and operates the book itself.

Each state has approached the distinction between brick-and-mortar and mobile licensing differently. Some have only legalized brick-and-mortar, some have fully legalized mobile, while others have legalized mobile with the requirement that either funding or withdrawal be done at a brick-and-mortar location. As for the parties that actually take bets, there are two basic business models: those who are fully integrated and make their own menu and betting lines, and those who rely on an outsourced provider for the menu and lines. No two operators in either bucket are exactly alike.

The front-end, in general (whether it be for integrated operators or pure front-ends) is a low margin, highly competitive business, while the back-end is structurally higher margin with considerable operating leverage and meaningful points of differentiation between offerings. While front-ends primarily invest in customer acquisition, back-ends invest in research & development in order to build out their capabilities and enhance their offerings.

Scale is incredibly important in making good lines; however, the balkanized regulatory regime makes scale a complex challenge. With greater scale, a book can take less “proprietary trading” risk and end up with better matched markets. A scale operator sees more flow and has insight into whether their lines are priced appropriately. An important value in seeing this kind of scaled flow is how the operator can build customer files and know who is a “sharp” bettor. If all the “sharps” are coming in on one side, it becomes a strong tell that a line is mispriced. Pulling this all together, scaled operators have less variance in their daily, weekly and monthly profitability. Further, scaled operators can offer a bigger menu because the costs to build out each pillar of the betting business are largely fixed. The quest for scale is even more important insofar as in-game betting is concerned (discussed more below), where lines must be priced every second, requiring distinct technology for both the estimation of probabilities and the acquisition, incorporation and delivery of the information.

One of the big distinctions industry people talk about in sports betting is the “European vs Vegas model.” The Europeans tends to focus on user experience and the entertainment angle to sports betting, whereas Vegas is far more interested in the skill and quantification thereof. Kambi put this rather succinctly: “So from the end-users’ perspective, we believe that we are in the entertainment business. We help our customers to provide a service to our end users — or not a service but an experience to our end users. And if the end users do not find that experience compelling, they will easily move to another sports book and put their bets there.”[9] Vegas is more purist and idealistic in the “American” way, thinking the “best odds” (aka lowest vig) are what win customers at a book. These differences in perspective have consequence, because in the early stages of regulation in the US market, the European companies have had a considerable advantage getting to market. European companies are already profitable, with scalable technology infrastructures. In contrast, American ones (represented colloquially as “Vegas”) were never built for scale and never had the opportunity to open up for in-play betting.

Kambi’s solution:

Kambi offers its partners two essential services that are related to one another—1) they build the menu and set the lines, and 2) they manage the risk. Here is Kambi’s explanation for how the process works:

What you do when you deliver this end-user product called sports betting? You can look at it this way, somewhere in the world 300,000 events per year is played in all various types of sports. They may have some relevance to some end users to bet on. We buy data from all these events in realtime. And this date then streams into our system and our organization. So there we work with a mix of specialist traders and algorithms. So we use that data to — for any really type of occurrence of what can happen here to predict the outcome. So I think we heard before, we — today, we do in a month 480 million predictions like that, which is what we call odds spin. That’s about 100 predictions per second.

And we actually don’t think that we get this right every time. It is impossible to, at that scale with a quite small margin, get that probability right every time. And that leads us onto the third part here, which is really a core part of what we do, and that’s the risk management. So in the lifecycle of an odd as we publish it on the site, a lot of new information comes. You have bets being placed, you have market movements, you may have injury news, you may have a really big bet or you may have really a high accumulated risk for one operator. And our risk management is about really optimizing at all times the price given this new information that we get.

At the heart, really, of risk management for us comes what we call player profiling. So this is about for every end user really that does something with our product, we build a profile of future profitability of that player. In around 98% of the cases here, we don’t really act on the information from end users from a risk management perspective. But around 2% of the players, they actually come with new information to us that we use in the trading. So adapt the price.

