Induced Demand within the Energy Complex

June 20, 2018 in Energy, Equities, Letters, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is co-authored by William Heard, CEO and CIO of Heard Capital, and Andrew Jesse, a Partner at Heard Capital and head of its energy and industrials practice. The article previews a key aspect of their session at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

In the latter stages of a bull market, when valuations are generally rich, deep domain expertise can be especially critical in helping an investor recognize misunderstood pockets of the markets where mispriced assets present attractive long-term opportunities. Within even the strongest bull market there are sectors suffering cyclical bear markets, where valuations are low, and appropriately so. These can be good places to find the figurative “baby that’s been thrown out with the bathwater.”

The prolonged cyclical bear market in the energy sector – one of six permanent, regulated industries where Heard Capital concentrates large, long-term, security-agnostic investments – has punished share prices and valuations across the board. But with the United States producing more natural gas than ever, a deep understanding of the natural gas supply chain reveals a “sweet spot” for companies that are positioned to be the bridge that brings this clean and cheap alternative energy source across the oceans to end-markets around the world. Furthermore, since natural gas end markets typically use the fuel for heating and power generation needs, identifying a quality opportunity within the natural gas supply chain not only can offer value, but the additional benefit of a significant degree of insulation from macroeconomic factors.

Within the energy sector broadly, natural gas has an attractive demand dynamic that is by now generally well understood and factored in by the market. Electric power generation end markets globally are seeing a secular shift, with gas plants taking meaningful market share from other sources such as coal and oil-fired plants. This secular shift is due to a litany of practical reasons (e.g., security of supply), financial reasons (e.g., marginal cost) and environmental reasons (e.g., carbon footprint / air quality) . Importantly, the $/mmbtu cost advantage of natural gas versus other fuel substitutes used in similar end markets is large, even on a “landed basis” (i.e., the all-in delivered cost to the end user, not merely the Henry Hub or comparable price), and even without assuming any particular price for natural gas within a relevant historical range.

But a major technological shift now underway within the natural gas supply chain portends a new and different significant shift in market share in which investors can participate. It is a shift from land-based natural gas and related storage and transportation infrastructure, to off-shore natural gas storage, transportation and related services, by means of Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) and Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRU). We think of the coming market share shift toward FLNG/FSRU as a technological innovation that is creating as area of “induced demand” activity at the upstream end of the natural gas supply chain.

FLNG/FSRU are essentially specialized shipping / transportation assets that allow producers of natural gas and LNG to get their production to overseas end markets. FLNG are shipping vessels or platforms that convert natural gas into LNG at the offshore well site, thereby avoiding the need for large scale development of subsea pipeline infrastructure and onshore liquefaction trains. FSRUs are shipping assets that can store LNG as well as convert LNG to natural gas that meets pipeline specifications for delivery to end users. Compared with shore-based alternatives (i.e., a fixed plant), FRSUs offer flexible, faster and cheaper means to store LNG and convert LNG to natural gas for end uses.

In essence, FLNG/FSRU act as the bridge that gets upstream natural gas resources into the midstream portion of the value chain, where they can then be delivered to end markets and monetized. Players in this space at times say they are “linking the well to the grid.”

We believe companies significantly exposed to growth in usage of FLNG/FSRU assets and technology will attract demand and market share away from shore-based incumbents, while also retaining the secular benefits of natural gas relative to other fuels, as well as the degree of insulation natural gas provides from macroeconomic factors.

FLNG/FSRU providers enjoy a number competitive advantages over shore-based solutions.

Importantly, FLNG/FSRU is location- and supplier- agnostic. While the US is likely to be a low cost supplier of natural gas for the foreseeable future, FLNG/FSRU providers are not beholden to any one specific geography or formation, and given the mobility of their asset base they are able to continue to play a key role in the LNG value chain regardless of where source gas is produced. Additionally, FSRUs are not subject to the intense competition and potentially difficult and lengthy permitting / approval processes to site new shore-based LNG liquefaction and regasification trains, and instead offer a flexible, fast-track solution to delivering natural gas to market.

