Joel Greenblatt’s Special Situation Class at Columbia Business School from 2002 through 2006 — https://t.co/uZqhO94cJh. No source of material has made more of an impact on my evolution as an investor. Enjoy!
— Andrew M. Kuhn (@FocusedCompound) March 31, 2018
Redbubble: Long Growth Runway and Exceptional Management
March 30, 2018 in Asia, GARP, Ideas, Letters, Small CapThis article by John Lewis is excerpted from a letter of Osmium Partners.
Redbubble Limited (RBL.AX) operates as an online marketplace that connects independent artists with customers and a network of third party fulfillers utilizing print-on-demand technology to fulfill customer orders. It offers apparel for men, women, and kids; cases and skins, such as phone cases and wallets, as well as laptop sleeves and skins; various stickers; home decor products, including throw Pillows, duvet covers, travel mugs, and mugs; bags, such as tote bags, pouchstudio pouches, drawstring bags, and laptop- sleeves; stationary products comprising greeting cards, postcards, calendars, spiral notebooks, and journals; wall art products, including posters, canvas prints, framed prints, photo prints, framed prints, and art prints; and gift certificates. The company was founded in 2006 and is headquartered in Melbourne, Australia. Redbubble’s current market capitalization is approximately $374 million.1 (RBL.AX is a holding across all funds.)
Last week, we spent time separately with the Chairman of the Board as well as the CEO, COO, and CFO of Redbubble. The management team is exceptional.
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Certain factual and statistical (both historical and projected) industry and market data and other information contained herein was obtained by Osmium Partners from independent, third-party sources that it deems to be reliable. However, Osmium Partners has not independently verified any of such data or other information, or the reasonableness of the assumptions upon which such data and other information was based, and there can be no assurance as to the accuracy of such data and other information. Further, many of the statements and assertions contained herein reflect the belief of Osmium Partners, which belief may be based in whole or in part on such data and other information. The analyses provided may include certain statements, assumptions, estimates and projections prepared with respect to, among other things, the historical and anticipated operating performance of the companies. Such statements, assumptions, estimates, and projections reflect various assumptions by Osmium Partners concerning anticipated results that are inherently subject to significant economic, competitive, and other uncertainties and contingencies and have included solely for illustrative purposes. No representations, express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of such statements, assumptions, estimates or projections or with respect to any materials herein. Actual results may vary materially from the estimates and projected results contained herein. Past Osmium performance is not indicative of future results. Osmium Partners disclaims any obligation to update this letter. A portion of the Partnership’s assets may from time to time be invested in securities that have limited liquidity. The Partnership’s investment strategy is to make concentrated investments in what it views as its best ideas. The Offering Memorandum and Limited Partnership Agreement offers a comprehensive overview of the risk factors involved in investing with Osmium Partners. The information contained herein is provided for informational purposes only. This is not an offer to sell, or a solicitation to buy, limited partnership interests in Osmium. An investment in Osmium is not suitable for all investors. Stocks mentioned in the newsletter do not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell the individual securities.
This article by Ryan O’Connor is excerpted from a letter of Crossroads Capital. The following case study was written prior to the Intermedix acquisition announcement, which Ryan estimates may increase intrinsic value by $15+ per share.
Given our mandate and focused approach, we can aggressively pursue compelling investment opportunities whenever and wherever they arrive. It’s with this in mind that we’d like to introduce you to R1 RCM, or just “R1” for short – a resilient, non-cyclical, high-quality business that’s been undergoing a value-unlocking transformation since we initiated our position in the low $2’s in late 2016.
R1 is a leading provider of revenue cycle management services to hospital networks. That means it handles their front- and back-office needs, aiming to streamline operations, cut out unnecessary costs, and reduce billing errors, all in a bid to maximize revenues and profits. With hospitals facing tight 1-to-2 percent margins, R1 can make a big contribution, often doubling or even tripling their profitability over time.
To deliver those extra profits, R1 plugs directly into its clients’ operations, tying its own differentiated IT and systems into hospital networks and working hand-in-hand with employees to eliminate margin-sapping inefficiency. With R1 on the scene, hospitals label patient visits more accurately, find more insurance options, and make sure everything gets properly billed. Moreover, by rationalizing vendors, moving hospitals to an offshore shared service platform (to benefit from labor arbitrage), and taking other cost-cutting measures, R1 is in a prime position to enhance its partners’ – and its own – bottom line.