Further, Kambi gives their partners great latitude in how they want to use the platform for their own differentiation:

“How Kambi differs from its competitors is that it offers this freedom, this flexibility, to innovate, to create and to build a sportsbook as desired. Kambi takes all the heavy lifting through the provision of sophisticated technology, a powerful sportsbook core and an experienced trading and risk team to deliver exciting sports betting experiences, while the operators, if they so wish, can work with us to co-create how those experiences are packaged and presented, as well as what levels of vig are applied per sports and per market.”[10]

Kambi’s edge stems from their ability to offer large scale, leading partners, across geographies:

  • Easy integration using Kambi’s APIs
  • A scalable software platform with little down time
  • Integrity
  • Quick access to markets following regulatory change.
  • A broad menu of diverse betting options, priced appropriately
  • A fair operator margin

Key partners (in no particular order) include Kindred, 888 Sports, BetPlay, Draftkings, Rush Street, Penn Gamin and more adding up to about 25 total relationships.

Back-end is the SaaS end:

“I think the biggest change that has happened for us here — the last 4 years is when we really moved over from delivering a service including a front-end client. We then started also delivering a service where you don’t need to take our client, you can work directly on our APIs. You have our full product either end to end with a mobile and web client or you can work directly on our APIs and create this yourself.”[11] – Erik Logdberg, Deputy CEO & Chief Business Development Officer

In the call following the announcement of Flutter Entertainment’s merger with The Stars Group (TSG), there was an insightful exchange on the lack of synergy between a front-end and back-end in sports betting:

Edward Young, Morgan Stanley, Research Division – Equity Analyst

I’ll ask 2 genuine questions. The first one is could you just elaborate a little bit what you meant on the conservative API approach to tech integration? And does that affect your capacity to generate additional synergies above that GBP 140 million target? And the second one is, are there any gray markets that TSG operates in that you or the Flutter Board would consider exiting?

Jeremy Peter Jackson, Flutter Entertainment PLC – CEO & Director

Okay. Thanks, Ed. Look, in terms of the first question about a conservative API approach, if I look at how we manage the Paddy Power Betfair integration work, we effectively had to turn the Betfair technology stack into something that could operate on a certain multi-brand, multi-jurisdictional basis. And we then migrated all of Paddy Power onto its back, and it’s a big, complex thing to do.

Since then, we’ve actually been able to separate our front-end and back-end platforms such that our front-end platforms communicated our back-end platforms by APIs. And that will allow us under this transaction — this proposed transaction to effectively allow teams with their own front-end platforms to maintain those product road maps, but then just to fit into a back-end betting platform and our global risk and trading capability, which we think will allow us to maintain momentum into the business, maintain individual identities associated with the brands but still deliver some considerable cost savings.

Jonathan Stanley Hill, Flutter Entertainment PLC – CFO & Executive Director [4]

The only thing I’d add there is it also — we feel is a much better customer proposition for enabling the front — the local teams and the brand teams to maintain their own identity and deliver really what the customers are after. [emphasis added][12]

Following the completion of the Flutter and TSG merger, the combined entity will be the largest sports betting company in the world. The foremost synergies in the deal come from “API based technology integration” though that effectively means that TSG will no longer run its own platform and all incremental investment to improve the product will be foregone and narrowed. The entirety of the synergies add up to 7.3% of TSG’s revenue run-rate (and even less so on the 3 year forward revenue guide, in the year in which synergies are actually meant to be achieved) and 3.7% of the combined company’s revenues. Simply put, the synergies are a fraction of the rationale behind the deal, with cross-selling the customer file serving as the primary motivation.[13]

The fact that the back-end’s relationship with the front-end, even at the largest sports book in the world, is so “complex” is the ultimate validation of Kambi’s raison d’etre and strategy. In effect, within Flutter, you have two separate companies with little vertical synergy, relationship or cross pollination between the teams. Front-ends have fundamentally distinct skill sets from back-ends. Front-ends have customer files and marketing prowess, whereas the back-ends are the technology. The Flutter team makes it abundantly clear that the front-end and back-end are essentially two entirely different businesses. Meanwhile in the industry there is only one other back-end who can adequately service both retail and mobile needs (SBTech) and a few others who do well at retail but suffer mightily online (William Hill/IGT, Don Best, NYX). If you want the best multi-jurisdiction sports book, Kambi is essentially the only option for a high quality operator.