FLNG/FSRU also are lower cost and more flexible solutions – and in certain circumstances they are the only viable solution for monetizing gas assets. FSRUs allow producers to avoid the expense of siting, permitting and building shore-based facilities. Meanwhile, FLNG represents a lower cost solution for getting far offshore natural gas assets to market. Furthermore, by avoiding large scale subsea pipeline developments and onshore liquefaction facilities, FLNG in some instances can represent the only solution to free otherwise stranded assets.

The return of dispersion to the equity markets that began in 2016 has been a welcome development for active managers. Earlier this Spring, we commented to our investors that a key difference between the investing environments of 2017 and 2016 was that in 2017, we witnessed dispersion elevated at the intra-sector levels, rather than inter-sector levels. In 2016, the primary driver of return dispersion was sector allocation, that is being in the right “neighborhood” was more often sufficient to generate excess returns. Extending the metaphor, the current dispersion environment now makes excess returns available to managers who can find the right house in the neighborhood: since 2017, we have observed dispersion at the individual sector level, which all else equal, provides a more robust security selection environment for sector specialists with domain expertise.

Having identified the FLNG/FSRU category within the natural gas supply chain as what we believe to be a fundamentally attractive and undervalued neighborhood within the beaten down energy sector, we focus during our Wide-Moat Investing Summit presentation on the house (i.e., company) we have identified as being best positioned to reward shareholders.

The Power of a Low-Cost Advantage

June 20, 2018 in Equities, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018 Featured

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor by Phil Ordway, Portfolio Manager of Anabatic Investment Partners. The article previews Phil’s presentation at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

A competitive advantage can come in many different flavors, but my favorite might be a low-cost advantage. I don’t think it’s necessarily better than others, but for me it’s easier to understand. A low-cost advantage can also be best exploited by one of my own areas of strength: patience.

An underlying premise here is that the world is competitive; I think the rumors of the death of capitalism are premature, and I see vicious competition in almost every business I come across. In these competitive fights there are few better allies to have than a low-cost advantage. Put differently, high costs – or even just an industry-average cost structure – can create serious impediments to success. Suffering less and avoiding failure can turn a prosaic business into a great success.

Some of the companies I most admire use a low-cost business model to create a virtuous feedback loop with volumes: low costs enable low prices; low prices generate high volumes; high volumes allow lower costs; lower costs are reinvested in lower prices; on and on we go. The best companies take this feedback loop and combine it with other hallmarks of “wide moat” companies – stellar customer service, notable brands/loyalty, strong network effects, effective capital allocation, etc. – to get exceptional and durable long-term results.

As noted in our 2017 letter to partners, history offers many examples of business success that was derived partially or mostly from a low-cost advantage:

Ford – The Model T changed the world with its efficient manufacturing approach, enabling a low-price product that was accessible to the masses.

McDonald’s – Real estate played a big role, but without a standardized, low-cost approach and low-price menu there would be no McDonald’s.

Sears – Before Amazon there was Sears and its low-cost catalog sales model that revolutionized the retail industry.

GEICO – Realizing that car insurance is both required and commodity-like, GEICO has been ruthless in exploiting its low-cost, direct-to-consumers approach.

Walmart – Sam Walton is perhaps the best-known example of a low-cost advantage being scaled up to massive effect.

IKEA – A simple warehouse with cheap, self-assembled furniture is now among the leading retailers (and brands) in the world.

Costco – Sol Price’s low-cost warehouse model was perfected at Costco, a company famous for reinvesting every last nickel of cost savings back into a virtuous loop of low prices and higher volumes. The annual membership fee (later copied by Amazon Prime) is also an important wrinkle that further enables low prices.

Nucor – Steel production is a brutal industry, but Nucor rode its low-cost “mini-mill” strategy to great success.

Southwest – Over more than 40 years Southwest has exploited its low-cost advantage to post an unbroken string of profits while many of its competitors withered and died. Ryanair took Southwest’s low-cost approach to the next level in Europe.

The Home Depot – After a successful stint running a leading home improvement chain, Blank and Marcus asked themselves a simple question: What kind of home improvement store could we not compete against? A big, no-frills, low-cost/low-price warehouse.