While it’s a solid business today, R1 has a complicated history. In fact, R1 wasn’t even always called R1 – it was originally known as Accretive Health, a spinoff of Ascension Health, the second-largest hospital system in the US. As Accretive, its troubles included:
— being charged with abusive billing practices by the state of Minnesota,
— being charged with failing to protect consumers’ personal information by the FTC, and
— a full-blown SEC investigation into aggressive revenue recognition from 2011 through 2013.
To make matters worse, in 2014 Accretive was delisted from the NYSE and banished to the OTC netherworld after missing a deadline to restate 2011-2013 results. Of course, problems like these did pretty much what one would expect for the share price: From above $30 in 2011, it crashed to below $10 in 2012, slumped below $5 in 2015, and even dipped below $2 for part of 2016. Then Ascension, the company’s largest customer, smelled blood in the water – ultimately making a lowball bid to reacquire Accretive at roughly 50% below market value, threatening to pull its business if Accretive didn’t fall in line.
Yet while the stock was tanking, the company itself was healing. First, in 2012, Accretive settled with the state of Minnesota while admitting no wrongdoing. Then, in 2013, it settled with the FTC and leadership changes were enacted, including the CEO and Chairman. Next, at the end of 2014, it filed restated earnings for the 2011-2013 period. Finally, in early 2016, it concluded a new agreement with Ascension that killed the take-under bid. Instead, Ascension bought $200 million worth of 8% convertible preferred shares in Accretive and got warrants for another 60 million in common shares. In exchange, it gave Accretive a new 10-year exclusive service contract and an enormous amount of new business. It was this new symbiotic arrangement that sparked our initial interest in a name that, at the time, was nothing short of despised. We pulled the trigger.
Fast forward to the start of 2017, and the company took further steps to dissociate itself from its difficult past, changing its name to R1 RCM and up-listing to the Nasdaq. Of course, we invested well ahead of these value-unlocking events in order to profit as R1’s respectability rose phoenix-like from its own ashes. And that respectability recently reached new heights as management nailed down another highly accretive deal with another highly reputable client: Intermountain Healthcare.
R1’s deal with Intermountain resembled the one with Ascension: Intermountain bought $20 million worth of R1 shares north of $4, with warrants for 1.5 million additional shares at $6 thrown in. In exchange, R1 got a 10-year exclusive service renewal and contract extension, plus rights to serve hospitals Intermountain might acquire later on. And by this point, the Ascension deal had been modified to grant R1 similar rights to serve hospitals Ascension might itself acquire down the road.
So where does all this leave R1 today?
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Disclaimer: The specific securities identified and discussed in this commentary pertain to the beneficial owner of this account and should not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any particular security. Rather, this commentary is presented solely for the purpose of illustrating Crossroads Capital’s investment philosophy and analytical approach. These commentaries contain our views and opinions at the time they were written, they do not represent a formal research report and are subject to change thereafter. These commentaries may include “forward looking statements” which may or may not be accurate in the long-term. It should not be assumed that any of the securities transactions or holdings discussed were or will prove to be profitable. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investments involve risk and may decrease in value. Additional Disclaimer: This reprint is furnished for general information purposes in order to provide some of the thought process and analysis used by Crossroads Capital, LLC. It is provided for illustrative purposes only. This material is not intended to be a formal research report and should not, under any circumstance, be construed as an offer or recommendation to buy or sell any security, nor should information contained herein be relied upon as investment advice. Opinions and information provided are as of the date indicated and are subject to change without notice to the reader. There is no assurance that the specific securities identified and described in this reprint are currently held in advisory client portfolios or will be purchased in the future. The reader should not assume that investments in the securities identified and discussed were or will be profitable. The specific securities identified and described do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold, or recommended for advisory clients. Any performance shown for relevant time periods is based upon a composite of actual trading in accounts managed by Crossroads Capital under a similar strategy. Except where otherwise noted, performance is shown net of billed management and incentive fees (where applicable), and all trading costs charged by the custodian. Composite performance calculations have been verified by our third-party administrator. Performance of client portfolios may differ materially due to differences in fee structures, the timing related to additional client deposits or withdrawals and the actual deployment and investment of a client portfolio, the length of time various positions are held, the client’s objectives and restrictions, and fees and expenses incurred by any specific individual portfolio. PAST PERFORMANCE IS NO GUARANTEE OF FUTURE RESULTS. These materials may not be disseminated without the prior written consent of Crossroads Capital, LLC
This article is excerpted from a letter of PenderFund Capital Management. The author, Felix Narhi, serves as Chief Investment Officer of Pender.