A look at the common-sized income statement of Kambi (a pure back-end) versus Kindred (a pure front-end) paints a clear picture of the distinct differences in the two business models:

Note the higher EBIT and EBITDA margins at Kambi, despite boasting well over double the top line growth rate, in an investment phase. The two highlighted lines are the big points where Kambi must spend more than Kindred, but importantly, these are the two lines with the most leverage on the income statement. As Kambi grows, the highlighted expenses will shrink, while Kindred will remain in steady state in aggregate. The clear difference between the front and back-end here is how the back-end invests in its human and technological capital (human capital is captured in “Administrative Expenses” where just less than half of the line is covered by personnel and personnel related expenses), while the front-end invests in marketing. This is the skill divide between the two: back-ends are competent in technology, while front-ends are competent in customer acquisition. Flutter’s emphasis on “cross-selling” with 18 references littered throughout their merger call hammers home this distinction in competency.

The beauty of the SaaS model from Kambi’s perspective is how it translates to very high incremental margins. There is very little incremental cost to onboard a new partner. Instead of charging customers a fixed fee per month, Kambi charges a take-rate on NGR of approximately 15%. We do think there will be some modest atrophy to somewhere around 13% over time as some larger customers achieve their scale ambitions, while remaining on Kambi in order to protect the front-end’s own profitability. Meanwhile, Kambi can continue to invest in product development and share the benefits of that investment with their partners. Kambi has 700 employees today, which includes 250 traders and 200 developers. The trading team is the non-SaaS piece; however, that is already at its mature size. Meanwhile, the company is recruiting more developers in order to continue enhancing the technology side. A key area within technology is risk management, where you need a higher degree of control to make sure no one has better information and better stakes. The infrastructure to aggregate, analyze and apply data is also a key area of investment. As of today, Kambi makes 450 million odds changes per month. In order to accomplish this feat, you need exceptional technology and people behind it. The investment is considerable and few, if any front-ends have the scale in order to do it on their own.

Partner with Integrity, Build Industry Knowledge:

“And the reason why is because we have that one solution and what it includes in it is about challenging mindsets, it’s about educating. And what we focus on is that second point there. Don’t turn up for meeting with the CEO or a Chairman or Board member or anyone if you haven’t got something insightful for them to take away from it. They may not buy from Kambi then, they might not buy in the next 3 years, but if they come to see Kambi, they’re coming to some get information and insight because they know Kambi really understands what they are doing. And that’s the difference. That opens doors. That’s what makes us stand out. We’re not there to just try and sell from — straight from the beginning. They will understand through our insights, “You know what Kambi knows something that we have don’t.” So even if they’ve got full trading solutions themselves internally, you go, “Hey, I really understand that Kambi could help us here, maybe we should consider things, maybe we should take more meetings, maybe we should meet the CEO of Kambi, let’s have more conversations.”[14]—Max Meltzer, Chief Commercial Officer.

“First of all, our unwavering commitment to integrity and corporate probity. Kambi is a [NASDAQ] listed company and therefore holds itself up to the highest of standards. For example, since our inception we have been careful to avoid markets where gambling is prohibited. This was a conscious and long-term decision as, not only is it the right thing to do, but we realized it was likely to be looked favorably on by regulators when moving into new territories in the future – particularly in the U.S. which has always been a key part of our long-term business strategy.”[15] –Max Meltzer, Chief Commercial Officer.

Kambi is discriminant about who they are willing to partner with and will only partner in regulated markets. This is important for both regulators and prospective partners, as their primary competitor in the pure-play back-end is not nearly as discriminant. SBTech is the company’s foremost competitor and was recently rumored to be in late stage talks to be acquired by Draftkings. Nylen has pointed out that he “think[s] it’s positive rather than negative that we have a good competitor nowadays, and I think the market is definitely large enough for both (SBTech) of us. But so far I am very pleased that we have been able to win our top targets.” Competition offers Kambi the opportunity for differentiation and one of the key pillars has been on integrity. While some of this can change, it is notable how Kambi received an actual license as a “Sports Information Services Limited…For A Gaming Related Casino Services Industry License” whereas SBTech settled for a temporary “Qualification Waiver.”

[16]

[17]

Pennsylvania, the other large, early legalizer of sports betting on the state level gave SBTech conditional approval and cited concerns with the company’s partnership relationships that enable betting in Iran.[18] While SBTech is insistent they do not facilitate operators in Iran, their response perhaps implicitly acknowledged they know some of their operators function in what the betting world calls “gray markets”: “To be very clear, SBTech does not operate in any black markets.”[19]

Scale + Time = Compounding Advantages

The two outside lines illustrate the upside and downside tracking error representing a 95% confidence interval. The selected confidence interval indicates that on average, for 19 months out of 20, the actual return should be between the two tracking error lines.