Wells Fargo – An efficient, low-cost deposit gathering machine is very tough to beat.

Amazon – The modern paragon of success, Amazon has low costs – and the reinvestment of those low costs – at the core of everything it does.

Vanguard – Aided by lean operations and its ownership structure, the low-cost index fund has made an enormous impact on the investment world.

Even if we accept the idea that history has proven low-cost business models to be successful, does that mean the future will offer similar rewards? Only time will tell, but I think the odds are favorable. I make an ongoing study of many of these companies and believe several of them are worthwhile investments.

Some current examples of companies/industries with a low-cost advantage that may be worth further consideration include:

– ultra-low-cost carriers (airlines);
– building products companies;
– industrial distributors;
– software companies;
– and financial intermediaries.

Previewing Bunzl: A Family Company in Disguise

June 19, 2018 in Equities, Ideas, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Henrik Andersson, Partner and Fund Manager at Didner & Gerge. The article previews Henrik’s in-depth idea presentation on Bunzl (London: BNZL) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

I first met the company in 2003. It has to me set a high bar in how a corporation slowly but steadily, with the highest ethical standards, year in and year out keeps expanding its business one well-served customer at a time. It is a grand example of what is today known as a compounding machine.

At the face of it, Bunzl is a distributor of goods typically not for resale; to food stores, restaurants, large corporations, health care operations…The list goes on. It is the brooms to clean the stores, the kitchen disposables, the napkins in conference rooms, the first aid kits in offices and the protection gloves in factories. But as with all great business models, Bunzl provides something more in its daily operations.

Look up “solving client problems” in a dictionary and a picture of Bunzl emerges. By managing customers working capital, solving complex logistics with a 98% fulfillment rate, being just-in-time, providing consultancy around procurement and providing push-through cost savings, Bunzl is one of these businesses that provides essential services that aids an entire operation but at a very small cost.

It is to me like an iceberg – what you see above the water (i.e. Bunzl´s fee/margin) is a fraction of its true impact.

It is furthermore governed by outstanding people, in a strong corporate culture with lots of responsibility and decentralization. Words such as modest, hard-working, long-term, steadfast come to mind. We hope to be part-owners of Bunzl for many years to come.

Previewing My Idea Presentation on School Specialty

June 13, 2018 in Equities, Ideas, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Patrick Retzer, Founder, President, and Chief Investment Officer of Retzer Capital Management. The article previews Patrick’s in-depth idea presentation on School Specialty (OTC: SCOO) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

The company that arguably has the widest and most effective moat is the company that has no true, head to head competitor. In addition, that company would ideally have high levels of recurring revenue, a large and growing addressable market with plenty of runway, an excellent, proven management team, be trading at an attractive valuation and have several catalysts in the very near future. That is the essence of School Specialty, Inc., a company that sets itself apart from potential competitors in 3 major ways.

First, SCOO serves, in some manner, over 95% of the school districts and 71% of the schools in the U.S. This is no small task, as it requires the ability to support public school procurement processes (access to legal purchasing vehicles, POs, multi-step approval routing, future dated orders, dedicated “punch-out” procurement sites, ERP integration) and the ability to support complex order processing and fulfillment requirements (orders can be broken down by building, classroom and/or teacher as necessary, while still accommodating centralized invoicing).

Second, SCOO carries over 100,000 SKUs, including supplies, furniture, Science curriculum, instruction and intervention products, student planners and AV Tech. The supplies category alone addresses the needs of the office, art, Phys Ed, basic classroom, science, special needs, early childhood and safety & security. No other company that serves SCOO’s $12 billion addressable market has their depth and breadth of product.

Third, SCOO has strengths in the two most critical issues facing public education today. The horrific school shootings illustrate the need for massive investment in safety equipment and training; $3.0 billion of new funding has been announced thus far in 2018. SCOO’s Safety & Security and Guardian offerings address these needs at a very high and comprehensive level. In this era of unsatisfactory results from all too many public school districts, SCOO’s well received 21st Century Safe School value proposition looks to improve student outcomes by addressing the social, emotional, mental and physical well-being and safety of students on a cohesive and holistic basis. This initiative elevates SCOO from working with teachers and procurement managers on a transactional basis to being more of a partner and engaging with principals, superintendents and school boards on a more comprehensive, inclusive, solutions-based basis.