“Since 1871, the market has spent 40% of all years either rising or falling more than 20%. Roaring booms and crushing busts are perfectly normal.” –Morgan Housel
Last year was a banner year in the US markets. Following the election of Trump, the S&P500 bolted out of the gates on initial optimism for deregulation across many sectors and ended the year with investors cheering huge US corporate tax cuts. In what has become a familiar refrain, a handful of mega cap internet and technology stocks continued their momentum.
The party on Wall Street didn’t end on New Year’s Eve. The gala continued right into 2018 as January’s total return marked the best start to a year since 1997. Indeed, since Trump was elected President, the US markets have largely shrugged off the political sideshow and chaos of the White House as the S&P500 put together an uninterrupted 15-month rally with no losing months on a total return basis. That period was the longest streak in the history of S&P500, beating the previous record of 10 months, set back in 1995, by a comfortable margin.
The recent mini-streak ended in early February 2018. The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), or “the fear index”, which is considered by many to be the world’s premier barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility skyrocketed by 116% on February 5th. That was the largest one-day increase ever. On the same day the S&P 500 fell by 4.1%. Investors were provided with a quick lesson on the dangers of short-term speculation and trend extrapolation as leveraged bets on low volatility imploded.
During the S&P500’s hot streak, the price index jumped 33% over 15 months. The index outperformed the underlying corporate fundamentals which pushed the S&P500 index even deeper into overvalued territory. By the end of the month, investors had something new to worry about – heightened risk that the Federal Reserve might hike interest rates faster than expected following growing signs of inflation.
Don’t get your teeth kicked in
“The most dangerous people in the world are very smart traders who have never gotten their teeth kicked in.” –F. Helmut Weymar
At Pender, we sometimes say that there are only two kinds of companies: Companies that are having problems and those that are going to have problems. The same is also true for the broader indices – it’s just a question of when a major correction will occur as extended periods of tranquility are often followed by not-so-tranquil times.
The S&P 500 is currently in the midst of the second greatest bull market in length and magnitude in history. It is less than a year away from becoming the longest bull run ever. It has been so long since there has been a major correction that the institutionalized memory of the gut-wrenching selloffs that occur periodically in the markets is in danger of fading.
Increasingly, the investors and fund managers who are making important investment decisions have never had their proverbial teeth kicked in. A survey of more than 4,800 fund managers in London, New York and Paris conducted last year showed that half of respondents had nine years of experience or less. That means there are thousands of fund managers who didn’t experience the 2008 collapse and its run up, let alone the dot com bubble that burst in the early 2000’s, the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, or the more distant 1987 and 1973-74 market crashes. Unfortunately, what we learn from history is that we don’t learn from history.
In any case, we keep in mind Buffett’s simple guideline, “The less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own.”
Secret Rule #2 and Patiently Onward
“In a rising market, enough of your bad ideas will pay off so that you’ll never learn that you should have fewer ideas.” –Daniel Kahneman
Warren Buffett’s # 1 rule of investing is “never lose money”, followed quickly by his second rule — “never forget #1”. While we remain admirers of the Oracle of Omaha, there is a clear flaw with Rule #2. Taken literally, one could put money in a GIC or a t-bill and meet both rules. But after taking into consideration inflation and taxes, investors would be going backwards, never mind have any realistic chance of growing their wealth over time. Rather, we believe Rule #2 should reflect what Buffett actually did to accumulate his capital.
The real secret Rule #2 is to be patient and to appreciate that investing is an endeavour where magnitude is more important than frequency. In other words, how big your wins are matters more than how often you win. Like many aspects of life, it turns out that capitalism is also beholden to the “80/20 rule”. A minority of individual stocks account for most of the stock market’s total returns over time, because only a handful of companies create real long-term wealth.