Over time the tracking error band has become narrower, indicating that the monthly margins have become more stable. The increased stability is primarily due to a relative increase of live betting, which is less volatile than pre-match betting, and a stabilizing effect resulting from Kambi’s risk management tools becoming increasingly sophisticated in identifying and managing different customer segments.

While Kambi has not revisited this specific chart, they have shown what the daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual distribution of operator margins looks like:

[20]

This is the nature of a business relying on assessment of probabilities. You can set the right probability for an outcome to happen, yet still lose. Without skill, the longer time-frames would also be random; however, with skill the longer timeframe would smooth the outcomes. That is clearly the case here. While the day-to-day can be volatile, the range of outcomes narrows as the timeframe is extended. We have spoken to industry experts, including employees at Draftkings involved in onboarding Kambi and at Kambi involved in managing the Draftkings relationship. One fundamental truth we have seen acknowledged on both sides is that Draftkings would be less profitable at their sports book and would take a period of three years before they can get their models up to Kambi’s skill and stability today. Meanwhile Kambi will continue improving, such that Draftkings would be trying to catch a moving target.

This risk management side is especially compelling. Kambi is phenomenally good at using anonymized information in order to hunt down people who are sharp betters and have figured out ways to whittle down the book’s edge. Sharp bettors find this especially frustrating and have come to facetiously call the company “Kan’tBet” for how little action they are willing to take from the experts; however, this is exactly why front-ends use Kambi. Notably, Kambi will take action from these people, but in small amounts, because learning their intents help in the process of refining their own line making.

Vegas as often been more willing to take this kind of action and the sharp bettors claim this is the fundamental flaw in the European model. Kambi brings their distinctly European model to the front-end operators they work with, even in the US. On their capital markets day, they pointed out how:

Ever since I started in 2005, we have looked at this chain being about one thing. And that’s not about margin, that’s not about accuracy and probability predictions. In the end, it is about user experience, it is about delivering entertainment. So our quant analyst, for instance, they’re not tasked with the sort of theoretical challenge of only predicting probability, they’re tasked with a challenge of delivering a fantastic experience. —Erik Logdberg, Deputy CEO & Chief Business Development Officer

Handicapping the probabilities is obviously an important endeavor, but so too is managing the user experience. Kambi does not exist to serve as a counterparty for sharp bettors. If a book consistently provides opportunity to those with an edge, the book will lose money. There are hedge funds and advanced quant strategies launching in an attempt to take advantage of inefficiencies in betting and the beauty of it from Kambi’s perspective is how the adverse selection bias of skill in risk management will ensure that those books who are not good at identifying sharp bettors will ultimately perish before the harvests of the industry landgrab are reaped.

Kambi is not resting on its laurels as a European Model innovator. Instead, the company is opening its first US office in Philadelphia, a strategic location given both Pennsylvania and New Jersey are the large, early-adopter states.[21] In keeping with management’s culture of shareholder value, Philadelphia was strategically selected for its lower costs than New York City or other technology hubs, its passionate sports fanbase and its many high quality universities offering a good opportunity set on the hiring front. The company is “ hoping to take people who have a passion for sports — maybe they’re in another business like finance or whatever — and convert that into what we need from an operational perspective — trading, risk management, sales, partner success.”[22] To date, Kambi’s progress in US markets has come without an on-the-ground premise here. The US office opened in Q2 and is in the process of staffing up. This will only help as more states legalize and regulate betting.

Adding it all up to shareholder value:

Kambi boasts large insider ownership and is operated by its founders, with a shareholder friendly management team and aligned interests. They both say and do the right things:

“Moving on to our shareholders. On top of what I’ve talked before, which is naturally also important for our shareholders, is to have a return on their investments. And one of the absolutely most important task for us, as the management team, is to have a very stringent and sophisticated approach to our capital and resource allocation with the ambition of securing a high return on investments for our shareholders.”[23] –Cecilia Wachtmeister EVP of Business & Group Functions

The company has a mandate to think long-term in capturing the large opportunity, while remaining anchored in establishing measurable, deliverable goals:

“and we have further evolved it during the last year, a very established strategy process where we set our long-term strategy on the 3 years horizon. We break that down to company performance target on a yearly basis, which in turn gets broken down into quarterly key objectives. And that gets actually broken down to departmental and team level within the company. And in that way, we’re really having the connection between what we want to achieve as a company and what is expected from each and every one of the employees. It’s a very, very solid and thought-through process. And we, as the management, we monitor this on a monthly basis how the progress is and where we are.”[24] –Cecilia Wachtmeister, EVP of Business & Group Functions

This will help innovate Kambi develop and tailor products that are more sanguine for the US sporting environment and create a local salesforce in the pursuit of partnerships.