In my opinion, SCOO’s moat is indeed wide and formidable, but even more impressive is the compelling valuation at which the stock currently trades as well as the significant catalysts that could move the stock higher in the immediate future. Without giving away the whole story, let me just say that SCOO currently trades at 17.3% free cash flow to market cap, 2.4 times 2018 estimated EBITDA to market cap and 5.2 times estimated EBITDA to enterprise value. Regarding near term catalysts, management is in the process of obtaining an uplisting to the NASDAQ which should multiply the investable audience for the stock. At the same time, the stock “overhang” that was present around the $17 share price seems to have been absorbed by the market. After several years of rebuilding the company to be competitive and efficient, operating results look poised to “break out” and accelerate higher. And finally, with the company on the verge of delivering impressive performance, management has begun an effort to actively tell the story. I believe we are likely to see them at investor conferences and perhaps gain research coverage in the very near future.

I last presented SCOO at the Manual of Ideas Best Ideas for 2018 conference about 5 months ago when the stock was at $17.00. At the risk of having you think I can only come up with one idea in a single year, I would argue that at $19.70 SCOO presents an even better opportunity as they have since issued impressive guidance for 2018 and I believe have several imminent catalysts.

Visual Impressions from The Zurich Project 2018

June 12, 2018 in Diary, The Zurich Project

“I learned so much at The Zurich Project. Incredibly grateful to returning and new participants for making it such a wonderful event. Looking forward to sharing highlights in a forthcoming edition of The Manual of Ideas.” –John Mihaljevic, CFA

Here’s to renewing the bonds in 2019!

Previewing My Idea Presentation on Ferrovial

June 12, 2018 in Equities, Europe, Ideas, Mid Cap, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Luis Garcia Alvarez, Equity Portfolio Manager at MAPFRE AM. The article previews Luis’ in-depth idea presentation on Ferrovial (Spain: FER) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

Ferrovial is a multinational infrastructure, services and construction group headquartered in Madrid, Spain. It owns significant stakes in Canada’s 407 ETR toll road (43% equity) and Heathrow airport (25% equity), plus four “managed lane” projects in the United States (of which two are currently operational). The company has a portfolio of mature assets generating predictable cash flows that the construction division deploys to develop new concession projects.

Ferrovial was founded in 1952 by Rafael del Pino y Moreno. Today, the del Pino family still owns a significant stake in the company. Rafael del Pino Calvo-Sotelo, the current Chairman, owns a 20% stake. His sister María del Pino owns an 8% stake and his brother Leopoldo del Pino owns 5%. Unlike other companies exposed to construction, infrastructure and services in Spain during the last decades, Ferrovial followed a conservative approach with respect to financial leverage and possesses a solid balance sheet with net cash at the parent company level.

Ferrovial’s valuation in terms of accounting multiples is distorted by the fact that the assets that contribute the most to the valuation (ETR, LHR) are integrated by the equity method without contribution to sales or EBITDA. The company has also started reporting its accounts proportionally to better reflect its economic and business reality.

During recent quarters, adverse market conditions in the Services activities in the United Kingdom and a lower contribution from projects in Construction, together with a couple of loss-making projects, have compressed the company’s operating margins on the contracting side. Additionally, political uncertainty in Spain has increased investors’ pessimism about Spanish stocks in general.

These factors combined have led to significant weakness in Ferrovial’s share price, which has decreased from EUR20 per share in mid-2017 to approximately EUR17 per share in May 2018. However, we think that this is a case in which investors are simply not focused on the right issues and misunderstand the relative weight of the various segments and geographies in Ferrovial’s valuation.

First, political uncertainty in Spain has very limited impact on the company’s cash-flow generation as the bulk of its operating cash flow currently comes from outside its home country.