The key, in our opinion, is to be patient with such compounders so one can benefit from magnitude in capitalism. This also explains in large part why portfolio turnover and returns tend to be inversely correlated. It’s hard to keep up when you sell the Starbucks, Amazons and Berkshire Hathaways of the world early-to-midway through in their respective lifecycles.
We believe it is important to see the world as it really is in order to stack the odds in one’s favour. It turns out that successful long-term investment strategies are also behold to the “80/20” rule. The greatest flaw in short-term investing is the belief that great business performance is always linear. Time tends to push out the weakly convicted and creates opportunities for those with a long-term perspective.
An idiosyncratic and patient approach to portfolio management is not practiced by many, but it tends to work over the long haul because it is aligned with how the world really works. Don’t just take our word for it. Recent research*concludes that among high Active Share portfolios – whose holdings differ substantially from their benchmark – only those with patient investment strategies on average outperform. This successful group represents a very small percentage of all active investors.
In large part, incentives driven by short-term relative performance and benchmarking prevents most managers from implementing the secret Rule #2 in their investment strategies. Yet these real-world findings have clear implications for today’s active vs passive debate.
Read more on how long-term considerations impact our investment strategies as they relate to interest rates, disruptive business models and cycles (including comments on individual holdings) in this Investment Insight.
Commissions, trailing commissions, management fees and expenses all may be associated with mutual fund investments. Please read the simplified prospectus before investing. The indicated rates of return are the historical annual compounded total returns including changes in net asset value and assume reinvestment of all distributions and are net of all management and administrative fees, but do not take into account sales, redemption or optional charges or income taxes payable by any security holder that would have reduced returns. Mutual funds are not guaranteed, their values change frequently and past performance may not be repeated. This communication is intended for information purposes only and does not constitute an offer to buy or sell our products or services nor is it intended as investment and/or financial advice on any subject matter and is provided for your information only. Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of its contents. Certain of the statements made may contain forward-looking statements, which involve known and unknown risk, uncertainties and other factors which may cause the actual results, performance or achievements of the Company, or industry results, to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. © Copyright PenderFund Capital Management Ltd. All rights reserved. March 2018.
Andromeda Value: Invirtiendo con Big Data
March 30, 2018 in Contenido Libre, Miscelánea, MOI Global en EspañolNOTA DEL EDITOR: Este texto es parte de la carta anual 2017 de Andromeda Value Capital.
* * *
As a principle, deadly problems that you don’t see or feel, especially those that are communal so that nobody is clearly given the authority and resources to deal with them well, are the ones that will kill you.
— Ray Dalio (@RayDalio) March 29, 2018
Conoce al Inversor Español Inteligente (Parte II)
March 29, 2018 in MOI Global en Español, MOI Global en Español PodcastEn este episodio de MOI Global en Español Podcast, presentado por MOI Global en Español, Ezra Crangle nuevamente entrevista a Miguel de Juan Fernández sobre su libro El Inversor Español Inteligente.
Miguel de Juan Fernández es Asesor Principal de Argos Capital, fondo value español que está construido siguiendo el espíritu del partnership de Warren Buffett. Antes de fundar Argos, Miguel trabajó para firmas de banca privada como Morgan Stanley, Banif, Citibank y Barclays Gestión de Patrimonios. Es autor de dos libros: El Lemming que Salió Raro (Eolas Ediciones, 2012) y El Inversor Español Inteligente (Eolas Ediciones, 2016).
MOI Global en Español Podcast está disponible en iVoox , Soundcloud, y iTunes.
“Todo lo que tenía era un sueño, pero era poderoso”
March 28, 2018 in MOI Global en Español, TraduccionesTuvimos el placer de reunirnos con Arnie Van Den Berg, presidente y CEO de Century Management, firma de inversión con sede en Austin, Texas; conversamos sobre su enfoque de inversión y su trayectoria como inversor. Arnie argumenta persuasivamente por un enfoque simple y disciplinado para invertir. Su notable historia nos inspira y nos desafía a ser mejores en todos los aspectos de la vida.