Sizing up the TAM:

In Kambi’s 2018 annual report they offered the following estimate for global sports betting GGR in 2018 and five-year forward forecast:

[25]

Historically, Kambi has operated primarily in Europe, which is about a €20b plus GGR market. 2018 was the first year where online betting exceeded retail in Europe and this trend of growth coming from online will only continue to accelerate:

[26]

The repeal of PASPA makes the US perhaps the most compelling market and largest opportunity the industry has ever encountered. Shortly after the SCOTUS ruling, Morgan Stanley pegged their base case 2025 revenue opportunity (in this case, revenue is a proxy for GGR) by 2025 at $5 billion:

[27]

(Please note, while the above chart is in US Dollars, much of the below conversation on TAM is covered in euros given that is the reporting currency for Kambi. Pay attention to the currency, for we change from euros to dollars depending on the source). The entire regulated market globally generated €5.4b in GGR in 2018 and is expected to grow to €11.5b by 2023 (a 16% CAGR). In order to translate that into a revenue opportunity for Kambi we need to know both the average tax rate across all their regimes and the company’s take rate; however, neither is precisely knowable. We will visit the assumptions later, but for now let us work with a 20% all-in tax rate (arguably on the high side) and a 13% take rate in order to translate GGR into Kambi’s revenue TAM.

Today at €5.4b, Kambi’s revenue TAM is approximately €562m, while in 2023 that number jumps up to €1.196b. Inevitably TAM will be highly sensitive to the cadence of regions legalizing sports betting. And thus far there are pieces of evidence that show regulated market GGR could exceed expectations. We think there is a degree of conservatism embedded in these numbers and that is a good thing insofar as planning corporate strategy and analyzing risk/reward in investments goes. For example, the American Gaming Association believes the illegal sports betting market size in the US to be “at least $150 billion annually.”[28] It is incredibly challenging to size up an illegal market.

When we think about addressable market, the upside of converting a black market to a regulated market is intriguing. This is true for several important reasons, mainly built around the idea that establishing trust in a regulated market is far easier than in an illegal bookie scheme. Some people simply won’t engage in an illegal activity even if the general idea is appealing. Some people may just hold back on the actual volume they would like to play. Most importantly though is the innovation and creativity that legalizing these markets unleashes for the industry. In Europe, it is said that over 70% of all sports betting occurs “in-game” versus less than 5% of US-based action occurring in-game pre-PASPA repeal.[29] In-game creates novel experiences and relies heavily on technology ranging from challenges in data and speed to building sharp algorithms to price probabilities in real-time and managing risk, while adding a human overlay in order to adjust to rapidly changing circumstances. For example, were a starting QB to leave the game with injury, the odds of the next play being a completed pass would be drastically different than immediately before the injury. It’s simply impossible for an illegal bookie to even contemplate offering in-game betting, meanwhile in many respects, this is Kambi’s specialty. In-game betting is basically entirely novel to American sports bettors, yet in some respects, our favorite sports are perfectly suited for this opportunity.

As a result of these unknowns, the range of potential TAMs is incredibly wide. Most US analysts expect somewhere between a $7.5-12b TAM in the US, base-case, while the American Gaming Association pegs the US market size at $150b total wagers (or the equivalent of $75b in GGR).[30] We do our work based on the low end of these estimates, while viewing any upside as incremental to our expectations.

Valuation:

Our valuation process starts with working backward to solve for the embedded assumptions in Kambi’s stock price. At todays price of around $14.50 USD, the market is pricing top line growth to slow down to a 9% 5 year CAGR and a 10x terminal EBITDA multiple all discounted at a 12% WACC. We think these results are highly achievable, even with the loss of Draftkings as a customer. Before the US market even legalized sports betting, Kambi was growing its top line at a 13.8% rate. That growth was lumpy and was slowing in the later periods; however, its core markets in Europe as of today are still growing at ~8% GGR. Meanwhile its partners are taking share with a combination of organic and inorganic growth, supporting base rate growth assumptions of around 12%. By our estimates, the US business has contributed nearly half of 2019’s 22%+ growth rate. Draftkings has accounted for a little less than half of the US contribution.