Second, although the competitive environment remains tough for the UK Services division, we believe that the worst is likely over. Operating margins should start to recover going forward as the negative impact of the challenging Birmingham project fades away. We further believe that the provisions that the company has already made regarding this project, which we subtract from our valuation, appropriately account for the negative impact. In any case, even if we were wrong regarding this view, our estimated valuation for the entire UK Services division is a minor component of the company’s total equity value, posing limited downside risk.

Finally, the most important asset in terms of equity value for the company – the Canadian 407 ETR toll road (close to 50% of our estimated intrinsic value for Ferrovial) – has continued to report very solid results in recent quarters, generating strong cash flow and outperforming analysts’ estimates on both tariff increases and traffic growth.

It is precisely the exceptional terms and performance of the 407 ETR concession that cause us to consider Ferrovial a Wide-Moat company. The 407 ETR is located in Toronto, Ontario (Canada) and runs parallel to the first city ring road, the 401, one of North America’s most congested highways. Currently, 108 km of the 407 ETR are operational. The concession was awarded to Ferrovial in 1999 as part of a consortium (in which it has a 43% stake) and runs until 2099 (more than 80 years remaining!). In our view, this is one of the best infrastructure assets in the world for the reasons we will explain below.

The 407 ETR is the world’s first all-electronic, barrier-free toll highway, which means the toll system does not require drivers to stop at the entry or exit tollbooths. Instead, it detects the vehicle, calculates the route to be covered and manages billing automatically. Most importantly for Ferrovial, toll charges can be varied freely provided that traffic remains above a certain threshold. This means that drivers pay according to the value (i.e., timesaving) that the highway provides at any given time.

From our point of view, the operative question and main value driver for this motorway (and, hence, for Ferrovial as a whole) is the price sensitivity of demand to changes in tariffs. Logically, increases in tariffs reduce expected traffic volume. However, despite 9% annual growth in tariffs over the past ten years, price elasticity has proven to be low (EBITDA grew 10.5% annually during this period). We see potential for continued low levels of elasticity into the medium term with significant implications for long-term value creation given the concession’s remarkable duration.

Ferrovial has been managing the 407 ETR successfully for almost 20 years. This constitutes, in our view, a key component of the company’s sustainable competitive advantage: proprietary expertise. For two decades the company has tested the elasticity of demand to changes in tariffs, which is the primary driver of cash flow for largely fixed-cost assets like toll roads. Hence, Ferrovial has access to a priceless set of data on how traffic reacts to changes in prices.

Other infrastructure competitors simply do not have comparable data, especially considering the uniqueness of the 407 Toll Road. This creates an advantage for Ferrovial and enables the company to design more compelling and competitive offers when bidding for projects where this information is crucial. For example, Ferrovial’s data capabilities were crucial to its success in winning the four “managed lanes” awards in the United States, projects that represent significant long-term value creation potential for shareholders.

Previewing My Idea Presentation on BlackBerry

June 12, 2018 in Communication Services, Deep Value, Equities, Ideas, Information Technology, Mid Cap, North America, Special Situations, Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Rodrigo Lopez Buenrostro, Investment Principal at KUE Capital. The article previews Rodrigo’s in-depth idea presentation on BlackBerry (NYSE: BB) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

“John Chen has completed the transition of BlackBerry from a smartphone company to a software company with about $1 billion in revenue and growing. BlackBerry’s reputation for security for mobile devices, its focus on an integrated internet of things system and its very large patent portfolio stand it in good stead for the future. Its QNX platform has had much success with building autonomous car systems for the major automobile companies, and its Radar for the trucking industry continues to excel.” –Prem Watsa, 2017 Letter to Shareholders of Fairfax Financial Holdings

“Wait, I thought Blackberry didn’t exist anymore…” is a phrase I have heard quite often the past few months. I don’t blame these people as BB isn’t the smartphone manufacturer that many people in the world used to know. Today, BB’s largest clients are government, banks, insurance companies, hospitals and large automotive OEMs. In fact, many of these clients have remained Blackberry clients since the company’s start back in the 1990s thanks to the company’s strong legacy on secure communications.