Arnold Van Den Berg fundó Century Management en 1974. No tiene educación universitaria formal. Es a través del autoestudio, dedicación y más de cuarenta y cinco años de experiencia en la industria que Arnie ha obtenido su conocimiento sobre los mercados. Antes de emprender Century Management, trabajó como asesor/consultor financiero para Capital Securities y John Hancock Insurance.
(La siguiente entrevista es una transcripción editada de una video entrevista, por lo tanto, puede presentar errores. La transcripción ha sido ligeramente resumida por motivos de claridad y legibilidad).
The Manual of Ideas: Hay mucho que aprender de ti sobre inversiones: sobre cómo convertiste US$250 mil en un negocio de US$2 mil millones. Hay mucho que aprender sobre la vida: cómo sobreviviste al Holocausto; cómo seguiste creyendo; cómo seguiste viviendo. ¿Cómo te interesaste en la inversión en valor?
Arnold Van Den Berg: Estaba trabajando para una empresa financiera y vendían seguros de vida y fondos mutuos. Tan pronto como me enteré de los fondos mutuos y comencé a aprender sobre ellos, el mercado había estado subiendo —esto fue en 1968, y me entusiasmaron los fondos mutuos. Estaba perdiendo el interés en el negocio de seguros porque no creía en los productos que tenían, y estaba buscando otra manera de salirme. Realmente pensé que había encontrado mi sueño, algo que quería hacer el resto de mi vida. No conocía a mucha gente con dinero, pero tenía algunos amigos de la preparatoria y personas que conocía de mi negocio de seguros.
Los inicié en los fondos mutuos, y tan pronto como comencé —no fueron más de seis a nueve meses— el mercado comenzó un deslizamiento repugnante en 1969. Cayó y cayó. Finalmente, tocó fondo en junio de 1970. Repuntó en 1972, y luego tuvo una gran caída desde 1972 hasta 1974. Este fue un periodo de seis años en el que fue como una tortura: goteo, tras goteo, tras goteo cada día. Vi que estos fondos mutuos simplemente se vinieron abajo, y realmente me molestó porque tenía a todos mis amigos en ellos, y para empezar no tenían mucho dinero. No tenía mucho dinero, así que realmente fue un tiempo para revisar mi conciencia.
Comencé a pensar: «¿Cómo pudo pasar esto?» Solía escuchar a estos gestores de inversiones; eran muy inteligentes e ingeniosos. ¿Cómo puso pasar esto? Cuanto más cuestionaba, cuanto más aprendía, cuanto más pensaba en ello, comencé a estudiar el mercado, y encontré encuestas sobre lo que hacían los diferentes fondos; y quién lo hizo bien y quién no lo hizo bien. Puse a un lado los fondos: este fondo lo hizo bien y este fondo lo hizo bien y este fondo lo hizo bien. Este no lo hizo bien. Entonces, comencé a ver un patrón. Todos eran personas que creían en Benjamin Graham: eran inversores en valor. Mientras que sus carteras cayeron, no hicieron nada como la mayoría de ellos (algunos de esos fondos de inversión cayeron un 50% y un 75%). Algunos de los fondos desaparecieron. Un fondo subió un 100%; el año siguiente cerró. Fue desastroso. El inversor promedio sufrió mucho. El mercado cayó un 48%; la acción promedio cayó un 75%. La culpa no fue totalmente de los fondos de inversión, era solo el entorno.
This article is authored by MOI Global instructor Jiro Yasu, representative director of Varecs Partners. Jiro is an instructor at Asian Investing Summit 2018, the fully online conference featuring more than thirty expert instructors from the MOI Global membership community.
In 1986, my grandfather, Koichiro Yasu (安 弘一郎) wrote a book about the origins of my family and Jyujiya Securities Co. Ltd. (十字屋証券), our family brokerage firm, which was originally started by my great grandfather, Tsunesaburo Yasu (安 常三郎), in 1924. Late in life, Koichiro was diagnosed with liver cancer and knew his remaining life was not long. Instead of going after his bucket list, he wrote a book to share his experiences with other family members and people in the brokerage industry. We privately published the book and distributed it at his funeral (so you won’t find it on Amazon).