One thing to consider in valuation is the asset value and replacement value. Kambi is a truly unique asset and management and ownership recognizes this. As such, they have a convertible note held at Kindred which is effectively a poison pill to prevent a hostile takeover attempt. Draftkings perhaps would prefer to acquire Kambi than SBTech, but no way management is selling. Meanwhile, the rumored Draftkings acquisition of SBTech quoted the prospective price tag as between $300-500 million, essentially bracketing Kambi’s market cap today.[31] SBTech is not public, so their financials are not disclosed though it is well established that they are smaller than Kambi and revenue estimates peg the run-rate at approximately $24 million USD (less than 1/3rd that of Kambi’s).[32] One other point of reference for replacement value is the price Scientific Games paid for NYX and Don Best in order to accelerate their own attempt to get into the sports betting industry. Scientific Games spent $632 million for NYX and around $40 million for Don Best, meanwhile they have no key partnerships to show for it, are suffering from employee exodus and an offering that is sub-par at best.[33]

To value Kambi directly, we rely predominantly on DCF. While Kambi does not disclose the GGR or NGR metrics for their operators, we can back into a rough approximation of the historical numbers and forecast them going forward. The key assumptions that we need to make in doing so are on the tax rate, the level of promotional activity and Kambi’s tax rate. Tax rates are the most challenging assumption here because we do not know the geographical distribution of GGR and tax regimes vary widely. Even within the US there is a high degree of variance. For example, Delaware and Rhode Island are lottos with the state getting a direct revenue share equivalent to a 50% tax rate, while New Jersey has an 8.5% tax at land-based sports books, 13% for casino-operated online sports books and 14.25% for racetrack operated online sports books.[34] Pennsylvania, another early adopter, has a 36% tax rate.[35] The UK recently raised their betting tax rate (which includes sports books) from 15% to 21%.[36] We cite these numbers here as illustrative examples. For the backwards numbers we apply a 15% tax rate to build up to our GGR estimate and for 2019 on, we use a 20% tax rate. Our purpose with this analysis is not to precisely nail down the GGR that Kambi’s partners generate, but rather to estimate roughly how much total GGR Kambi needs to capture over the coming five year period in order to rationalize our financial estimates for the company.

As for take rate, we know from triangulating around industry sources and company conversations that today they are in the mid-teens and take rates have come down modestly in the past few years. With some smaller operators, early on, take rates have been as high as the low 20s. Kambi has cited SBTech’s emergence on the competitive front as putting pressure on take rates, though the market is now approaching a degree of stability. Some of the US operators were more insistent on joint venture relationships which have an even higher implicit cost than a take rate, for even lower quality. In a lot of respects, we think of Kambi’s value much like programmatic DSPs for advertising and we would note that the highest quality operator in that sector (The Trade Desk) earns a 20% take rate. Long-term, we expect some modest degradation, though think working with an approximate 15% rate today makes sense. We take that down to 14% in 2021 and 13% thereafter under the assumption that some of the larger operators with long-term deals and little volume as of yet (like Penn Gaming) have come on with more favorable rates than the existing book of business. Here is where we think GGR has come from and where it will go:

The most important takeaway from this chart should be how much incremental GGR Kambi’s partners need to receive in order to underwrite out-year earnings expectations. In order for Kambi to compound top line at a rate just above 20% for the next five years, their partners need an incremental €1.7b, or $1.9b of GGR. That $1.9b of GGR can come from the US and Kambi’s operators. With the more mature, European online business expected to grow at ~8% annualized (5% tailwind in global GGR w/ excess capture in transition from black/gray markets to regulated) , that means Kambi partners need to capture about $1.2 billion of the US opportunity over the next five years. Given most industry estimates peg the opportunity between $7.5-12 billion in GGR over that time, that means Kambi partners need to capture anywhere from 10-16% of the US opportunity. As of today, Kambi’s market share is well above these levels. Here is how Kambi’s suite of partners stacks up in revenue share in the more mature New Jersey and Pennsylvania markets:

[37][38]

While we hardly expect these market shares to remain constant over time, we think with its crop of partnerships Kambi has cemented its place as a key provider in the US sports betting industry. Importantly, we see upside not just for the base case market shares, but also for the potential size of the US market. Rather than incorporating that into our estimates, we will leave any upside for optionality on top of our base expectations. Plus in effect, this “US” number we are using here is the rest of the world outside of Europe. Kambi sees great potential in Latin America and APAC though given we are less familiar with those markets and the sporting industry in general is far less mature there, we are not willing to incorporate that into our expectations.