Blackberry is a software security company. It focuses on mobile, security, and automotive software, catering to the enterprise. Blackberry’s value add includes securing and managing endpoints in the Internet of Things. At the beginning of 2017, new CEO John Chen announced their withdrawal from the hardware business which he claims to be “commoditized and saturated”.

As of the latest filing, more than 80% of revenues are software and services and this is expected to be 100% in the next couple of quarters as they continue to exit the hardware market. 75% of this revenue is recurring and requires limited CAPEX/WC to continue to grow. Current gross margins stand at 72% and are expected to increase toward the 80-85% range in the next couple of years.

As with any software business, R&D is BB’s most important expense. The company spends 20-25% of revenues on R&D or $230-250M per year. Although this investment is dwarfed by the large tech firms who spend billions on developing new products, BB has been able to win market share in the cybersecurity segment. Why? Because BB has a unique patent portfolio that allows it to compete despite smaller investment in R&D. These patents have positioned BB as the to-go cybersecurity company in the world for high-profile clients such as 9/10 of the largest commercial banks and insurance companies, 8/10 of the largest healthcare and aerospace/defense companies, and all of the G7 governments. Blackberry is the only company that has the ISO 26262 certification, which is the international standard for functional safety in electronic systems in automobiles, as well as the patents that allow Blackberry to be the sole user of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), essentially the most secure and efficient cryptography for the near future.

Given that the patents provide the wide moat for BB, we can get a sense of their market value with previous software acquisitions and the bid to buy the whole company from a renowned value investor. First, previous acquisitions provide a reference value of $116K EV/patent. Assuming no premium for Blackberry’s unique patents, this values BB at $10.9 per share or a downside of ~9%. Second, Prem Watsa from Fairfax Financial offered to buy the whole company for $9 per share back in 2013. If I bring Watsa’s offer to 2018 numbers after adding invested capital and current net cash, he would be willing to buy BB for $11-12 per share, like the current market price.

That covers the downside as is tradition at Kue Capital. What about the upside? The two main drivers for Blackberry’s business going forward are QNX (secure automotive software platform) and EMM (enterprise communications security service). Assuming conservatively that BB grows parallel to the overall cybersecurity industry and takes advantage of the operating leverage inherent in this great business this company could be valued at $25-27 in 5 years or $15 per share today providing an attractive risk-reward relative to the value of its patents.

Blackberry is an opportunity to invest in a tarnished yet legacy brand, in a formerly mismanaged company that boasts the right team today, in a company that used to manufacture smartphones but today sells cybersecurity solutions to large-ticket clients, and finally, in a portfolio of solid patents that provide the foundation for growth in the enterprise of things.

Moats of Discipline, Moats of Control: Investing Beyond The Castle

June 9, 2018 in Wide-Moat Investing Summit, Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018

This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Jonathan Isaac, President and Portfolio Manager of Quilt Investment Management. Jonathan is an instructor at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2018.

In observing institutions such as schools, factories, hospitals, the army, and prisons, the twentieth-century French philosopher Michel Foucault became fascinated by disciplinary relationships — the relationships that produced subjects and exercised power. (1) Years later, these relationships expanded beyond institutions towards the production of corporate structural advantages in public spaces, shopping spaces, and eventually even the home. This “mechanism of normalization” is how so many of today’s consumers develop their own personal brand, and how they prioritize a certain product or service in a certain space or in certain conditions. (2) These site-specific encounters, where a product or service and an instance come together in a feedback loop, are what we might call “disciplinary moats.” (3)

With Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, we can see the origins of disciplinary moats as the metastasized product of procedures that emerged in an institutional context hundreds of years ago, before eventually spreading throughout society. (4) Foucault’s disciplinary societies reached their peak at the beginning of the twentieth century and their successor, which the philosopher Gilles Deleuze called the “societies of control,” saw their emergence gain momentum after World War II. (5) In today’s globalized world, both disciplinary societies and societies of control coexist, generating and regenerating moats. (6) What we will describe as control moats are structural advantages that maintain themselves or grow as environments and scenarios change, rather than being suctioned to the discipline of a spatial relationship in order to maintain returns on invested capital or pricing power.