The title of the book is “Memoir of a Snail”. The book started with the following Haiku by Seibo Kitamura (北村西望, 1884-1987), a Japanese sculptor.
Tayumazaru (たゆまざる)
Ayumi osoroshi (あゆみ恐ろし)
Katatsumuri (かたつむり)
Tirelessly onward
Remarkable progress
The Dao of a snail
Mr. Kitamura created the Peace Statue at the Nagasaki Peace Park. When he was making the statue, he found a snail on the ground which looked like it was not moving. The next morning, he found the same snail on top of the statue. He recognized that untiring small efforts will make a huge difference over time. His success did not come easily. So, I guess he saw himself in the snail.
My grandfather also thought his half century experience in the brokerage industry was like the methodical walk of the snail. He was the kind of person who preferred humility and stability. He never over-expanded the business nor took undo-investment risk. He indirectly learned from his father, who was his polar opposite. Tsunesaburo was a big speculator and always reached for what he could not afford. I respect him since his drive and luck became the basis of our family business. But I also respect my grandfather since he was the guy who kept us in business.
The book introduced a couple of investment successes from both my grandfather’s and great grandfather’s days. Tsunesaburo was a journalist covering the markets before getting into the brokerage business. I guess he took advantage of his special relationship with journalist friends and made a fortune by shorting popular speculative stocks before the Asahi newspaper put up an article that the government was considering delisting some of them. The article proved to be correct, and years later he made enough money to become a member of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Koichiro’s trade of his life was an arbitrage trade. A few years after World War II, the government decided to issue a new yen and freeze deposits to cope with high inflation. To convert old yen to new yen, people needed to deposit cash to their bank accounts within about one month after the announcement. At that time, a common way of saving money was storing bills under mattresses or in drawers. Also, people were only allowed to withdraw 300 new yen per month from their bank account, which was barely enough to support daily needs (the average monthly salary of a public worker was about 500 yen). Therefore, most of people’s savings were stuck in bank accounts and losing purchasing power due to the high rate of inflation. Prices were rising as high as 1000% in 3 months.
Koichiro and a few other brokers found a loophole: buy a stock in the old yen, and then turn and sell it for the new yen. Although the Tokyo Stock Exchange was occupied by the GHQ and officially closed, brokers set up aisles in front of the exchange building and actively traded securities. My family’s firm made 20% every time they did this trade for clients. New clients who learned of the loophole from word of mouth kept coming to Jyujiya with their old yen bills.
When the stock exchange officially reopened, the Ministry of Finance put a very high capital hurdle requirement to be a member of it. Jyujiya had enough capital to maintain its membership because of the new yen/old yen trades.
Koichiro preferred such arbitrage transactions throughout his career. The book also introduced profitable trades related to dismantling the Zaibatsu. For example, if you bought shares of one of Mitsubishi’s chemical companies, you could convert it into shares of three new spun-out entities. Since these spin-outs traded at a premium, there were large spreads to be captured. In many cases, shares of Zaibatsu companies were sold through auctions by a government body to licensed brokers. Also, there was no Bloomberg terminal then, so a broker’s location provided great advantage for arbitrage transactions. Koichiro actively participated in such auctions.
At the end of the book, my grandfather wrote a message to successors of the family business: as Japanese equity markets face increased globalization and deregulation, boutique firms like Jyujiya will have to find a new raison d’être. My family decided to exit the brokerage business right before the financial crisis. Around the same time, we started VARECS as a boutique investment firm. We thought the investment management business was more suitable for boutique firms to be differentiated and succeed.
Value investing and compounding capital is a lot like the crawl of a snail, I believe. We try to invest in high quality companies at a price that has some margin of safety. I think the returns of our portfolio will not be a homerun in any particular year. We instead try to achieve decent returns while preserving capital over the years. I still have 30 more years to reach the age my grandfather was when he wrote his book. We wish to compound capital at attractive rates for 30 years — like the snail which reached the top of the statue.
It is a great honor to see my name in the March issue of "The Manual of Ideas" by @manualofideas, together with other investors I deeply admire. Thank you @JMihaljevic, @ShaiDardashti and @EzraCrangle. I feel very proud to be part of your community.
— Luis García Álvarez, CFA (@lgarcia1984) March 26, 2018