In the investment phase of US market launches, Kambi had formerly guided to 4-6% quarter over quarter growth in operating expenses. That has been taken down this year to 3-5% growth given “in some states, it’s actually going to be slightly lighter-touch application and therefore, by implication, a slightly lower cost for us.”[39] By and large, the operating cost structure is fixed once Kambi launches in a state. As of today, the company need not hire more traders (as discussed above), with incremental investments flowing predominantly into state-by-state launches and technology. The launch costs will roll off and incremental technology investments will continue, though with benefits of scale affording more overall technology investment at a lower percent of revenues. Incremental EBITDA margins are in the mid-40 percents. We expect a low 30 percent EBITDA margin in 2019 that gradually walks up to a low 40% margin in out-years. This adds up to about 200 bps of EBITDA margin leverage per year.

[40]

For our purposes here, beyond EBITDA, we assume fairly modest leverage on technology expense (which is not incorporated into EBITDA) to the tune of 100 bps over the next five years. Pulling it all together, this is how we think about the value in Kambi:

We see a path to a 275 krona stock in Kambi, based on today’s value, which would represent 95% upside to recent closing prices. It is important to emphasize that while the model is close to a straight-line CAGR, the reality for Kambi will be very different. Embedded in here are assumptions on future states legalizing and then regulating betting, including California. Consequently, there will be considerable lumpiness to the actual path. Additionally, sports betting itself is cyclical, with notable spikes around major events like the World Cup and varying degrees of interest in events like the Super Bowl depending on the teams involved. The key takeaway is what the company will likely look like in 2024 once more states have had the opportunity to legalize and regulate sports betting and the United States becomes the most important global market for sports betting. In order to achieve the run-rate we would apply our 15x EBIT multiple (equivalent to 10x EBITDA), Kambi would need to capture the $1.9b of incremental GGR, $1.2b of which comes from the US.

If the US market does not develop as contemplated, the stock today trades at reasonable values. Growth will still register low double-digit levels, on near all-time low multiples at 3.25x EV/2020 S (see chart below) and EBITDA margins registering in the mid-30s. Multiple expansion is unnecessary for a good return, for the company’s top line and cash flow generation would support where the stock is trading today:

The adverse scenario in the US market would still result in a stock that is undervalued on DCF, cruising along as a rule of 40s SaaS operator with long-term margin leverage. The core sports betting market globally continues to grow at about 5%, with the dual uplifts of regulatory acceptance and digitization enabling a better, more engaging experience.

Risk factors:

1. Competition. This can come either from new entrants in B2B or more large suppliers buying or building their own backend. SBTech in particular competes with a broader suite of services including marketing services and digital casino games, while Kambi operates as a pure sports operator.[41] IGT in the US packages in their sports offering with slot machines. Neither boasts the quality of Kambi; however, both use other levers to try and capture their share of the sports business.
2. Regulation. This can manifest in several ways. States can be slower to legalize sports betting than expected. States (and countries) can also be more aggressive on the tax front. The impact of taxes hits twice. Taxes factor directly into the calculation of odds, so higher tax rates make odds less favorable, which translates to lower betting volumes, plus operators must give up more of that volume.
3. Integrity fees. Leagues are strategizing on how they can monetize betting and while no outright integrity fees have been demanded from US leagues there are intimations that leagues will use data in order to grab their cut.[42] Kambi passes these costs on to front-end operators; however, this could negatively impact aggregate GGR.
4. Customer concentration. Kindred Group is an especially large partner globally while Draftkings is a large US partner. Kindred risk is mitigated by virtue of the corporate history, a shared concentrated owner in Anders Ström and a long-term partnership agreement.