In this article I will take the reader from a description of disciplinary moats and their individual distinctions, through disciplinary moats in holding company form, to control moats. The reader will see how moats shift, from the discipline of a consumer’s repeated action producing a known end, towards the “perpetual training” and “continuous control” of a consumer without other options or even a known end. (7) This may be where we are today, in a feedback loop or endless marathon of consumption—or we may already be embedded in new types of moats.

I

Disciplinary moats are those that operate through routine and repetition; they are site-specific, occurring within the bounds of a relationship. Their livelihood is their ability to discipline the flows and the relationships created by the environment. It doesn’t matter how seemingly wide or deep the moat is around the castle if the community decides it doesn’t need castles anymore, or if the environment’s proclivity towards shifts and tectonic movements impacts the viability of the moat’s particular seal of normativity.

Much of the discourse on moats ends here, with the closed system of the castle and its capacities. Through analytical techniques, the investor can declare that a moat exists; through an understanding of the scenography producing the business relationships, and the business itself, the investor can declare that a castle exists. One may even look into the future and see capacities for reinvestment, capital allocation, or a positive outlook considering the environment. This is the discourse of structural stability: the capacity of a closed system to reproduce relationships, events, and self-similarity from within its conditions of possibility, a posteriori.

But sometimes even the most structurally stable systems may overlook the Trojan horse of shifting business landscapes. By focusing on a company’s research and development efforts as a way to gain an advantage in business, Philip Fisher chose an expansive style of investing over the repetitious and eventually decadent mechanics of disciplinary moats. (8) Fisher could see the beginnings of something beyond post-war, halcyon notions of stability. For Fisher’s generation, the television’s capacity to encompass new demands within its reach was the beauty of the TV dinner, an intermediary object in the transformation of disciplinary spaces into control spaces. What else would the population do, at that time of day, than eat in front of the television and kill two birds with one stone?

Epochal shifts occur in these subliminal ways when those engaged in sedentary processes are forced to encounter new situations. The modality shifts, creating new demands and making indispensable demands seem incorrigible, parochial, and out-of-step. For the castle, willful blindness is rarely an economic solution. While the reasons for the fatal attack on the castle are obvious in retrospect, how the structure interacts with environmental variability may have a predictive value. In other words, by focusing on structural stability and its apparatus of reproduction within a closed system, we miss not only the fissures that may lead to the castle’s fall, but also a thorough understanding of the value of interoperability.

II

Alexander Galloway discusses the shift from Foucault’s disciplinary societies to Deleuze’s control societies in his essay “Computers and the Superfold.” Galloway declares that disciplinary functions are heterogeneous but “happen to interoperate because they have managed… to ‘grow’ the necessary sockets that fit into each other.” (9) The interoperability of disciplinary moats can benefit on paper the holding company owning multiple castles but not the structural advantages of each castle. The ability of disciplinary moats to link-up can create scale advantages: under one corporate roof, general and administrative, marketing costs, and other synergies can occur, as disciplinary holding companies piece together heterogeneous castles into wider arrays which, despite their number, still cannot control environmental variability.

The ability to connect castles is a largely spurious operation, capable of benefits that may deteriorate as the scale benefits—in addition to any financial engineering—divert attention from structural fissures. My leap of judgment from Galloway’s text is thinking of interoperability for control societies as a structure inherited in form but modified in function from disciplinary societies. With control moats, interoperability becomes less of a connective tissue between numerous site-specific functions, and more of a membrane through which life passes.

III

What happens to a product or service if the relationships that produce routine and repetition are modified? Can the product or service surf into other flows and still maintain its historical returns on invested capital? (10) Think, for instance, of the differences in interoperability between a substance built for a very specific use, unable to correspond with other forms and uses, versus a substance which does a general task very well and can be used from low-tech to high-tech applications in a wide variety of industries, without the site-specificity of customer or industry concentration. For the latter, a shifting environment may be an opportunity, while for the former it is often a death sentence.

Control moats have the capacity for continued relevance even when their conditions of possibility shift; they are resonant and experimental, while disciplinary moats are dogmatic and preset. Disciplinary moats are parts of a larger environment, without the ability to control variation but only to implore the subsistence of someone else’s action, while control moats take environmental variability with stride and rely more upon interpolation than repetition.

While disciplinary moats concentrate on the castle and its defense as a way to create preferable events again and again, like a video looped on auto-play that eventually disintegrates, control moats are oftentimes overheard saying, “Is the castle really the highest and best-use for that land?” Control moats figured out that encompassing only part of the environment is generally less durable and predictable in the face of variability than composing the entire environment, including the territory and processes outside of the castle’s walls. While disciplinary moats maintain the rigidity of warfare and alignment, control moats are comfortable leaving their military stripes behind when they leave the castle, if only to blend in.

Control moats, at their limit, have seamless interoperability. They are the epidemiology that evaded our grasp for too long, and now underlines reality; they are the membrane, the checkpoint through which we travel with each step or cognitive leap. (11) And so some companies today attempt to compose entire environments as a way to control the consumer and create further network effects and switching costs. While this semiotic leadership is a remnant from disciplinary moats, it is not so much about the consumer’s discipline in making this a control moat. It is about there being no other option.

Endnotes

(1) Regarding disciplinary societies, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Second Vintage Books ed. (New York: Second Vintage Books, 1995), particularly the section, “Discipline” (135-228).

(2) Foucault sums up disciplinary power as that which “normalizes” (183). Discussing the relevancy of normalization in modern society, Foucault declares, “Is this [the norm] the new law of modern society?” (184). Furthermore, Foucault says, “At present, the problem lies… in the steep rise in the use of these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging powers which, through the proliferation of new disciplines, they bring with them” (306, emphasis mine). We can presume that disciplinary moats, as a new discipline, include mechanisms of normalization.

(3) While the concept of the “moat” originates with Warren Buffett (see the 1986 Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letter), others such as Tom Russo, Connor Leonard, and Pat Dorsey have offered generally interesting developments of Buffett’s original theme.

(4) Foucault discusses how discipline became “deinstitutionalized” before its procedures spread throughout the society (211-212).

(5) Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October, vol. 59 (Winter, 1992): 3-7, 1 (hereafter referred to as PSC). Regarding the societies of control, see also Gilles Deleuze, “Having an Idea in Cinema [On the Cinema of Straub-Huillet],” Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller (eds.), Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1998: 14-19 (hereafter referred to as HIC).

(6) As Deleuze discusses in HIC (17-18), the movement from disciplinary to control societies is not a clean break.

(7) Speaking of the shift from disciplinary societies to control societies, Deleuze explains in PSC: “Perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control… replace(s) the examination… In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished with anything—the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation…” (5).

(8) Philip Fisher, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits and Other Writings (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ed. Canada: 1996). Fisher’s discussions of research and development capacities and scientific/technical talent as paths towards survival remain eerily relevant in today’s world. In speaking about the subject matter, Fisher uses language such as “scientific manpower,” “frontiers of scientific technology,” and “leading technological edge” (30, 64, 230). “Outstanding research and technical effort” is part of Fisher’s first dimension (157-158). In Fisher’s second dimension, he lambasts corporate rigidity: “The company that is rigid in its actions and is not constantly challenging itself has only one way to go, and that way is down” (165). A zealot of self-similarity and repetition Philip Fisher was not.

(9) Alexander Galloway, “Computers and the Superfold,” Deleuze Studies 6.4 (2012): 513-528. Galloway defines the analogue, the language of disciplinary societies (517-518), as “[working through] modularity… What this means is that different elements, remaining relatively whole and heterogeneous to each other, are nevertheless able to interoperate immediately… In the analogue paradigm, the stuff of the world remains unaligned, idiosyncratic, singular… They only happen to interoperate because they have managed, by virtue of what Deleuze would call mutual deterritorialisation, to ‘grow’ the necessary sockets that fit into each other” (519-520).

(10) As Deleuze says in PSC, “The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network. Everywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports” (5-6, author’s emphasis retained).

(11) According to Galloway, “[The French word contrôle] means control as in the power to influence people and things, but it also refers to the actual administration of control via particular monitoring apparatuses, such as train turnstiles, border crossings and check points” (522).

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