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[1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3704
[2] https://www.legalsportsreport.com/18718/nj-sports-betting-case-2/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-betting-draftkings-new-jersey/draftkings-launches-mobile-sports-betting-in-new-jersey-idUSKBN1KM60H
[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-23/draftkings-soaring-legal-betting-shows-how-big-gambling-can-be
[5] We strongly recommend reading The Logic of Sports Betting by Miller and Davidow for anyone looking of a detailed overview for how sports betting itself works, what kind of bets are possible and how sports books make their lines.
[6] https://twitter.com/darrenrovell/status/1165583562025951232
[7] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1084
[8] https://www.wsj.com/articles/mobile-sports-betting-is-the-moneymaker-as-more-states-legalize-11567445689
[9] Kambi Capital Markets Day, Sentieo.
[10] https://www.pennbets.com/kambi-interview-max-meltzer-sports-betting/
[11] Kambi Group PLC Capital Markets Day, May 20, 2019. Sentieo.
[12] Edited Transcript of Flutter Entertainment PLC M&A conference call presentation, October 2, 2019, Sentieo.
[13] https://www.flutter.com/sites/paddy-power-betfair/files/documents/Investor-Presentation.pdf
[14] Kambi Group PLC Capital Markets Day, May 20, 2019. Sentieo.
[15] https://www.pennbets.com/kambi-interview-max-meltzer-sports-betting/
[16] https://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/docs/Petitions/2018/06152018.pdf, page 8.
[17] https://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/docs/Petitions/2018/04302018.pdf, page 4.
[18] https://floridianpress.com/2019/04/online-gaming-company-could-have-business-ties-to-iran/
[19] https://www.vegasslotsonline.com/news/2019/06/19/oregon-pay-27m-controversial-sports-betting-operator-sbtech/
[20] Kambi Capital Markets Day – May 20, 2019
[21] https://www.inquirer.com/business/sports-betting-bookmaker-kambi-sets-up-shop-philadelphia-sugarhouse-parx-20190708.html
[22] Ibid.
[23] Kambi Capital Markets Day, May 20, 2019. Sentieo.
[24] Kambi Capital Markets Day, May 20, 2019. Sentieo.
[25] https://www.kambi.com/sites/default/files/Documents/Annual-Report-2017/Kambi%20Group%20plc%20Annual%20Report%202018.pdf page, 19.
[26] https://www.kambi.com/sites/default/files/Documents/Annual-Report-2017/Kambi%20Group%20plc%20Annual%20Report%202018.pdf page 19
[27] “US Sports Betting: Who Could be the Winners?” Morgan Stanley Research. June 26, 2018. Page 6.
[28] https://www.americangaming.org/new/97-of-expected-10-billion-wagered-on-march-madness-to-be-bet-illegally/
[29] https://www.si.com/mlb/2018/10/11/ryan-howard-sports-betting-game-app-investments
[30] https://www.americangaming.org/new/97-of-expected-10-billion-wagered-on-march-madness-to-be-bet-illegally/
[31] https://ayo.news/2019/07/01/draftkings-about-to-fully-acquire-sbtech-for-up-to-500m/
[32] https://www.zoominfo.com/c/sbtech/348729494
[33] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nyx-gaming-group-m-a-scientific-games/scientific-games-to-buy-nyx-gaming-in-c775-million-deal-idUSKCN1BV1Q9
[34] https://www.thelines.com/betting/revenue/
[35] Ibid.
[36] https://www.onlinepokerreport.com/32913/uk-gambling-tax-increase/
[37] https://www.playpennsylvania.com/sports-betting/revenue/
[38] https://www.playnj.com/sports-betting/revenue/
[39] Kambi Q2 2019 Earnings Call, Sentieo.
[40] Sentieo for historical financial data and RGA Investment Advisors for estimates.
[41] https://sbcnews.co.uk/partners/sbtech/2018/02/01/richard-carter-sbtech-solving-mansions-vertical-challenge/
[42] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-12/nfl-takes-first-major-gambling-step-with-sportradar-data-deal

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Jesse Koltes on Scaling a Food and Beverage Challenger Brand

October 21, 2019 in Audio, Consumer Staples, Equities, Interviews

We had the pleasure of speaking with fellow MOI Global member Jesse Koltes, entrepreneur and value investor, about the food and beverage industry. Jesse is disrupting the industry with his challenger brand, LonoLife.

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